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This is a book of hope for Africa’s smallholder farmers. It shows how they can earn more 
from their crops and livestock by taking control over the value chains they are part of – 
chains that link them with consumers in Africa’s towns and cities, as well as in other 
countries.
The book describes two basic strategies that groups of farmers can use to improve their 
incomes: vertical and horizontal integration. Vertical integration means taking on 
additional activities in the value chain: processing or grading produce, for example. 
Horizontal integration means becoming more involved in managing the value chain itself 
– by farmers’ improving their access to and management of information, their knowledge 
of the market, their control over contracts, or their cooperation with other actors in the 
chain.
This book contains 19 case studies showing how groups of farmers through out Africa 
have adopted one or both of these strategies to improve their incomes. It shows how 
development organizations have helped them do this – how they have succeeded, and 
how they have sometimes failed. It shows the need to invest in improving the quality of 
existing products, developing new products, establishing market linkages, and building 
farmer organization and capacity.
The book provides numerous insights for those striving to empower smallholder farmers 
to develop markets. It will be of particular interest to government policymakers and staff 
involved in agricultural development, non-government organizations, university faculty 
and students, trainers, evaluators, and donors seeking ways to promote agriculture in 
Africa and elsewhere in the developing world.
The book is written in easy-to-understand language and is richly illustrated with line 
drawings.
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foreword
Millions of sMallholder farMers and indigenous communities in Africa are working to improve their livelihoods in an environment characterized by 
dwindling government support and increased competition between producers, 
processing companies and supermarkets within agricultural markets. How can 
we assist smallholders to cope with these challenges and secure market access and 
better incomes? What strategies can NGOs and business development services 
adopt to support this type of farmers?
This manual brings together a broad range of experiences to secure market ac-
cess for smallholder farmers and indigenous marginalized communities from 
very different contexts from throughout Africa. It shows how vital it is to invest 
in quality improvement of existing products, develop new products, establish 
market linkages, and build farmer organization and capacity. It describes small-
scale initiatives to collect honey from pastoralist communities in Kenya or collect 
and process shea butter in Mali, as well as large-scale initiatives in sugarcane (in 
Tanzania) or paprika (in Malawi). Some experiences are directed to accessing 
local markets, others at gaining access to European markets. It is a book about 
creating opportunities for the poor, and about eliminating bottlenecks to their 
inclusion in dynamic chains. 
We hope that this manual is a useful tool for NGOs and emerging business de-
velopment services and funding agencies to reflect on their roles and improve 
their capacities to provide effective support to such initiatives. The manual also 
documents some experiences that Cordaid as a funding agency has been involved 
in for a number of years. 
Cordaid tries to facilitate new initiatives and innovations by providing grants for 
capacity building and market analysis to business development support organiza-
tions,  like Faida Mali or SNV. We provide institutional and programme support 
to local and international non-government organizations, such as PADO, CRS 
and VECO. Cordaid not only provides grants, but also offers loans to commercial 
companies such as Cheetah in Malawi, Tongu Fruits Company in Ghana, and to 
Highlow in Uganda, to promote investments among smallholders. This mix of 
grants and loans is aimed to ensure that initiatives facilitate the inclusion of poor 
communities into changing markets, while at the same time ensuring long-term 
financial sustainability.  
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The various experiences demonstrate the need for secure planning and for close 
collaboration on the ground between small-scale producers, associations, NGOs, 
companies, banks, funding agencies and technical and research bodies. We 
hope that the production of this manual contributes to the ongoing reflection on 
our work and will help us to become even more effective in our support to the 
poor. 
René Grotenhuis
General Director, Cordaid
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preface
one of the lessons from 50 years of development assistance in sub-Saharan Africa is that matching true interests in a multi-stakeholder environment 
is essential to sustainable development. Over the past decade the ideological 
“Berlin Wall” between civil society organizations and the private sector has been 
effectively brought down. This has created many new opportunities, but also 
new questions regarding the roles, functions and core capacities of the various 
key players. Deep-rooted principles and paradigms have been cut down in a 
short period. It is sometimes like mixing an Italian basketball team with Nigerian 
soccer players, and trying to play in a volleyball tournament. The new situation 
raises many questions about how the game is played, and who are the winners 
and losers. 
In some ways we can think of the world as a giant laboratory where both deliber-
ate experiments and random mutations take place. Every moment, new partners 
meet, explore opportunities and create new ways to cooperate. Some of these 
become successful ventures, while others remain infant initiatives or turn out 
as failures.
Yet science does not recognize failures as such. Einstein confirmed that failures 
contain more information than successes. But practice may be different. In our 
quest for success, we often forget to learn from our mistakes. At the same time, 
we also tend to repeat successes without analysing the underlying principles. 
Success may thus lead to stagnation, because it can cause corporate laziness.
Organizations and enterprises may have their internal learning mechanisms, but 
they rarely share knowledge with each other. They evolve separately, without 
interaction. This is not an optimal process for innovation and development – or 
for developing knowledge and disseminating information on emerging issues 
such as public–private cooperation, value chain development, or management 
of complex multi-stakeholder processes. 
Accelerating learning processes is a skill that few organizations master. IIRR and 
KIT specialize in facilitating organizational and institutional learning. We apply 
a wide variety of skills and techniques that turn implicit “knowing” into explicit 
know-how. By doing so, we can initiate building knowledge. In this process of 
construction each brick counts.
This book is more than a heap of bricks. Relevant cases of chain empowerment 
and development of value chains in Africa are presented, analysed and compared. 
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This collective process that took place in Moshi, Tanzania, has resulted in a set of 
valuable lessons that are original, up-to-date and useful to a wide audience that 
is interested in market access for African farmers. The lessons are not the result 
of academic research, but are drawn from practice and daily reality. They tell 
us stories of the experiments in which organizations – previously unknown to 
one other – work together to realize a collective goal. Above all, these are stories 
about human interaction. Value chains are about linkages between actors who 
transfer or exchange goods, capital or knowledge. In that respect, they are also 
trading places of culture, values, and personalities. If these match, we observe 
that there is trust or “chemistry”.
The quest for good practice and lessons from value chain development is an 
exploration of human behaviour. This book is a stepping-stone towards a better 
mutual understanding, between people of various backgrounds, be it farmers, 
entrepreneurs, civil society representatives, economists, etc. The contributors to 
this book are very diverse, but by taking up complementary roles and functions 
and focusing on a collective goal, they have succeeded in producing a valuable 
output. In this sense they have become a good example of a successful value 
chain themselves.
Bart de Steenhuijsen Piters
Area leader, Sustainable Economic Development
KIT – Royal Tropical Institute
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Setting	the	scene
Rapid changes in the social and economic environment are challenging Afri-can smallholders to supply their products to the market and their ability to 
improve their families’ livelihoods. These changes include:
•	 Market liberalization and integration
•	 The rise of the retail sector
•	 The decline of government support for and intervention in agriculture and 
rural areas.
Market	liberalization	and	integration
Over the past 20 years, new trading policies have liberalized and integrated mar-
kets. Some farmers have benefited. But many farmers in developing countries have 
seen their incomes fall. Their terms of trade (the price of what they sell compared 
to what they buy) have declined steadily as prices of agricultural commodities 
have fallen compared with manufactures. 
The integration of world markets, or “globalization”, has formed closed supply 
networks. Buyers and sellers sign contracts to produce and trade a wide range 
of specialized products. For example, a buyer may want to purchase a specific 
variety of pineapples, grown to strict specifications and packaged in a certain 
way. The buyer may negotiate a contract directly with a grower, rather than 
buying through a trader. 
This new organization of supply chains is unfamiliar territory for many African 
smallholders. It is very different from the conventional, arm’s-length trade in 
undifferentiated commodities such as maize or wheat, which may involve many 
intermediaries, and where the buyer may not know who the producer is.
It is accompanied by a market concentration, with a small number of powerful 
transnational companies dominating large parts of the agrifood system. Small-
scale producers and processors have little market power in comparison. 
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The	rise	of	processors	and	retailers
The rise of the food processing and retail sectors has compounded this market 
concentration. Buying power is now concentrated in the hands of a small number 
of food processing firms and supermarkets that have significant power over 
producers and other actors in the supply chain. 
This trend is not just true of the developed world. In Africa too, supermarket 
chains such as Shoprite, Uchumi and Nakumatt are coming to dominate food 
retailing. Supermarkets account for 30% of the food retail trade in Kenya, and 
55% in South Africa (FAO 2003).
The supermarkets enforce exacting standards for the produce they buy. They 
want their beans to be a uniform length, their mangoes to ripen at exactly the 
right time, and their bananas to be free of bruises. They have developed new 
private standards and rules, and have created certification and auditing systems 
to make sure they get the product they want. 
These rules enable the supermarkets to sell what consumers want – and to be 
left with as little unsaleable produce at the end of the day. The supermarkets 
pay growers attractive prices to ensure they get produce of the right quality. But 
the rules are hard for smallholder farmers to comply with: they lack the right 
technology and management skills. So smallholders are being squeezed out of 
a lucrative market.
Declining	government	involvement	in	
agriculture	and	rural	areas
Structural adjustment programmes have meant that developing country gov-
ernments have significantly reduced their support to farming communities. In-
vestments in rural infrastructure (roads, electricity, telecommunications), input 
subsidies, marketing schemes, and services such as extension and research have 
all declined. In the past, most African governments provided services to farm-
ers and rural areas through commodity marketing boards and state-supported 
cooperative movements. The decline of these institutions has hampered economic 
development as well as farmers’ access to local markets. 
For development to take place, various actors in the supply chain must invest in a 
coordinated way (Stockbridge et al. 2003). For example, government investments 
in rural infrastructure are profitable if farm organizations also invest in increased 
production, local businesses invest in processing and distribution, service provid-
ers invest in new technology, and so on. If these complementary efforts are not 
well coordinated, an equilibrium of underdevelopment may occur (Hoff 2001).
As a result of these changes, the majority of smallholder farmers in developing 
countries are now less organized than before. They are trying to increase their 
production in the face of reduced inputs and declining prices. This increases the 
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supply of low-quality goods onto the market, which further suppresses prices. 
This situation is “Cochran’s treadmill” (Cochran 1979): more farmers supply 
more products into a market where prices are steadily falling, natural resources 
are being degraded and poorly managed farming systems are spreading into 
increasingly marginal areas.
The	challenge	for	smallholder	
producers
To address this situation, development agencies, donors and NGOs are placing 
more emphasis on enabling farmers to increase their level of competitiveness, to 
produce for an identified market, rather than trying to sell what they have already 
produced and also seeking new market opportunities that offer higher levels of 
income. These goals can be achieved through better economic coordination and 
institutions. Farmer organizations can play a key role of organizing economic 
activities beyond local boundaries. They can build up relationships with vari-
ous chain actors and create commitments from various actors to cooperate on 
mutually beneficial actions and investments and thus create value chains (see 
box below). 
It is a challenge for smallholder farmers, through their organizations, to under-
stand market demand and develop their skills and capital requirements to supply 
the required volumes of quality product at the right time of the season.
•	 Market information A group finds it easier than individual farmers to ob-
tain the information that members need to grow for a particular market. At 
the same time, other chain actors find it more attractive to deal with a group 
than with numerous small-scale producers.
•	 Capital and skills The group can pool their resources, access credit and 
services to develop the technology and skills needed to produce more sophis-
Actors, supply chains and value chains
Actors are those involved in producing, processing, trading or consuming a particular 
agricultural product. They include direct actors which are commercially involved in the 
chain (producers, traders, retailers, consumers) and indirect actors which provide financial 
or non-financial support services, such as bankers and credit agencies, business service 
providers, government, researchers and extensionists.
A supply chain is a set of linkages between actors where there are no binding or sought-after 
formal or informal relationships, except when the goods, services and financial agreements 
are actually transacted. 
A value chain is a specific type of supply chain – one where the actors actively seek to 
support each other so they can increase their efficiency and competitiveness. They invest 
time, effort and money, and build relationships with other actors to reach a common goal of 
satisfying consumer needs – so they can increase their profits.
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ticated products. A group is more able than an individual to take risks.
•	 Volume The group can grow enough produce to meet a buyer’s volume 
requirements. The buyer can deal with the group as a whole rather than with 
individual farmers.
•	 Quality A group can set rules specifying quality standards, and can appoint 
members to enforce them. The group can access extension and marketing 
advice that would be impractical to provide to individual farmers. And it is 
worthwhile paying for certification and inspection procedures so the group 
can sell produce to high-value export markets.
•	 Consistency of supply A group finds it easier than an individual to ensure 
a consistent supply of produce in terms of volume and quality. Group mem-
bers can organize among themselves to grow crops that mature at staggered 
times, so ensuring a continuous supply for the buyer. They can pool their 
resources (or get credit) to acquire the technology they need to force flowering 
or fruiting, invest in irrigation so they can grow off-season crops, or to store 
produce. They can also buy produce from other farmers to cover shortfalls 
in their own production.
Principles	of	empowering	smallholders
Empowerment is vital for sustainability. Confronted by short project timeframes 
and limited funding, development organizations often make the mistake of trying 
to intervene too much – for example, by taking over management of the chain, 
rather than enabling the farmers’ organization (or other players) to do it them-
selves. When the project finishes and the development organization withdraws, 
the value chain is left without a key link, so it collapses.
Intermediary organizations should aim instead to support farmer organizations 
to strengthen their capacity to manage chains or chain activities. They should 
embrace the following principles before engaging smallholders in a value-chain 
development process. This may help ensure that interventions target develop-
ment objectives such as equity, gender, sustainable development, and poverty 
reduction.
Sustainable	businesses	
Successful intervention in a chain involves promoting sustainable business mod-
els. This means that the various actors in the chain must all be able to make a 
sufficient profit. After an initial period of assistance, each of the actors in the chain 
must be able to act on their own, without continuing long-term outside subsidies 
or other forms of support. A business model that does not generate sufficient 
profit on a sustainable basis for each of the actors, or that relies on continuous 
outside support, is doomed to fail in the long term.
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Equity
Equity means ensuring that the economic gains in value chains are fairly distrib-
uted among the various actors. It is necessary to take into consideration aspects 
such as return on investments and the bargaining power of the various actors. 
Returns should be proportionate to the level of effort and risk that the actors as-
sume. Smallholder farmers should be treated as rational business people who 
require empowerment to be able to negotiate a higher economic return. 
Inclusion	and	exclusion
Value chain development should not be seen as a social policy to include every-
one. It is targeted at particular players – those who have the potential to generate 
wealth by producing and processing specific products that the market demands. 
Inclusion – and exclusion – are a necessary part of such a “game”. Smallholders 
must be able to meet market conditions if they are to become players in this game. 
Not everyone can grow a particular specialist crop (that would merely flood the 
market). Not all farmers will have the right type of soils, own enough land, have 
land near enough to a road, or possess the necessary skills to grow a certain crop. 
They may not be able to organize themselves into groups, and they may not be 
interested in doing so.
Value chains and the Millennium Development Goals
Donors support the value chain approach because they recognize that to reduce poverty 
and to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, the livelihood issues of the world’s rural 
poor must be addressed. Many donors have shifted their attention towards private-sector 
implementation of programmes, market-based allocation of resources, and public–private 
partnerships.
A value chain approach supports several of the Millennium Development Goals:
MDG 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger  Strengthening the capacity of smallholder 
farmers to develop markets increases their share of the value chain and thus improves their 
livelihoods. Also, it helps them indirectly, by generating employment and creating wealth in 
rural communities and in the larger economy that can trickle down to the very poor. 
MDG 3: Promote gender equality and empower women The majority of farmers are 
women, though they are typically under-represented in farmer organizations and are poorly 
served by extension and other services. Value chain interventions typically mainstream 
gender issues, or include a strong gender component.
MDG 4: Reduce child mortality Reducing child mortality depends on access to nutritious 
food, which a value chain strategy can increase.
MDG 7: Ensure environmental sustainability Rural people are custodians of much of the 
world’s land and water resources and biodiversity. They are central to achieving this goal.
MDG 8: Develop a global partnership for development Improved market access (es-
pecially international trade in agriculture, which remains highly protected) depends directly 
or indirectly on pro-poor agricultural growth.
More information on the Millennium Development Goals: United Nations 2005
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That does not mean that development agencies should focus on the more fortunate 
members of society, a “chosen few”, and ignore the rest. That would reinforce 
the divisions in society rather than helping create broad-based opportunities 
(see Pro-poor value chain development below). Rather, it means that strategies to 
promote inclusion should focus on building the farmers’ organizational and 
management skills and supporting farmers to realize where and how they can 
sustain a profitable business. 
Gender	responsiveness
Although women do the majority of farm work in Africa, they are relatively poorly 
served by development agencies. There is a danger that women and other vulner-
able groups are excluded by default from new, potentially profitable opportuni-
ties. It is a challenge to overcome the inherent gender biases in society, culture 
and organizations. Steps are needed to ensure that women and other vulnerable 
groups (such as young people, elderly people, and people living with HIV/AIDS) 
are given the opportunity to participate in and contribute to such initiatives. Ide-
ally, interventions should provide opportunities for various segments in society: 
men and women, young and old, privileged and underprivileged. 
1 Highest wealth 
quartile 
Most innovative, most 
educated and articu-
late; includes leaders 
and people with most 
skills
This group generally 
benefits most from social 
support programmes, is 
most interested in new 
ideas and ready to take 
on new risks
2 Incremental 
asset building
Social mobility depend-
ent on local economic 
growth
Can follow the first 
group, but are generally 
not leaders
3 Lower asset 
group
Precarious in terms of 
their ability to keep the 
assets they gain
Seeking change but less 
able to control their as-
sets and options
4 Poorest of the 
poor, declining 
assets
Poorly educated, low 
assets, marginal areas, 
landless, often receiv-
ing food aid/remit-
tances 
Number of this group in 
a community depends on 
distance to market, local 
economy, degree of inte-
gration with mainstream 
economic processes, 
shocks and opportunities
Wealth categories within a rural community
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Specific interventions to support the needs of disadvantaged groups are often ap-
propriate. Such groups typically have limited access to and control over resources, 
so are less likely to benefit from new opportunities. The intermediary organiza-
tion should check which groups (in terms of wealth, sex, age, etc.) control what 
resources. This will help them understand how decisions are made at household 
level – for example, how are decisions made on what crops to produce, when to 
sell, and what to grow for the family’s own consumption? Understanding this 
will enable interventions to be designed and targeted properly.
Social	responsibility
Promoting value chains often involves difficult issues of social responsibility. For 
example, many farmers think that children are the best pollinators of crops such 
as vanilla. During pollination season, they may take their children out of school 
for weeks or months so they can work on the farm. The family may earn more 
money, but at the price of poorer education for the children. So should develop-
ment agencies promote vanilla? This is not just an issue for NGOs and government 
agencies, but also for private firms engaged in value chains. Irrespective of the 
size of the enterprise, they should pursue a socially responsible agenda. 
Pro-poor	value	chain	development
How can value chain development be targeted to help the poor? 
By default, most development programmes benefit the better-off people in a 
community. These are the most innovative, better educated, upwardly mobile 
people, who are generally more confident and interested to take on new risks 
(see the figure on the previous page). Interventions targeted towards them risk 
merely helping those who least need it. 
Vulnerable households – those headed by women, or the families of AIDS victims, 
for example – may find it difficult to grasp new market opportunities. Even if 
they have the information they would need, other constraints may prevent them 
from benefiting, such as limited access to credit, natural resources or social capital. 
The poor generally lack a cushion that enables them to take on risk – and risk is 
inherent in business. 
This means that if the goal of the intervention is general economic development, 
a lack of targeting is likely to select the best-off people in the community. This 
is particularly true for interventions that include a lot of risk. But if the aim is 
to specifically support the poorest, then the approach will need to target groups 
based on their ability to save or ability to deal with exposure to risk.
Designing supply chain interventions so they benefit vulnerable groups poses a 
considerable challenge for development organizations. It is necessary to identify 
beneficiaries who are likely to be able to benefit from a supply chain approach. 
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Efforts will be needed to build the group’s livelihood assets and strengthen their 
capacity to manage the chain or chain activities.
The ability of communities to respond to development interventions depends on 
a number of factors. These include:
•	 The farmers’ access to capital assets: economic/financial capital, physical 
capital (such as infrastructure), natural resources (land, soil, water), human 
capital (skills, education, labour), and social capital (ability to organize, links 
with outsiders, etc.).
•	 The level of social integration of the community. Some groups are relatively 
isolated (e.g., forest dwellers, pastoralists and ethnic minorities), while other 
communities are in regular contact with urban centres and have strong social 
and economic ties with influential outsiders.
•	 The stability of the environment where the community lives. Has the com-
munity been exposed to security problems such as civil war or ethnic conflict? 
Is it recovering from a disaster, or has it been exposed to economic shocks? Is 
it subject to chronic emergencies, such as repeated drought, disease or political 
discrimination?
Purpose	and	readership	of	this	book
Markets play an increasingly important role in the lives of even the most remote 
economic actors. This book describes how marketing strategies can help groups 
of smallholders analyse their position in the supply chain, and develop and take 
advantage of supply chains to improve their incomes and livelihoods. It illustrates 
how service providers can assist and empower rural and peri-urban communi-
ties to identify market opportunities, improve supply chain management skills, 
increase their competitiveness and diversify into alternative and higher value 
products. 
The approach takes a “value chain” perspective that strengthens business linkages 
between producer groups, service providers and other actors such as processors 
and importers, rather than focusing only on on-farm interventions. The book pro-
vides case studies on how intermediary organizations have empowered farmer 
organizations to develop markets. The lessons drawn from these case studies will 
serve the various intermediary organizations and enhance their performance to 
facilitate market access for smallholder farmers. 
The book is intended mainly for use by organizations interested in empowering 
smallholder farmers to develop markets. It is specifically aimed at those involved 
in project design and implementation, building staff capacity in market facilita-
tion, and project evaluation. They may include the following:
•	 Extension workers: individuals or institutions providing agricultural exten-
sion services, particularly those involved in market linkages practices.
•	 NGOs, national farmers’ associations, and other organizations that provide 
market linkage services.
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•	 Training institutions at all levels, especially farmer training colleges.
•	 Ministry of Agriculture staff and other development workers.
•	 Private sector actors involved in inputs, extension, business planning, finance, 
market facilitation, storage, etc.
•	 Research organizations promoting market linkage methods, especially na-
tional agricultural research organizations.
•	 Policy makers and donor organizations. 
These organizations and individuals inevitably have different perspectives, but 
they all have a common interest: developing the ability of farmers to produce 
and sell a product that consumers want, on a reliable basis. 
The interest of development agencies and NGOs in this is obvious: they have a 
development agenda to increase the income and wellbeing of the poor. Respon-
sible firms in the private sector have a similar interest: in order to supply their 
customers with a quality product at a reasonable price, they need to develop 
stable, long-term relationships with producers and processors. They therefore 
have a major interest in supporting the development of farmer groups, helping 
them organize, educating them to produce the desired product, and ensuring 
that they approach the market in a businesslike way.
Development organizations can help this process in various ways (see Chapters 
7 and 8):
•	 They can initiate or facilitate the process as a neutral outsider.
•	 They can act as trainers or coaches to strengthen the capacity of farmers’ 
organizations to manage chains.
•	 They can act as information and knowledge brokers to facilitate understand-
ing of the value chain and provide information about innovations.
Success is not easy. It may require considerable amounts of effort, perseverance, 
and support from outsiders. If the efforts are to be sustainable, the farmers and 
supply chain actors must be able to understand the market and respond to its 
many, constant changes in a timely, effective way. 
Parts	of	the	book
The remaining chapters in this book focus on the concept of value chains and 
how to improve them.
Chapter 2, Introducing value chains, describes a framework for analysing the 
farmers’ position in a value chain, and for making strategic decisions on how to 
help them improve it. It presents four roles that farmers may play in the chain.
Chapters 3–6 present cases describing how groups of farmers have improved 
their position in the chain, either by improving how they perform the role, or by 
taking on new roles. These chapters also describe the role of the intermediary 
organization in helping them to do this. 
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Chapter 3, Chain actors,  describes how three groups of producers improved their 
position as chain actors by improving their production techniques and finding 
markets for their produce. 
Chapter 4, Chain partners, tells how various groups have been able to take on 
more management roles in the chain, so becoming chain partners. 
Chapter 5, Chain activity integrators, shows how farmers’ groups shifted from 
being chain actors to chain activity integrators by adding value to their produce, 
for example by processing it. 
 Chapter 6, Chain co-owners, describes how farmers have become chain co-own-
ers through a combination of increasing the types of activities they perform, as 
well as increasing their ability to manage the chain itself.
Chapter 7, Strategies for chain empowerment, distils lessons from these cases. It 
describes the strategies that the intermediary organization can use to help farmers 
improve their position in the chain.
Chapter 8, Facilitating chain development, describes the various roles that the 
intermediary organization may consider playing in promoting value chains.
Chapter 9, Resources, gives a brief overview of various tools that intermediary 
organizations can use in analysing and facilitating the development of value 
chains. It also lists relevant resource materials and provides details on the con-
tributors to this book.
How	this	book	was	prepared
This manual is part of wider efforts to promote pro-poor access to markets in 
Africa. It is designed to reflect the experiences and views of many organizations 
working with pro-poor supply chains. The book was developed with a range of 
partners (see pages xiv–xvi) with experience in assisting farmers develop markets 
for their produce. 
The idea for this book began with a report produced by KIT and Faida MaLi in 
2004 on the role of Dutch farmers in Tanzania’s rural economic development 
(Verkuijl and Masao 2004). This examined the contribution of Dutch enterprises to 
local economic development by creating employment opportunities and transfer-
ring knowledge of sustainable production systems, improved labour standards 
or food-quality and safety standards. One of the report’s recommendations was 
to capitalize on Faida’s and KIT’s experiences in securing smallholders’ access to 
markets. Therefore, a “writeshop” was proposed in 2005 to learn and disseminate 
the experiences of various organizations on this topic.
In April 2005, KIT and Faida MaLi met with the International Institute for Rural 
Reconstruction (IIRR), which has extensive experience in facilitating writeshops. 
IIRR recommended starting with a preparatory workshop with key stakehold-
ers that would allow the participants to agree on the content, scope and target 
audience of the manuscripts. Such a preparatory workshop was held in Arusha, 
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Tanzania, on 16–17 March 2005, with participants from Faida MaLi, FAO, KIT, 
Matchmakers Associates, SNV and the University of Florida.
KIT facilitated the conceptual learning process, played an overall technical role 
and raised funds. Faida MaLi organized the logistics and shared its experi-
ence, and IIRR advised on the overall process, assembled the technical team, 
facilitated the writeshop and took charge of the book editing and printing. KIT 
funded the preparatory workshop, while Cordaid and CTA funded the writeshop 
itself. Others like SNV, FAO and CIAT contributed by supporting the participa-
tion of their staff.
The	Moshi	writeshop
An intensive, 6-day writeshop was held in Moshi, at the foot of Mt. Kilimanjaro 
in Tanzania, on 24–30 October 2005. The contributors brought manuscripts with 
them, along with other printed materials, and photographs relevant to the subject. 
A total of 38 representatives from local, regional and international NGOs, United 
Nations organizations and international research centres, together with staff of 
KIT, IIRR and Faida MaLi, participated in the writeshop. 
Each of the participants was asked to prepare a brief paper describing a particular 
case they had been involved in. Each case focused on how a particular group of 
farmers had, with the assistance of an intermediary organization, developed a 
supply chain or improved their position within it. The participants brought these 
manuscripts with them to the writeshop. 
The writeshop began with a presentation of a framework describing different 
ways that farmers can participate in a supply chain – as chain actor, chain partner, 
chain activity integrator, or chain co-owner. This framework facilitates a strate-
gic understanding of interventions to integrate small-scale farmers in the chain. 
Substantially modified as a result of comments made during the writeshop, it 
forms the basis of Chapter 2 in this book.
The participants then split into two groups, each discussing half of the case stud-
ies that had been prepared. Each participant presented his or her case study; the 
other participants commented on the drafts, asked questions, and suggested ad-
ditions or changes. The participants then revised their drafts with the assistance 
of a team of editors and resource persons. Artists drew illustrations to accom-
pany the text. The participants then presented their revised drafts to the group 
a second time, along with the illustrations, which allowed other participants to 
make further suggestions. The editors and artists again helped revise the text and 
illustrations. The groups were fairly fluid: individual participants and resource 
persons were able to move from group to group, so contributing to the drafting 
of more than one chapter.
By the end of the writeshop, the participants had completed drafts that fitted into 
the four typologies of the framework (chain actor, partner, activity integrator and 
co-owner). These cases form the bulk of the book – Chapters 3 to 6.
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Also during the writeshop, the participants divided into four smaller groups, each 
of which synthesized the case studies on one of the typologies, and discussed 
the strategies appropriate to that typology. This resulted in Chapter 7. The draft 
of this chapter was also presented to the plenary, and participants were able to 
provide comments and suggestions on the text.
After the writeshop, considerable restructuring and rewriting were necessary to 
eliminate overlap among the various chapters and to ensure the style was clear 
and consistent. The chief editor in collaboration with the representatives of KIT 
and Faida MaLi were responsible for finalizing the book.
Throughout the writeshop process, the initial manuscripts were revised substan-
tially or were completely rewritten. The information they contained was selected, 
sifted, and combined with ideas from other sources, and was distributed through-
out the book. A single section in the book may contain information provided by 
many different participants. This means it is not possible to label a particular 
chapter or section as the work of a particular participant. The “authors” and 
resource persons of the book are thus the contributors listed on pages xv–xvi.
Writeshop	advantages
The sequence described above is an adaptation of the writeshop approach 
pioneered by IIRR at its headquarters in the Philippines. IIRR–Africa has used 
this approach to produce extension and information materials on a wide range 
of subjects. Writeshops have several advantages over conventional methods 
of producing a publication. They speed up the production process, taking full 
advantage of the participants’ range of expertise. The process of writing, getting 
comments, revising and illustrating takes place at the same time, considerably 
shortening the often-difficult process of writing, editing and publishing. A large 
number of participants contribute to each topic: in effect, the writeshop provides 
an opportunity for technical peer review by a large number of reviewers, as 
well as pre-testing for understandability and field relevance by a group of the 
intended readers. 
In addition, writeshops bring together a large number of people from various 
institutions and walks of life, each with different perspectives and expertise. They 
are an excellent training and networking opportunity, with individuals learning 
about each other’s work and exchanging ideas and experiences that will be of 
value for them when they return home. It is hoped that the relationships and 
networks forged during the writeshop will continue long into the future.
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Zahina grows pineapples on part of her 3 ha farm in Bagamoyo district in the Coast Region in eastern Tanzania. She plants shoots on her farm at the be-
ginning of the rainy season, and applies a spoonful of fertilizer near each plant. 
She weeds her field a few weeks after planting to make sure that weeds do not 
smother the young plants. She watches anxiously as the flowers appear and then 
the fruits begin to swell in the centre of the spiky crown of leaves. When the fruit 
is ready for harvest, she hires several young men in the neighbourhood to harvest 
the fruit by hand and carry it to the road. The young men load Zahina’s fruit onto 
a lorry owned by the producers’ association she is a member of. The lorry takes 
the fruit to the association’s grading station, where it is weighed, graded, sorted 
and packed into boxes for shipment. The association pays Zahina for her produce 
– enough to buy several sacks of maize for her family. 
Simone is a Brazilian tourist staying at a beach resort on the island of Zanzibar. 
Each morning, the hotel serves its guests with fresh pineapple for breakfast. 
Simone does not know it, but the fruit she is eating this morning was grown by 
Zahina. The previous day, the hotel received a consignment of fruit from its sup-
plier in town. The supplier buys from a trader who has a contract with Zahina’s 
association for a regular supply of fresh pineapples. 
Zahina and Simone* are at opposite ends of a value chain. Between them is a 
long chain of activities: planting, pest and disease control, harvesting, sorting, 
grading, packaging, transport, shipping and storage. Each of these activities has 
to be carried out in the right way, at the right time. If not, the pineapples will 
not be in tip-top condition when they arrive at the hotel, and the hotel manager 
will cancel the contract with the supplier and arrange to serve mangoes or wa-
termelon instead.
* Zahina and Simone are hypothetical. Except where stated, everyone else named in this book is real.
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Each of the links in the chain involves a different set of actors: input suppliers, 
farmers such as Zahina, labourers who harvest the crop, the association’s workers 
who sort and pack it, the trader who buys the fruit and sells it to the hotel’s sup-
plier, the shipping firm that ferries it across to the island, the supplier who brings 
a van load of fresh produce to the hotel each day, and the hotel’s management 
and staff who prepare breakfast each morning for the hotel guests.
Supply	chains
We are all part of a supply chain. In fact, as consumers, we are all part of innumer-
able chains – of fruit and vegetables, grains and oils, textiles and cosmetics – that 
stretch from the producers in far-flung corners of the globe, all the way to our 
kitchens, dinner tables, wardrobes and bathrooms. At one end are the producers 
– the farmers who grow the crops and raise the animals. At the other end are con-
sumers, who eat, drink and wear the final products. In the middle are hundreds 
and thousands of individuals and firms, each performing one small step in the 
chain: transporting, processing, storing, selling, buying, packaging, checking, 
monitoring, making decisions. Other players also have a key role: the banks that 
provide loans and arrange payments, the government that sets regulations and 
determines policy, information brokers who keep the market players informed 
about prices and quantities, and so on.
At each stage in the chain, the value of the product goes up. The same pineapple 
that Zahina sold for €0.10 may cost the hotel €2.00 or more in Zanzibar. The value 
of the product goes up because the product becomes more convenient for the 
consumer – after all, Simone does not want to have to travel to Bagamoyo just to 
eat pineapple for breakfast. The product may also be transformed or processed 
in various ways: the pineapple may be peeled and sliced, diced and canned, or 
turned into jam, cakes or juice, before it is consumed.
The same is true for other crops. For example, if a farmer dries and husks her 
maize, she will be able to sell it at a higher price than maize that is still on the cob. 
If she grinds it to make flour, she can sell it at a still higher price. This processing 
may help preserve the product (enabling her to sell it at a later date when the 
price is higher), make the product more attractive for the buyer (sorted, graded 
produce fetches a higher price than ungraded), or enable her to sell to a different 
buyer (a baker rather than a miller).
Costs are also incurred at each stage in the chain. Zahina has to buy fertilizer and 
pay the young men who harvest her pineapples. The producers’ association has 
to employ staff and pay for its operations. The trader has to cover the costs of 
transport, crating, shipping and storage. The supplier in Zanzibar has to pay for 
its office and staff costs, as well as the salary of the van driver who delivers the 
pineapples to the hotel. The hotel must pay salaries of the restaurant staff who 
peel the fruit and serve it to Simone for breakfast.
Losses also occur: despite all the best efforts of everyone in the chain, some of 
the fruit may spoil before it is sold. And each actor in the chain must also cover 
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their risks and make a profit – otherwise they would not want to be involved in 
the pineapple business.
Some people benefit more than others from being part of a supply chain. Indi-
viduals and firms can grow rich if they can exploit advantages in the chain. For 
example, a trader who has the only truck in an area can buy from farmers at 
rock-bottom prices, then sell at a high mark-up in the nearby town. Supermarkets 
or processors are often powerful players that can dictate terms to their suppliers 
and force down prices.
Farmers are often at a disadvantage in such chains. Many farmers grow crops or 
raise animals on an individual basis, so they have little bargaining power vis-a-
vis traders or input suppliers. They often lack market information – so they may 
not know how much their produce is really worth, and how much more they 
might earn if they were to transport it to the nearby town rather than sell to the 
trader who arrives at the farm gate in a truck. They are often involved only in 
producing the crop or animal, and not in processing it to add value. They lack 
an understanding of the market: they do not know who the other players in the 
market are, what happens to their produce after they sell it, or what types of 
products consumers want. They do not control the terms on which they partici-
pate in the chain.
This is particularly true for smallholder farmers in Africa. They often live in remote 
areas, far from good roads and markets. The physical environment may be dif-
ficult: rainfall may be erratic, soils poor, and crops and livestock may be attacked 
by pests and diseases. Rural areas in Africa are poorly served by infrastructure 
such as electricity and telecommunications. Smallholder farmers usually lack the 
capital to invest in irrigation, equipment, inputs or marketing. They have limited 
access to information about prices, quality standards and other market-related 
information. All these factors make it especially difficult for African farmers to 
benefit from the chains they are involved in. 
But it does not have to be so. Smallholder farmers in Africa can benefit from their 
supply chains in several different ways. They can do more of the activities in the 
chain – for example, they may process their product before selling it. And they 
can take more control over the management of the chain itself – for example, by 
negotiating better prices and terms of trade, seeking new markets, and control-
ling product quality. 
Supply	chains	vs	value	chains
One of the key differences between Zahina and millions of other farmers around 
the world is that she and other members of her producers’ association are part 
of a value chain. 
Other farmers grow their produce and sell it to the highest bidder – or more often, 
at a pitifully low price to a single trader who comes by with a lorry at harvest 
time. They grow the same crops as everyone else in their area, they all plant and 
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Export vs local consumption
The example at the beginning of this chapter is of an African farmer who is part of a value 
chain that ends in a luxury hotel in another part of the same country. The hotel pays a 
premium price for a reliable, high-quality product. Such value chains are still a small part 
of the total market in Africa. 
Exports are increasingly important for African farmers as Africa becomes integrated into 
the world trading system. Africa is increasingly supplying farm produce to foreign markets: 
cut flowers grown in Kenya are flown daily to Amsterdam’s flower auctions; Ethiopia and 
Kenya export large numbers of cattle, sheep and goats to the Middle East; farmers in Mali 
and Burkina Faso produce shea butter that is sent to Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, as well as 
to the chocolate and cosmetic industries in Europe.
Consumers in developed countries like to buy produce that appears in top condition: fruits 
must be free of blemishes; vegetables must have a uniform size, shape and colour; produce 
must be fresh and attractively packaged.
In addition, developed countries impose stringent quality standards on imported produce. The 
produce must pass phytosanitary hurdles, be free of pesticide residues, have no disease and 
mould, and so on. It must be traceable to its origin. If a single consignment of produce violates 
these requirements, importing firms may refuse to buy from that supplier, and the importing 
country may ban imports of that type of produce from an entire exporting country.
But most chains are more local in scope. The Kenyan farmer who supplies vegetables to 
the local Uchumi supermarket has a much shorter chain. The Malian farmer who sells her 
tomatoes at the village market is also part of a chain: one that links her with her friends and 
neighbours, who are also her customers.
These local chains are usually a lot less stringent than export markets. It is possible to sell 
produce on the local market that cannot be exported. Quality is lower, and so are prices. 
But consumers in Africa’s cities are becoming fussier. The customer in a Nairobi supermarket 
may be as choosy as one in Paris or New York. This poses new challenges, as well as new 
opportunities, for Africa’s farmers. They are ideally placed to supply local high-quality markets. 
The question is, how can they upgrade their product and activities so they can do so?
Complex chains
Many chains are much more complex than the pineapple example at the beginning of this 
chapter. Pineapples themselves can end up in various different forms: sliced or diced in 
cans, as juice in bottles, or in cakes and jam. A product such as vanilla may be sold to con-
sumers as dried beans or as powder, and in bulk as powder to ice cream makers, bakers, 
chocolatiers and confectioners. Paprika may be sold fresh or dried, or as an ingredient in a 
thousand different types of packaged food, from chilli sauce to dried soup. So rather than 
single lines, chains may in fact look more like a tree with many branches – with each branch 
representing a particular end-product.
These complex chains offer a multitude of choice to farmers. They may choose to supply 
a specific market segment, and produce the crop or animal that is tailored to that segment. 
They may also try to process their produce to add value to it: they may dry chillies rather 
than selling them fresh, or they may make shea butter rather than selling the unprocessed 
nuts.
Farmers need to understand the players in the chain and the requirements of the different 
branches so they can supply the product which that branch requires. That will increase their 
bargaining power in the chain, and improve the price they get for their product.
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harvest at the same time, and they all have to sell at rock-bottom prices. They do 
not check what specialist crops the market might want, and if they have a perma-
nent relationship with a trader, it is based on mutual suspicion rather than trust. 
The farmers might sign a contract with a buyer to supply produce at a certain 
price – but they readily sell to another buyer who offers a higher price at harvest 
time. The original buyer is understandably reluctant to deal with people who 
break agreements so readily. This supply chain functions – but not very well: the 
farmers make little money and have no incentive to improve their product, and 
the traders face a great deal of risk and can buy only low-quality produce.
Zahina and her friends are different. Their association has negotiated a deal with 
a trader who buys a certain amount of high-quality fruit each week. The trader 
in turn has a contract with the hotel’s supplier. This is a value chain: each of the 
actors in this chain is prepared to invest in the chain, and to support the other 
actors, to make sure that it functions smoothly. This makes sense for them all: 
all of them benefit from having a smooth supply of top-quality fruit arriving on 
Simone’s breakfast table. 
This book describes how intermediary organizations can work with farmers’ 
groups and other actors to convert supply chains into value chains.
Strategies	for	chain	development	with	
small-scale	farmers
The day-to-day work of supporting the integration of small-scale farmers into 
supply chains is very practical: it may involve identifying a buyer, solving a qual-
ity problem, or improving packaging. But behind these practicalities are more 
strategic issues. How should the supply chain be designed? Who should do what 
task? Who should have what skills and capacities? Where should the power lie? 
What should organizational and institutional arrangements look like?
This section presents a model to help you think about this in a strategic way. It 
presents a framework that distinguishes four basic forms of small-scale farmer 
participation in supply chains. Each of these roles requires different intervention 
strategies by the intermediary organization.
Small-scale farmers can participate in value chains in many different ways. These 
types of participation can be summarized into two broad dimensions: 
• The types of activities that farmers undertake in the chain
• The involvement of the farmer in the management of the chain.
Activities	farmers	undertake	in	the	chain
Farmers may concern themselves only with production: they prepare the land, 
plant the seeds, apply fertilizer, control pests and weeds, and harvest the crop 
when it is mature. But they may also be involved in other activities – for example, 
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procuring inputs, drying their crop, sorting and grading, processing, transporting 
and trading. These are the chain activities. Being involved in various activities 
in the chain is known as vertical integration. 
We can plot farmers’ level of involvement in the chain on a line (see the figure 
below).
Farmers’	involvement	in	chain	management
Farmers may be excluded from any decision making about issues that affect them 
– even over what crops they grow or what animals they raise. Someone else may 
make these decisions – then inform the farmers. Or the farmers may have a high 
degree of control over management: they may be able to decide how much they 
sell, to whom and at what price. They may control the terms of payment, the 
definition of grades and standards, the targeting of consumers, the management 
of innovation, and so on. We can think of these aspects as chain management.
We can also plot farmers’ degree of involvement in the management of the chain 
on a line (see the figure below).
What activities in the chain do the farmers do?
Farmers involved in a 
wide range of activities 
in the chain, including 
production
Farmers involved only 
in production
Farmers do many  
chain activities
Farmers specialized  
in production
Who determines the conditions under which these activities are done?
Farmers 
participate in 
chain manage-
ment
Farmers do 
not participate 
in chain  
management
Farmers 
manage many 
aspects of the 
value chain
Farmers not 
involved in 
managing the 
chain
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If we combine these two diagrams we get a matrix (see the figure above). Farmers 
may be located anywhere on this matrix. Here are some examples:
• Aisha* keeps a herd of goats in arid northern Kenya. Every few months, she 
sells a few goats to a trader who visits her village. The trader dictates the price 
he pays, and she has no choice but to accept. We call her a chain actor, because 
she engages only in farming and has no influence over the management of 
the chain. Farmers in conventional contract farming schemes are also chain 
actors.
• Pius grows maize on his small farm in western Kenya. He harvests and dries 
his grain, then mills it into flour before selling it a trader who visits his village 
after harvest. We call Pius a chain activity integrator because he has moved 
from farming into other activities in the chain, yet without exerting more 
influence on the management of the chain. Chain activity integrators may be 
organized into groups (such as marketing coops) to buy inputs, process or 
market produce, but they have no managerial control over the chain because 
they are not involved in quality management, consumer targeting, or proac-
tive innovation. 
Chain
(co-)owner
(Ato Imito)
Chain 
partner
(Zahina)
Farmers do many  
chain activities
Farmers specialized  
in production
Farmers 
participate 
in chain 
manage-
ment
Farmers do 
not partici-
pate in chain 
manage-
ment
Chain
actor
(Aisha)
Chain activity 
integrator
(Pius)
Horizontal integration 
(management)
Vertical integration 
(activities)
Forms of chain participation by small-scale farmers
Adapted from Peppelenbos 2005
*Aisha, Pius and Zahina (next page) are not their real names.
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• Zahina grows pineapples in coastal Tanzania. She sells her fruit to the farmer 
association but does not do any processing or grading. Through the associa-
tion, she has some control over the price she receives. The association has 
negotiated a contract to supply luxury hotels in Zanzibar. We call Zahina a 
chain partner, because she specializes in farming and – through the association 
– exerts influence over the management of the chain. Chain partners have a 
long-term chain partnership with traders, processors or retailers. They may 
be organized for technological innovation and institutional dialogue in the 
chain (as in farmer business schools, page 31), but they are involved only in 
production, and not in further processing of their produce.
• Ato Imito is a member of the Kaffa Forest Coffee Union (page 133). He harvests 
coffee, removes the pulp, dries the beans and then delivers them to the Union 
to be graded and packaged them for export from Ethiopia to Germany. The 
Union has negotiated to supply several importers with high-quality beans, 
and has created its own brand that fetches premium prices on the German 
market. We call this association and its members chain co-owners, because 
they have moved upstream in the chain, increasing both their activities and 
their influence. Chain co-owners are organized in business cooperatives that 
develop new products and reach the end-consumer.
About	the	matrix
The matrix on the previous page is about the position of the farmer within the 
chain. The two dimensions refer to the chain: who does what in the chain, and who 
determines how things are done in the chain? Against this wider chain analysis, 
we focus on the position of the farmer – for he or she forms our target group.
The matrix is a tool for strategic thinking about chain development. It is useful 
for making sense of reality quickly and sharply. But reality itself is far more com-
plex than a simple model with four boxes. To do justice to this complexity, we 
can think of the matrix as a continuum. The four quadrants are vague, blurred 
areas, and a farmer can be located anywhere within the large grey rectangle (see 
the figure on the next page). 
For example, a farmer may start off at the bottom left corner of the rectangle. He 
begins grading his product. Doing so moves him a little upwards in the rectangle, 
so increasing his vertical integration (because he adds an activity). He also moves 
a little to the right, reflecting greater chain management (because he improves 
quality management). But he remains within the area of the chain actor .
If the same farmer later starts processing and packaging his product, he may move 
into the activity integrator segment . Or he and his neighbours may organize 
as a group and negotiate deals with traders, input suppliers and credit agencies, 
and may start working with the local research institute to test new technologies. 
This would move them into the chain partner quadrant .
A combination of vertical (more activities) and horizontal (more management) 
movements would push the farmers into the chain co-ownership quadrant . 
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It can be difficult for farmers to move from one quadrant into another. There may 
be considerable resistance from other players in the chain. Traders may see their 
position threatened if farmers take more control over the chain management (see 
the box on the next page). Established processors may be reluctant to see farm-
ers taking on such a role. The authorities may wittingly or unwittingly prevent 
value chains from emerging (see the box on page 23). It can take a long time for 
farmers to move from being chain actors to co-owners.
It is also possible to move to the left or downwards in the matrix. For example, 
a farmer group that gives up processing to focus on production would move 
downwards (since they perform fewer chain activities). A farmers’ association 
that disbands might move to the left (since it has given up some management 
functions). These movements may be detrimental to the group, and they may be 
forced on it – for example as a result of falling prices, a drought, or new taxes. Or 
they may be desirable and a result of a conscious decision – for example, if the 
group sees that they can make more money by giving up an inefficient process-
ing operation.
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How rumbesa harms Karatu District’s onion growers
Karatu District in Tanzania is a popular destination for tourists: it is home of the famous 
Ngorongoro Crater with its teeming wildlife. But Karatu’s people do not depend just on 
tourists. The district is also one of the biggest producers of fresh onions in the country. The 
Mangola plain in the Rift Valley is where most of these onions are produced. Farmers grow 
various varieties, attracting traders from different parts of Tanzania and from neighbouring 
countries.
During the harvest season, traders bring lorries into the villages to buy directly from the 
growers. The onions are packed and sold in bags, rather than being weighed and sold by 
the kilogram. The farmers are forced to over-fill the bags: a bag intended to hold 100 kg is 
sewn together with an extra half bag to bring the total volume almost 1.5 times that. There 
is even a word for this practice: rumbesa, which means “in excess”.
Understandably, the farmers are unhappy with this unfair practice. They are being cheated, 
but they cannot do much to stop it – not yet! Their incomes depend on these onions. If they 
store them for a long time, the losses will be even higher. And the farmers need to sell im-
mediately at harvest so they can pay for their immediate family needs.
Rumbesa works to the advantage of the traders. They get almost half as many onions again 
for the same price. They take the produce Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Nairobi and sell it 
for a good price. 
Many farmers have tried taking their onions to Dar es Salaam to sell in Kariakoo Market 
and other wholesale markets. But the marketing system is “closed”: only middlemen called 
“dalali” (brokers) can sell. The farmers can only hand over their onions to a dalali, who 
decides what price to sell at. The farmers cannot meet the end buyer, let alone negotiate. 
The dalali have formed a sort of cartel with the traders who buy from the villages. Others 
cannot penetrate easily.
The rumbesa system is used to measure almost all crops that can be transported in bags, 
especially bulky produce such as cabbages, carrots, potatoes, and most grains and leg-
umes.
Initial efforts by government ministries to address this problem through policy formulation 
and strategy setting are yet to bear fruit.
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Local levies hamper development
During the 1998/99 growing season, one Tanzanian investor got involved in oil crops in 
northern Tanzania. He had done a feasibility analysis and gained insight into this business. 
With the help of an experienced market linkage facilitator, his company contracted smallhold-
ers to produce safflower seeds to supply his oil mill. This was a trial year for the company, 
and the first time the farmers had grown the crop. Smallholders in the district had not grown 
safflower commercially before.
The company invested up front: it provided the farmers with good seed and ploughed their 
fields. The farmers agreed that the company would deduct the loan from the crop sales at 
the end of the season.
The facilitator helped the farmers organize collection centres for the crop at the end of the 
season. The company sent lorries to pick up the crop and bring it to the factory in Arusha, 
about 300 km away.
But then the local government stepped in. The authorities set up checkpoints on the road 
leading out of the district town. Officials inspected each lorry, and the drivers had to declare 
how many bags of safflower seed the vehicle carried. They sometimes even had to offload 
the bags to count them. They then had to pay a levy of TSh 300 (€0.21) per bag before 
they could continue. This levy increased the cost of the safflower by 4% per bag. A series 
of checkpoints along the road stopped each lorry, scrutinizing its travel documents, and 
certified that the levy had been paid. 
This exercise caused unnecessary delays on the road and meant unexpected expenditures 
for the company. It was a surprise for the facilitator, company and farmers alike – safflower 
was not on the list of crops grown in the district (since it was being planted for the first time), 
so no crop levies had been announced. The authorities did not inform the investor about 
the levy, even though the company had informed officials beforehand about its intended 
investment.
The investor was discouraged and almost pulled out. The facilitator helped the company 
lobby the district authorities to reduce the levy on safflower during the following season. But 
the company was unable to continue with the pre-financing arrangements for the farmers, 
and the whole chain collapsed.
By imposing unannounced levies, the local authority had killed off an important investment. It 
would have been better to announce the levies beforehand so the investor, farmers and mar-
ket facilitator would have better information about the costs of production and transport. 
Where	is	best	position	for	farmers?
One danger with a matrix like this is that readers may think that the ideal position 
for farmers is as a chain co-owner. That is not necessarily true. 
For example, hundreds of farmers in Spain, Portugal and Italy grow tomatoes for 
processing companies. They  earn a good living doing so. In Ghana, small-scale 
growers who produce pineapples under contract for Tongu Gold Farm (page 34) 
earn much more than they could before. They have all the conditions they need 
for sustained entrepreneurial growth. Through crop specialization and a secure 
market outlet the farmers may generate a high income – even though they are 
“mere” chain actors. 
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So the best chain position for the farmer depends on the specific situation, and 
may change over time. As farmers evolve from chain actors into chain owners, 
they add “economic rent” to their business (they increase their share of benefits), 
increase their control over the chain, and protect themselves better from competi-
tion. But this brings with it greater risks and responsibilities, which the farmers 
should be able and willing to bear. The costs may outweigh the benefits.
Intervention	strategies
Intermediary organizations can help farmers to get integrated into the chain, to 
improve as chain actors, or to move onto another form of chain development 
– partner, activity integrator, or co-owner. The matrix shows that pro-farmer 
chain development is a two-dimensional process. To improve the position of the 
farmer in the chain, we can either work on chain activities or on chain manage-
ment, or on both at the same time.
Vertical	integration
One type of intervention is vertical integration (arrow A in the figure on the next 
page). This tries to increase the number of chain activities the farmer undertakes 
Supply chains and subsistence farming
Are subsistence farmers part of a supply chain? 
Almost always, yes. The vast majority of subsistence farmers also grow crops or raise 
animals for sale. Even in the most remote areas, many subsistence farmers are connected 
to markets, selling small amounts of cash crops in a local village market or to a trader who 
comes and visits the farmer to buy. 
• They may sell surplus that they cannot consume themselves: for example, a farmer may 
sell a few bags of maize to pay for the next season’s inputs; a family may sell eggs or 
milk to help cover household expenses. 
• They may grow crops specifically for cash: Malian farmers often grow cotton to sell as 
well as food crops for subsistence.
• They may have to sell part of their staple crop to pay off debts, and then buy back their 
own grain later at higher prices. 
• They may process some of their produce and sell it to their neighbours. For example, 
women in Zimbabwe make beer from maize to sell as well as to drink at home.
Selling their products makes these farmers part of a value chain. The chain may be very 
short – they may sell directly to the consumer. But it is still a chain. And the type of analysis 
described in this book can still be used.
In their situation the question often is how they can improve their performance as a chain 
actor. They may be able to increase the quality or volume of their output, or improve their 
farm management, to their incomes and improve their livelihood. This is a necessary first 
step before any other type of chain development may take place. 
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– from farming into processing, transport, and trading. Vertical integration seems 
the preferred strategy of farmers. They like to “shorten the chain” by cutting out 
traders or other intermediary agents. They think that adding activities to their 
businesses will provide them a lot of added value and extra income. 
This, however, is not always true. Adding activities also means adding costs and 
risks. More importantly, it requires a new set of assets and skills. Some of these 
are:
• Technology Identifying and using appropriate technologies for the value-
adding activities (grading, processing, transport, etc.). These technologies 
must be well maintained and be kept updated. Technological innovation is a 
permanent concern.
• Finance Securing access to (a) credit or investment in facilities for process-
ing, marketing and distribution, and (b) working capital to run the operations. 
Reserves must be built up for future investments. Profits must be divided in 
a rational way between the farmers and the cooperative they are members of. 
Profits should be paid in accordance with the performance or contribution of 
each member.
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• Human resources Building up managerial competence and appropriate hu-
man resources to operate these facilities – for example, a specialized marketing 
manager or quality control staff.
• Organization Making sure that the farmer organization has the organiza-
tional discipline to get involved in joint value-adding activities. Farmer-mem-
bers should adhere to quality standards, delivery procedures, obligations to 
sell their produce, etc.
Chain	management
The return to investments in vertical integration may be disappointing unless due 
attention is also given to the second dimension of chain development: involving 
the farmer in chain management (arrow B in the figure on the previous page). 
Some aspects are the following:
Information management Knowledge is power. Often the farmers are in a 
disadvantaged information position. They have no information about the per-
formance of their own organization, let alone of the market. By contrast, compa-
nies downstream in the chain tend to have elaborate information systems. For 
example, supermarkets register the daily buying behaviour of their customers, 
while processing companies register the yields, volumes and prices of major 
crops. The more information someone manages, the better he or she can manage 
a company, and the higher are the returns. To improve the position of the farmers 
in the chain, their management of information has to improve. Some elements of 
information management are:
• Record-keeping of the use of labour and farm inputs. This is necessary to 
give a proper understanding of the costs involved, to base farm management 
decisions upon information, and to build the ability to negotiate the price of 
the product.
• Traceability This means keeping records to guarantee the buyer on the 
source of the product and the inputs that were used. 
• Market information This involves knowing about prices and trends in the 
market so that the farmers can bargain with potential buyers.
Quality management Quality management assures that both the product and 
the production processes satisfy the consumer. It assures that the farm product 
can find its way into the market. Quality can be a unique selling-point, through 
which one group of farmers differentiate themselves from other suppliers. Quality 
increases the attractiveness of farmers as business partners, hence, their bargain-
ing power. Some aspects are the following:
• Grading of the product into homogeneous quality grades, each with a differ-
ent price, each for a different market segment.
• Implementation of quality control systems at critical points in the produc-
tion system. These make sure that the farmers are on top of the product – that 
quality is controlled.
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• Implementation of quality certification schemes that are demanded in the 
market, such as GAP (Good Agricultural Practices), Food Safety Certification, 
EurepGAP (quality management system of European Union supermarkets), 
etc.
Innovation management Often innovation is steered from above. New technolo-
gies are brought to the farmers by extension officers from contracting companies 
or the public sector. The farmers are passive recipients of ready-made techno-
logical solutions. But it can also be the other way around. Farmers have detailed 
knowledge of what works best in their fields. They can share these experiences 
among each other, identify best practices, start experimenting, etc. They can 
make study trips to large-scale farmers, research institutes and experimentation 
centres. In this way, formal scientific knowledge will be combined with practical 
knowledge from the ground. This will not only boost innovation in the chain, but 
also make the farmers more attractive business partners.
Chain cooperation Cooperation with other chain actors is a skill in itself. Often 
chain relations are marked by distrust. The farmers and traders fight over the price; 
the farmers may swindle the traders by putting low-quality produce at the bottom 
of the crates, and the traders may swindle the farmers by using inappropriate 
weights and measures. This situation is bad for all. That is why it is important to 
seek cooperation along the chain. Some elements are the following:
• Chain vision Chain cooperation starts with the recognition that the chain 
actors depend on one another for their business performance. A good chain has 
synergetic, complementary relations between specialized chain segments. This 
chain vision can be built up by taking the farmers (or other chain segments) 
on excursions to companies up and downstream in the chain, and showing 
them the reality along the chain. For example, this will show them that poor 
quality at the beginning of the chain multiplies into great losses elsewhere in 
the chain. A bad tomato which is transported to the city is a loss of money. 
This loss may lower the price paid for a good tomato. Hence it is better not 
sell the bad tomato and get better price for the good one.
• Trust building Once there is recognition of mutual dependency between two 
chain segments, then there is a scope for a dialogue around shared interests. 
Initially the dialogue is focused on trust building, exchanging information and 
creating shared visions. Later, the dialogue may result in joint action plans to 
improve the chain to the benefit of all. 
• Joint action plans In dialogue with each other, the chain actors can identify 
ambitions (e.g., the development of a new product, or improvement of qual-
ity) that they may want to undertake together. Or they may identify problems 
that they may want to tackle (e.g., the loss of produce during transport). For 
such problems or ambitions they can draft a joint action plan, in which each 
of the parties undertakes certain actions. 
• Negotiation In such dialogue the parties can also structure their negotiations 
about the transaction conditions (price, quality standards, payment proce-
dures, etc.).
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Marketing intelligence This involves making sure that the product finds its way 
into the market. Production processes must be tailored to market demands. There 
must be knowledge of what the consumer wants. Products should be produced, 
designed and packaged to attract the preference of the consumer.
Components	of	chain	interventions
The case studies in Chapters 3–6 present experiences with implementing these 
two types of chain interventions. These interventions fall into five components 
or phases (see the figure below). 
1	 Chain	assessment
The first thing to do is to analyse the situation and the goals. This includes:
• Assessing the farmers, their organization, livelihoods, skills, assets and ambi-
tions.
• Mapping the different actors in the chain, and profiling each of them.
• Analysing the market, trends, prices, comparative advantages, competitors, 
etc.
• Reviewing the business environment, analysing stakeholders and the policy 
environment.
Components of chain interventions
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2	 Building	engagement
Any intervention requires engagement from and between farmers, other actors 
in the chain and the wider (policy) environment. Some elements are:
• Identifying common and conflicting issues.
• Identifying chain leaders and facilitators.
• Strengthening linkages and building trust among chain actors.
• Developing a joint chain strategy.
• Learning by doing joint projects and through platform meetings.
3	 Chain	development
Farmers and their organizations may improve their position in the chain in sev-
eral different ways:
• Process upgrading This means producing the same product more efficiently 
– perhaps by using new technologies or management methods. For example, 
farmers may grow more by switching varieties or applying fertilizer; they 
may reduce pest attacks and save costs through integrated pest management 
rather than spraying; they may husk maize more quickly using a machine 
rather than by hand; or they may invest in build new grain bins to improve 
storage. Farmers can also improve their links with other actors in the chain 
– for example, they can sign contracts with input suppliers or processors.
• Product upgrading Farmers can improve their product in various ways. For 
example, they may plant a new variety that has more desirable characteristics; 
or they may stop using agrochemicals and apply for certification so they can 
sell their produce as “organic”.
• Functional or intra-chain upgrading Farmers can take on new activities in 
the chain, either upstream or downstream, or change the mix of activities they 
undertake. For example, they may start grading and sorting their produce; 
they may bulk it to make pick-up more convenient for buyers; or they may 
process it (drying, milling, etc.) to improve its value or increase its storage 
life.
• Chain or inter-chain upgrading Farmers can also set out on a new value 
chain: they can start growing a new crop, keep a new species of livestock, or 
start a new enterprise such as dairying or agrotourism. They may be com-
pletely new to these activities, or they may transfer their skills and experience 
from their existing enterprises.
The first of these, process upgrading, is vital if farmers are to increase their income 
and participate in wider markets than at present. The farmers must be able to 
produce enough output, at the right time to interest a buyer; they must have the 
links with the buyer so they can sell it at all.
But while process upgrading is necessary to boost farmer’s incomes, it is unlikely 
by itself to give them a larger slice of the cake – a bigger share of the income from 
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the value chain. They can do this only by introducing new products or improv-
ing existing products (product upgrading), by changing the mix of activities in 
the chain (functional upgrading), or by getting involved in a new value chain 
(chain upgrading).
But this is not easy. Small-scale producers are likely to run into powerful interests 
that hamper their progress (see the boxes on pages 22 and 23). Other interests 
– traders, processors, larger-scale producers – may be reluctant to help small-scale 
farmers take a slice of their own profitable businesses. This means that farmers’ 
organizations and intermediary organizations must analyse the value chain care-
fully (see page 28) before deciding what action to take.
In many instances, indeed, other players in the chain may actually welcome the 
small-scale farmers’ involvement, for example if they increase the volume of pro-
duce that can be processed, so making factories more efficient (see the example 
of cashew in Mozambique, page 47).
4	 Monitoring	and	evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation are vital for the farmers and their organizations, 
and for intermediary organizations that assist them. Here are some indicators 
to watch:
Within the supply chain
• Production cost How much does it cost to produce the output?
• Yield How much does the crop (or livestock) produce per unit area (or per 
unit of a key input such as labour)?
• Gross margin or profitability How much money do the farmers make after 
deducting their costs?
• Distribution of benefits How are the benefits distributed between the farm-
ers and the organization, and among the farmers? 
• Improvements in products and efficiencies In what way are these achieved: 
through process, product, functional or chain upgrading? (see page 29).
In the market
• Market penetration What percentage of the market do the farmers serve?
• Sales volume How much produce do they sell?
• Sales value How much money does it bring in?
• Product differentiation What range of products do they supply?
Livelihoods
To judge the effects of the chain on livelihoods, check the effects on different 
groups in the community: men and women, different ethnic groups, and poor 
vs better-off people.
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• Role of income from chain How big a role does income from the chain play 
in the farmers’ overall livelihoods? What do they use the extra money for?
• Diversification of income sources Does the chain add to the farmers’ income 
sources, or are they over-reliant on a single source?
• Income stability Does the chain give the farmers income throughout the 
year?
• Employment What has been the impact on employment?
• Economic participation Do the farmers participate in the local economy 
more? E.g., do they buy and sell more in the local market? 
5	 Learning	and	innovation
Learning and innovation are at the heart of interventions in chains. Both farm-
ers’ organizations and intermediary organizations must be able to learn from the 
situation and adjust their approach accordingly. 
Two examples of interesting innovations: 
• “Farmer business schools” are an approach pioneered by FAO. This builds 
upon the “farmer field school” approach that supports farmers to learn about 
and innovate in their production systems. Farmer business schools support 
farmers to be market-oriented, start business planning, and improve their 
market information systems (see page 155). 
• “Chain platforms”, piloted by KIT, bring various stakeholders or actors in 
a chain together so they can discuss issues in the chain and develop ways to 
improve it (see page 173).
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Chain	actors
Chain aCtors are engaged only in farming and have no influence over the management of the chain. In 
general, such farmers are not well connected to mar-
kets, so their production is not well tailored to what 
the market needs. They may produce mainly for their 
own consumption, or they may supply staple crops to 
passing traders. 
A first step to chain development is to support these 
farmers to improve their farming skills. This helps them 
produce higher yields of higher, more consistent qual-
ity, and produce which is better suited to the market. This enables them to make 
more money and improve their livelihoods. 
Becoming a crop specialist is a necessary first step, before any other form of chain 
development. Unless the farm is well run, it makes no sense to invest in processing 
or to seek chain partnerships. When the farmers have consolidated as specialists, 
however, other options open up. 
In the following case studies we see examples of how intermediary organizations 
have supported farmers to become crop specialists:
• Reviving Mozambique’s cashew industry.
• Setting up an outgrower scheme for pineapples in Ghana.
• Jatropha herbal soap: from development project to commercial venture.
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Setting	up	an	outgrower	scheme		
for	pineapples	in	Ghana
“My naMe is aad den Heijer. I’m from the Netherlands. I was in the flower business for more than 25 years. I first worked as an employee for a 
company, and then I started my own business in flower trading. My main custom-
ers were supermarkets in the UK, Germany and Switzerland. In 1996 I sold my 
company to an English consortium and started a company providing machinery 
and equipment for the agricultural sector.
“In 1999 I was invited to Ghana to assess the possibility of growing flowers. After 
I had travelled around for 7 days, it became clear that the average temperature 
is too high to grow flowers on a commercial basis. I spent the last 2 days of my 
visit in a hotel in Accra. The first morning, fresh sliced pineapple was served at 
breakfast. The second morning there was no pineapple. Conclusion: no regular 
supply. Then the idea was born: if it is not possible to grow flowers, then why 
not to try pineapples?
“My next step was a tour. I visited several large fresh-fruit-salad producers in 
Europe. They all gave the same response: ‘If there is fresh sliced pineapple avail-
able for a decent price we certainly are interested’. The next move was to learn 
Outgrowers can make a good income if they manage their crop well
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as much as possible about the pineapple market in Ghana. It seemed that 65% 
of the pineapple is of high quality and can be exported, while 35% is sold for a 
very low price on the local market. Information was available about slicing yields, 
the price of packaging, duties on sliced pineapples and airfreight prices. Also 
about the availability of the product in Ghana, and the level of market demand 
in Europe.
Testing	the	market
“These findings were so positive that I decided to start a small trial. I brought 
several small shipments of fresh sliced pineapples from Ghana to Holland. At 
least five fruit-salad processors checked the quality and taste and gave an indi-
cation of the price they would pay. The trial was so successful that the next step 
was to invest in a small slicery. I found a good location in Accra, and a manager 
who knew a lot about logistics, quality, time, etc. It took 2 months to build the 
slicery. It started operation in February 2000, employing 40 people. Tongu Fruits 
Ltd. (TFL) was born.
Contract	problems
“After 3 months it became evident that it was almost impossible to make good 
contracts with local growers to buy pineapples for the slicery. TFL wanted to buy 
the 35% of low-price pineapples that did not comply with export standards, but 
were good enough for the slicery. The problems faced were:
•	 TFL agreed a price with the farmers – who suddenly raised the price, claiming 
that the pineapple was used for export, so TFL should pay the export price 
instead of the domestic price.
•	 TFL agreed to collect the fruit, but when the lorry arrived the farmer had 
already sold it to someone else.
•	 The quality of the fruit was often poor.
“It was clear that TFL could not rely on supplies from local farmers. We could 
not assure a regular supply to our customers. 
Starting	a	pineapple	farm
“The solution was to start a pineapple farm. We made use of PSOM, an invest-
ment instrument of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs. This facility provided 
something between 6 and 8% of the total investment. In this way, Tongu Gold 
Farm Ltd. (TGF) was born in Sogakope, in Volta Region, close to the border with 
Togo. The farm provided employment to 120 people. In February 2001, we built 
a new building next to the farm and moved the slicery there from Accra. 
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“TGF faced various start-up problems: 
•	 TGF had to provide electricity itself, even though the government had prom-
ised to take care of this. 
•	 Despite promises from the district government, the roads were in bad condi-
tion. TGF had to spend a lot of money to improve them.
Responding	to	market	challenges
“The first year (2001) was not profitable. Turnover grew in 2002, but higher fuel 
prices still resulted in a small loss. The first 9 months of 2003 were okay; TGF 
produced a small profit. But in October 2003, things started to change. 
“The variety of pineapple grown on the farm was Smooth Cayenne. This variety 
competed on the market with the Del Monte variety Gold Sweet (MD2). Del Monte 
had done a perfect job in marketing. All the years they sold MD2, the quality 
was very good: bright yellow outside and inside, with good taste, and always 
available. After the licence for this variety expired in 2002, a lot of suppliers from 
South America and Hawaii started planting MD2, entering the market in 2003. 
At the same time, the quality of the Ghanaian Smooth Cayenne had gone down 
dramatically, affecting its reputation in the market. The result was that the Smooth 
Cayenne was kicked out of the European market. So TGF decided to change its 
variety from Smooth Cayenne to MD2. 
The right variety, and careful handling, are crucial for top-quality pineapples on the 
European market
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Ensuring	a	supply	of	planting	materials
“We visited potential suppliers of MD2 over the world. These suppliers are known 
as “in-vitro laboratories”. An in-vitro laboratory multiplies pineapple plants. 
Conditions in this lab are like in a hospital: everything must be very clean and 
free of diseases. The first step is to identify some nice, healthy plants. From these 
plants you isolate the growing-points. These growing-points are brought into the 
laboratory, where they are kept for some time to see if they are free of diseases or 
problems. The multiplication can then start. This method quickly produces a lot 
of very good quality, disease-free plants. It works for different types of plants: 
Brazil used it to double the sugar content of its sugarcane, and breeders have 
raised banana yields by 30%.
“TGF started an in-vitro laboratory in Ghana to multiply the MD2 variety. This 
lab employs 40 young women. They do a very good job, and because they earn 
their own income they have become emancipated and more independent. The 
parent material for multiplying MD2 plantlets came from a lab in Europe. In 2004 
and 2005, the TGF lab produced more than three million MD2 plantlets. TGF uses 
some of these plantlets on its “shoot farm”, and sells the rest locally in Ghana.
“A shoot farm is a farm where plants are grown so the shoots can be harvested. 
The shoots are then planted on the pineapple farm. The shoot farm guarantees 
that the shoots are always the same size, thus assuring a uniform, high-quality 
crop. Furthermore, the total costs are lower than with conventional planting. 
“In 2004 TGF started a shoot farm to grow shoots for MD2 pineapples for export 
and processing. This whole operation was co-financed by Cordaid. Their interest 
was to start an outgrower programme with local farmers. After several rounds of 
discussion, we developed a business plan, specifying the timeframe, the money 
needed to start the project, the project sustainability, the basic principles of coop-
eration between TGF and the outgrowers, the costs of the training programme to 
be covered by Cordaid, and the costs covered by TGF. It was envisaged that by 
the end of the project, the outgrowers would have learned enough to continue 
either as outgrowers or as independent farmers. Cordaid provided TGF with a 
grant and loan to cover its costs.
Contract	farming	programme
“The contract farming programme has two phases: 
1	 Training	of	outgrowers	 The potential contract growers work 4 days a week 
at the shoot farm. This is practical training in sourcing, farm management, 
fertilizing, etc. On top of this, there is one day of theoretical training about 
crop management, bookkeeping, marketing, etc. We have just finalized the 
theoretical and practical training, and are now shifting to outgrowing. 
2	 Implementation	of	the	outgrowing	 After a year’s training and when they 
have passed an exam, the outgrowers can start growing pineapples by them-
selves. TGF provides the outgrowers one acre (0.4 ha) of ploughed land. Four 
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days a week they work at the farm so they can earn a living. One day a week 
they work on their own plot. TGF sells them on credit 20,000 MD2 shoots 
and all the inputs they need. The outgrowers must offer their total MD2 
production to TGF. TGF guarantees a price that covers all their costs. If the 
outgrower manages his crop well he can make reasonable profit. After the 
costs of shoots and inputs are deducted, TGF pays 50% of the profit in cash to 
the outgrower, and puts the rest in a savings account for the outgrower. After 
3 years, the outgrowers can decide to be 100% on their own: they can access 
their accounts and start their own farms. Or they can collect their money and 
use it for something else. If the outgrowers start their own farm, TGF will 
market their products.
“This approach minimizes the project’s risk. TGF’s core product is sliced pineap-
ple. The best and easiest way to produce this is to buy from local farmers. But 
TGF will keep its own farm for security reasons. If you want a secure supply, 
it is not possible to rely only on contracts or buying from other farmers, so it is 
better to depend on outgrowers for half your supply, and on your own farm for 
the rest. This means you can use the best fruits for export, and still make a good 
price on the second grade by making pineapple slices or juice.
Position	of	farmers	in	the	chain
“Initially the farmers will be no more than chain actors supplying to TGF. They 
will have to follow TGF’s instructions. However, after some years of outgrowing, 
the farmers will be capable of taking their own decisions. They will be educated 
enough to become crop specialists, expand their farm and earn a decent income. 
They might even want to have direct influence on marketing and prices. 
Benefits for farmers
“TGF’s current project will benefit a total of 120 farmers in 5 years’ time. Every 
month, two outgrowers will start their own farm. How much they benefit finan-
cially depends on their own efforts. Apart from the salary they earn working on the 
shoot farm, outgrowers may earn a profit of €600 a year. The benefits go beyond 
income, though. Some of the outgrowers are illiterate. During the training, they 
are encouraged to learn to read and write – skills they will need as independent 
outgrowers. Also, outgrowers learn to become farmers with a business approach. 
This also motivates them to send their children to school. Another impact is that 
due to TGF’s presence, the government devotes more attention to the area. 
“To get a good view of the social benefits, TGF has started a social impact study 
in cooperation with Cordaid. The study aims to measure the changes in the vil-
lages and communities after the start of the outgrower programme. 
“The shoot farm and the outgrowers have now developed well. The next invest-
ment will be to build a new in-vitro laboratory. The demand for plantlets is so 
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A business planning approach
1. Develop a business idea.
2.	 Define	a	combination	of	product	and	market.
3.	 Find	a	market	for	the	product.
4.	 Assess	the	quality	and	quantity	available	of	the	product.
5.	 Make	sure	the	price	is	competitive.
6.	 Calculate	the	profit	margins.
7.	 Define	the	product’s	source	and	location.
8.	 Once	the	location	is	identified,	check	the	infrastructure,	banking,	political	situation,	land	
issues,	labour,	etc.
9. Write your business plan.
10.	 Make	a	small	trial	to	identify	the	problems	and	pitfalls.
11. Review your business plan.
high that a bigger lab is needed. The new lab will start producing in February 
2006. It will provide employment to 150 young women, and will produce ten 
million plantlets of various species a year. Some 30% will be for Africa – such as 
MD2 pineapples, banana and sugarcane. The rest are destined for the European 
market.”
Lessons
Here are some general lessons from TGF’s experience.
Africa	and	Europe	are	different	business	environments Firms investing in 
Africa may be forced to take over functions normally performed by the govern-
ment (improving roads, providing children’s education) or other organizations 
such as banks (providing credit) or the employees themselves (transport to and 
from work).
Europe is a buyers’ market: the customers determine the price of products and 
whether to buy them. Africa is a sellers’ market: there is a shortage of many types 
of goods, so it is always possible to sell, and sellers determine the prices.
Employer	and	employees	have	different	expectations TGF’s staff seem to want 
a patron–client relationship with TGF – reminiscent of the relationship between 
chiefs and people in West Africa. They expect the company to provide a range 
of benefits that a firm in Europe would not feel obliged to provide. For example, 
they expected the firm to raise salaries when fuel prices rose (even though sal-
ary levels had already been negotiated), workers who moved to town expected 
the firm to pick them up from their new homes, and the workers wanted TGF to 
repair the road and to provide irrigation water for their private plots.
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The firm has provided many of these benefits, but cannot possibly cover them 
all. Wages are lower in Ghana than in many other countries, but these additional 
expenses push up costs. Buyers of the product in Europe are not willing to pay 
a premium to cover the additional costs, so the firm cannot be competitive if it 
agrees to all its workers’ demands. 
These different expectations can lead to misunderstandings and conflict between 
the workers and the firm. For example, the firm needs to invest to start production, 
but then needs to recoup that investment by making a profit. The workers often 
fail to recognize that the investment must be repaid – they see it as a sunk cost.
The	farmers	improved	technical,	business	and	management	skills Their in-
creased savings allows them to better control the chain, and may enable them to 
become a chain partner.
Development	projects	and	businesses	have	different	approaches	 Development 
projects start off with a problem – poverty among a certain group of people, for 
example – and try to find solutions to that problem. Businesses start off from a 
completely different point – the market for a product. They then seek a suitable 
location to invest money to produce and market the product. 
Development	organizations	can	play	important	roles	 Development organiza-
tions and employees’ unions can play important roles in launching programmes 
and in facilitating interaction between company and community. In TGF’s case, 
Cordaid played a key role in establishing and funding the outgrower scheme. 
TGF has encouraged its workers to form a union that can act as a partner in dia-
logue. The union officials can help educate their members in how to work with 
a private company – for example, on the importance of turning up to work on 
time, on rules on hygiene, behaviour, sick leave, rights and responsibilities. It can 
also work in the communities the workers come from.
More information: www.verdelpcs.nl/tongu/ or contact Aad den Heijer, info@ 
heijerconsultant.nl
Chain movements
The	 farmers	 have	entered	 the	 value	 chain	 as	 chain	 actors	
. 
If	they	form	a	cooperative,	they	may	be	able	to	develop	into	
chain partners .

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Jatropha	herbal	soap:		
From	project	to	commercial	venture	
it is diffiCult to make a living in semi-arid Africa. But one crop, jatropha, shows promise for farmers in these areas. This perennial shrub is originally from 
tropical America, but is now widespread in Africa, and grows well in the drier 
parts of northern Tanzania. It is easy to establish, grows relatively quickly, and 
produces seed for up to 50 years. 
The Maasai and other agro-pastoralists have planted jatropha for many years 
as a windbreak and living fence. But the seeds are also valuable. They contain a 
viscous, non-edible oil that can be used to make candles and soap, as a raw ma-
terial in the cosmetics industry, for cooking and lighting, or as a fuel. The seed 
cake is high in nitrogen and can be used as fertilizer.
Beginning in 2000, Heifer Project International, an international NGO, promoted 
the commercial use of jatropha as part of a project to improve the incomes of rural 
women in the Arusha and Manyara regions. The NGO commissioned Kakute 
Ltd. (a small-scale enterprise active in appropriate technology dissemination) to 
manage this project. Kakute provided groups of women with seeds, seedlings 
and cuttings, and offered them technical assistance and extension on how to 
grow them. It also trained them how 
to process the seeds to make oil and 
soap. Over a dozen groups of women 
in Arusha and Manyara regions have 
become involved in production and 
processing jatropha, benefiting more 
than 500 households. 
The project trained the women to make 
soap, but since the end of the project in 
2004, fewer now do so. Some sell soap 
in the local markets, but most sell seeds 
or oil to Kakute.
The jatropha shrub grows well in dry areas 
and on infertile soils
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The jatropha industry now has two distinct segments:
•	 The women’s groups produce jatropha seedlings, plant and tend the crop, 
harvest the seeds and crush them to extract the oil. 
•	 Kakute produces herbal soap from jatropha on a commercial basis. It buys 
seeds from the women, extracts the oil by hand, and mixes it with caustic soda 
and materials to make bars of soap. It then packages the soap and distributes 
it to retailers: supermarkets, pharmacies, dispensaries, kiosks and natural 
products shops.
Tanzania’s jatropha industry is less than a decade old. The women manage to 
make some supplementary income from the crop. But their position is precari-
ous, especially after the end of the development project that started the industry 
off. They are price-takers, and have little involvement in decision making about 
production or trade.
Kakute, their sole outlet for the wider market, still produces on a very small scale. 
But the firm is overstretched: it tries to handle both production and marketing. 
Until recently, no feasibility analysis for herbal soap production had been done, 
and Kakute had no business plan mapping out its future in the industry (though it 
is now doing a feasibility analysis for possible expansion). Kakute has twice-yearly 
meetings with retailers to discuss marketing issues and contractual arrangements, 
but mechanisms to govern the chain are not yet in place.
On the regulatory side, the herbal and medicinal qualities of jatropha soap are 
yet to be certified by the relevant government agencies. 
How can the women benefit on a sustainable basis, and how can this fledgling 
industry be put on a sound commercial footing?
Chain	analysis
Match Maker Associates Ltd., a development consulting firm, conducts training 
on value chains in the vicinity of the Kakute factory. It became interested in the 
jatropha industry because it seemed to have potential for growth. Match Maker 
contacted Kakute, and agreed to do an analysis of jatropha soap as a case study 
in one of its courses. 
With guidance from Match Maker, the course participants identified the various 
actors in the chain and their functions, analysed the constraints and opportunities 
for each function, calculated gross margins, and identified business solutions. 
They also did a detailed analysis of how to develop the value chain in ways that 
would optimize the strategic collaboration among the various actors, and advised 
on chain governance, market assessment and distribution of economic gains. 
Kakute and other key actors attended the training sessions when the course par-
ticipants presented their findings and recommendations. 
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Upgrading	the	chain
The recommendations focused on ways that Kakute can collaborate on a win–win 
basis with other key actors, including the women’s groups. The following upgrad-
ing strategies have been recommended:
Upgrading	processes	 The production process for soap making should be up-
graded in light of expected growth in the market. At present Kakute produces 
around 2 tons of soap a year (67,000 pieces of 30 grams each), generating around 
€15,000. It should expand and modernize its soap-making functions under one 
roof (instead of the current two locations). It should make its procurement more 
efficient, organize delivery schedules with the women’s groups, and negotiate 
contracts with them instead of the current ad-hoc procedures.
Upgrading	products	 Kakute should improve its products in various ways:
•	 Standardization	 It should standardize its herbal soap and ensure that it 
complies with government regulations. 
•	 Packaging	and	labelling	 Kakute should improve the soap packaging, espe-
cially for products targeted to higher-income markets. It should also develop 
a branding strategy for its products.
•	 Product diversification Customers said they wanted a broader choice of 
soap products with different aromas. A wider range of aromas would appeal 
to consumers who buy toilet soap. Kakute could make these using essential 
oils, and could also tailor-make orders. 
•	 Quality	control	 This is very important, especially if Kakute continues to 
make soap at more than one location.
Upgrading	functions	 Recommendations include the following:
•	 Location	of	activities	 Kakute should explore the advantages of decentral-
izing all activities up to oil extraction, and centralizing the soap making. 
This would ensure product consistency and ease the planning of deliveries. 
If aspects of production are subcontracted to the women’s groups, then strict 
quality control is needed.
•	 Sources	of	raw	materials	 Large-scale growers are becoming interested in 
the jatropha’s potential as a source of bio-diesel. One of these is such as Dili-
gent Tanzania Ltd. (see box below). Kakute should seek supplies of seed and 
Bio-diesel from jatropha
A	new	venture	in	northern	Tanzania	is	the	large-scale	production	of	jatropha	to	make	bio-
diesel.	Biofuels	are	an	attractive	option	 if	 (as	seems	 likely)	 the	price	of	petroleum	stays	
high.	The	European	Union	has	stipulated	 that	5%	of	 the	diesel	consumed	should	come	
from	renewable	resources.	Various	firms	are	seeking	ways	to	comply	with	this	new	rule,	
and	jatropha	is	one	of	the	crops	they	are	investigating.	
This	will	pose	a	challenge	to	small-scale	growers	and	soap	makers,	who	may	find	it	difficult	
to compete with large-scale producers. 
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oil from such producers. It should also consider expanding into other areas 
where new women’s groups could supply it with raw materials.
•	 Export	markets	 Kakute should solicit contracts with international outlets 
such as specialist toiletry stores. 
•	 Feasibility	study	 Kakute needs to improve its understanding of the market 
and the implications of these upgrading strategies. To do this, it should un-
dertake a feasibility study of soap making as well as develop a business plan 
and investment profile. 
Building	engagement
Creating a value chain will entail the following:
•	 Kakute will have to specialize in soap making. It should bring on board agents 
to market its products. 
•	 It should strengthen its retailers’ forum as a way of analysing the market.
•	 It should forge strategic collaborations with women’s groups and other sup-
pliers to ensure a constant supply of raw materials. Engaging with the wom-
The women had not realized 
the potential value of jatropha 
plants
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en’s groups will be a challenge, since they do not yet have the capacity to act 
collectively. But it is in Kakute’s own interest to build on the relationship it 
already has with the groups.
Kakute could build its engagement with the groups by helping them organize 
themselves into an umbrella organization that can represent their interests in 
the chain. This will minimize Kakute’s costs of dealing with the group. It is also 
in the women’s own interest because an association would be able to negotiate 
more effectively on their behalf.
It is in the interests of both Kakute and the women’s groups to draw up a contract 
making the groups Kakute’s preferred suppliers. 
Position	of	the	women	in	the	chain
The aim of the original project was to pilot a model of linking women’s groups 
to reliable markets. The women started growing jatropha and processing it. But 
when the project ended, they began to fall back to their original position as chain 
actors – as producers of seedlings and oil, rather than of soap. Kakute has taken 
over the main role in making soap.
Match Maker’s recommendations provide an opportunity for both Kakute and the 
women’s groups to strengthen their positions in the chain. The implications for 
Kakute are outlined above. The women will be able to benefit by becoming chain 
partners, but only if they manage to organize themselves into an effective associa-
tion that can negotiate with Kakute. They will need assistance to do this.
Lessons	
•	 Dangers	of	 a	project	 approach	 A project approach to developing value 
chains is detrimental if it is ill conceived, and if not enough time and resources 
are devoted to it. In this case, the women’s groups were left out too soon, so 
had little chance of maintaining their position in the chain.
•	 Business	development	support	 Identification of upgrading strategies should 
be followed by a feasibility	study	and	business	planning. Business planning 
is a powerful instrument, especially when facilitated in a “do-it-yourself” way: 
the people who are responsible for the upgrading should themselves take the 
lead in the business planning. 
•	 Involvement	of	all	actors	 Value chain analysis and upgrading strategies 
should be internalized by all the main actors in the chain. Often only the chain 
leader is actively involved. In this case, the women’s groups have participated 
only by providing information. They have not had the chance to internalize the 
results of the analysis or its implications for their position in the business.
•	 Support	organizations	 Although value chain development should be led 
by the private sector, cooperation and coordination with relevant support 
organizations is a key to success.
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Chain movements
Through	the	original	development	project,	the	women	started	
growing	jatropha		and	processing	it	to	make	oil	and	soap	
. 
But	after	 the	end	of	 the	project,	 they	stopped	making	soap,	
selling	their	oil	instead	to	Kakute	.
They	will	 have	 to	 become	more	 organized	 if	 they	 are	 to	
strengthen their position in the chain .


 
•	 Market-driven	 Chain upgrading must be market-driven. Upgrading is es-
sential if changing market needs are to be met. Changes may be needed in the 
product, process or function; usually, a combination of all three is needed. 
More information: Match Makers Associates, www.mma-ltd.com or contact Peniel Uliwa, 
puliwa@raha.com
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Reviving	Mozambique’s	cashew	
industry
Cashew is the Most important nut crop in the world – beating almonds into second place. In the mid-1970s, Mozambique was the leading cashew pro-
ducer, accounting for over two-fifths of world production. But the country’s 
long civil war took its toll: orchards and processing plants were neglected, and 
output tumbled. 
By the end of the war in the early 1990s, new investment was badly needed. The 
state cashew company was broken up and sold off to Mozambican firms. The 
government had supported the local cashew-processing industry by imposing 
a variable surtax of 18–22% on exports of raw nuts. But in a controversial move, 
the World Bank forced the government to liberalize the raw cashew trade in 1995. 
The tax was reduced, first to 20%, then to 14%, and exports of raw nuts soared. 
The local industry found it impossible to compete with traders selling raw nuts 
to India, where the industry is subsidized. As a result, 10 of the 15 processing 
factories closed, and more than 7000 workers lost their jobs.
Under pressure from local business people, the government reinstated the ex-
port tax on raw nuts in 2001. This has opened an opportunity to rebuild the local 
processing industry.
In the same year, an entrepreneur named Antonio Miranda refurbished a process-
ing plant in Nampula Province in northern Mozambique. With assistance from 
TechnoServe, a US-based NGO, he installed new equipment that produces larger 
numbers of whole kernels (see box on the next page). This plant produces nuts 
equal in quality to those produced in India and Brazil. 
About a dozen medium-scale factories around the country now use this tech-
nology. They buy inputs, market their products as a group, and monitor the all-
important quality of their output. In 2005 they launched a cashew brand called 
“Zambique”. 
Cashew is almost exclusively produced on small farms, and provides income for 
hundreds of thousands of Mozambican families. Farmers usually sell raw nuts 
to traders, who then export them to India for processing. But the farmers can 
get much better prices by selling to local processors, or by processing the nuts 
themselves. Small-scale cashew processing is very labour-intensive, and employs 
large numbers of women in Mozambique. 
Some two-thirds of Mozambique’s cashew trees are over 25 years old, so yields 
are low. The orchards are susceptible to bush fires and to pests and diseases, 
48
Chain empowerment 
Cashew
Originally	 from	Brazil,	 the	 cashew	 tree	was	brought	 by	
the Portuguese to Mozambique and India in the 16th 
century.	The	tree	produces	a	curious	fruit:	a	fleshy	“apple”,	
below	which	 hangs	a	 kidney-shaped	nut.	The	 “apples”	
can	be	processed	to	make	jam,	syrup,	soft	drinks,	wine	
and	spirits,	but	the	nuts	are	the	main	export	product.	In	
small-scale	 factories,	 the	nuts	are	 steamed,	 shelled	by	
hand,	and	then	pre-graded	to	ensure	a	high	percentage	
of	whole	kernels.	These	pre-processed	kernels	are	sent	
to	factories	for	further	grading,	packaging	and	export.	The	
international	demand	for	cashew	kernels	is	high,	and	the	
market	is	growing.
Whole	cashew	kernels	–	eaten	as	snacks	in	the	developed	
world	 –	 are	worth	 far	more	 than	 broken	 nuts.	 Special	
equipment	and	careful	handling	 throughout	are	needed	
to	preserve	quality	and	minimize	 the	number	of	broken	
kernels.
especially powdery mildew. This disease can cut yields or even cause total crop 
failure. Cashew farmers have very little capital and limited access to credit, so 
they find it difficult to invest in their orchards. 
Despite these problems, cashew offers potential in Mozambique, especially for 
smallholders. Much of the recent investment in Mozambique has been in large 
projects that have benefited only a few. Developing the cashew industry offers a 
way to benefit much larger numbers of people.
The	CASCA	project
SNV’s Support for the Cashew Sector (CASCA) programme aims to help peo-
ple start small-scale village processing plants around medium-sized factories 
such as Mr Miranda’s, and to improve the quality and increase the quantity of 
cashew nut production by smallholders. These small plants sell their output to 
the factories, which select, grade, and vacuum-pack the nuts, then sell them to 
importers in Europe.
CASCA works in Nampula province, where two-thirds of the province’s 3 mil-
lion people depend on subsistence farming, and as many as 80% are involved 
in cashew production. This is one of the poorest areas of Mozambique: access to 
basic services such as potable water and health care is limited, and transporta-
tion, communications and market infrastructure are poor to non-existent. Cashew 
offers real hope for these people.
The main objectives of CASCA are:
• To assist farmers to increase the production of high-quality cashew nuts.
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• To support local entrepreneurs to establish ten new small-scale cashew-
processing units, so generating income and employment for women and men 
in one of the poorest areas of Mozambique.
Chain	analysis
Recognizing cashew’s high potential to alleviate poverty, SNV began exploring the 
possibility of intervening in the cashew sector. It studied the economic, technical 
and social viability of interventions to promote the processing of cashew nuts at 
the community level. The CASCA programme is the result of this analysis.
Preparatory	phase
In the first one-year preparatory phase, SNV formulated the CASCA programme 
and facilitated various activities, including:
• Selecting a suitable intervention area for piloting small-scale processing 
units.
• Assessing processing options.
• Identifying potential stakeholders. 
• Developing a basic business plan addressing the overall viability and sustain-
ability of CASCA. 
• Negotiating programme funding. 
• Formalizing partnership agreements within the programme.
• Preparing to launch the programme.
Implementation	phase
In the second phase of the CASCA programme, SNV provides advisory services 
to the implementing partners ADPP and AMODER (two local NGOs), which are 
involved in various segments of the value chain. It facilitates relationships among 
the various stakeholders, and is building the capacity of the NGOs. It has trained 
them in market research and gender issues, helped them set up the processing 
units, improved their fundraising capabilities, and assisted with monitoring and 
evaluation.
The cashew chain before CASCA
Traders  
(raw	nuts)
Smallholder 
cashew  
producers
Export	raw	
nuts	(mainly	to	
India)
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Smallholder 
cashew  
producers
Land prepara-
tion
Tree planting
Pruning
Pest and dis-
ease control
Harvesting
Marketing	of	
raw nuts
Small-scale 
processors 
(kernel semi-
processors)
Cashew nuts 
steaming 
Cashew	ker-
nels drying 
Grading
Peeling 
Selection	of	
whole and bro-
ken	kernels
Medium-
sized cashew 
factory
Selection	of	
kernels	
Grading
Vacuum	pack-
ing
Export
Export
SNV 
Programme	identification	and	formulation:	appropriate	technology,	market	linkages,	
workshops,	facilitation,	advice,	funding	identification
Services 
Microfinance
Training
Technical advice
Input supply Production Processing Marketing
INCAJU 
(National 
Cashew 
Institute)
Seedling	
production 
(nursery)
Outcomes	
CASCA had made significant progress by mid-2004:
• The cashew processing units now employ about 100 workers, managers and 
technicians, all from local communities. The minimum wage is about €42 per 
month, in an area where the average per capita income is only €58 per year. 
The employees spend their money locally, boosting other businesses in the 
district. 
• More than 1000 farmers – most of them women – have planted improved 
cashew trees. 
• A total of 800 people have attended courses on various aspects of cashew 
production (identifying high-yield varieties, preventing bush fires, pest and 
disease control measures, etc.) and processing (unit management, quality 
control, and other technical aspects). As a result, the yield and the quality of 
cashew have improved, with producers being paid better prices. 
CASCA cashew chain
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CASCA beneficiaries and partners
CASCA	serves	a	large	number	of	rural	cashew	growers	and	processors,	and	collaborates	
with	a	range	of	partners.
Beneficiaries
• Over 1000 smallholder cashew producers.
•	 10	small	processing	units,	employing	a	total	of	about	100	women	and	men.	
NGO partners
Two	local	NGOs	deliver	training	and	micro-finance	services	to	producers	and	processors	on	
a	long-term	basis.	They	implement	the	CASCA	programme	and	receive	capacity	develop-
ment	support	from	SNV.	
• Development Aid from People to People (ADPP)	 Based	in	Monapo	District,	Nam-
pula	province,	ADPP	runs	a	training	school	that	offers	courses	to	farmers	on	practical	
skills	 they	need	to	manage	their	 farms,	either	 independently	or	 in	collaboration	with	
other	small-scale	producers.	Through	CASCA,	ADPP	provides	technical	courses	for	
the	processing	unit	managers	on	quality	control,	equipment	maintenance,	etc.	It	also	
trains	cashew	farmers,	who	are	mostly	women.	
• Mozambican Association for Rural Development (AMODER)	 This	is	a	microfinance	
institution	based	in	the	capital,	Maputo.	It	identifies,	promotes	and	finances	local	project	
initiatives.	As	part	of	 the	CASCA	programme,	AMODER	offers	 low-interest	 loans	 to	
the	processing	units,	and	manages	the	funds	received	from	HIVOS,	the	Dutch	donor	
agency. 
Medium and large private enterprises
• Miranda Caju factory	 This	medium-scale	cashew-processing	 factory	 is	owned	by	
Antonio	Miranda.	It	buys	semi-processed	kernels	from	the	small-scale	processing	units,	
grades	them	and	packages	them	for	export.	Miranda	Caju	pays	20%	more	for	raw	nuts	
than	farmers	typically	receive	from	traders,	and	pays	15–20%	more	for	whole,	white,	
clean,	well-dried	cashew	kernels.
• Global Trading	 This	Dutch	cashew	broker	buys	packaged	kernels	from	Miranda	Caju	
and imports them to the Netherlands.
Technical assistance
• TechnoServe This	US-based	NGO	provides	technical	assistance	to	Miranda	Caju	and	
the	small	scale	processing	units,	and	advises	on	equipment,	product	quality	standards,	
etc. 
• National Cashew Promotion Institute (INCAJU) is a government institute established 
in	1998	with	the	objective	to	revitalize	cashew	production	and	processing.	It	links	the	
CASCA	programme	with	other	government	agencies.	 It	plays	a	vital	 role	 in	helping	
to	create	a	more	favourable	institutional	environment	for	agro-business	ventures	like	
CASCA.
Donor
• HIVOS,	 a	Dutch	development	agency,	 provides	 funding	 to	 support	CASCA’s	activi-
ties. 
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• The processing units have reliable local supplies and are able to sell semi-
processed kernels to the factory at fair prices (currently €3.24/kg for whole 
kernels and €2.19/kg for broken ones). 
• With women playing a dominant role in the production and processing of 
cashew, the programme has clearly had a positive impact on the empower-
ment of women in the programme area. 
• The interventions also had a positive impact on the establishment of local 
enterprises (processing units) as well as the lager agro-industrial plants at 
provincial level all being relevant targets for the continued broad-based pri-
vate sector development in rural Mozambique.
Position	of	smallholders	in	the	chain
The smallholders who do not work in the processing units are still “chain ac-
tors”. They have not taken on any additional activities in the chain. Nor have 
they increased their participation in chain management. But they have benefited 
in other ways:
• They have more marketable produce; they have become regular, reliable sup-
pliers.
• They have considerably more income than before.
• They have improved their cashew orchards (increased natural capital as-
sets).
Cashew processing employs mainly women
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• They have learned better production techniques (increased human capital 
assets).
• They cooperate with each other and with the small-scale processing plant 
(increased social capital assets).
Some of the smallholders work for the small-scale processing units. They benefit 
from increased income and new employment opportunities. Such livelihood 
transitions are vital if rural Mozambique is to develop further.
The small-scale cashew processing units are run by local entrepreneurs who own 
and control the activities and manage their units.   
Wider benefits
• Many national and international organizations recognize CASCA’s achieve-
ments in alleviating rural poverty. Although at first few believed the pro-
gramme would succeed, other organizations are becoming involved in re-
building the cashew sector. They have offered to join CASCA to provide other 
services, such as training for processing cooperatives and associations. 
• INCAJU is also aware of the importance of the CASCA programme, and 
plays a crucial role in lobbying for more favourable policies and regulations. 
INCAJU and the government have recently expressed interest in replicat-
ing the CASCA programme in other provinces. SNV is frequently invited to 
workshops in other provinces to address potential stakeholders who wish to 
become involved in small-scale cashew processing.
• The government is now more sensitive to the situation of small-scale cashew 
producers. It is helping farmers to rehabilitate their cashew orchards, and is 
promoting research on new high-yielding varieties and more effective pest 
and disease control measures. 
• One of the most important long-term benefits of the programme is the in-
creased entrepreneurial capacity in Nampula province. This should increase 
local people’s confidence and encourage them to develop other economic 
activities. 
Chain movements
Those smallholders who have remained in cashew production 
and not started processing nuts have improved their position 
within the chain actor quadrant .
Farmers who are also involved in the small processing units 
have become chain activity integrators .


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Risks
Political The government may abolish the export tax on raw cashew – though 
there are no signs of this at present.
Socio-economic World markets determine raw cashew prices. A bumper crop 
in India means falling prices in Mozambique. Farmers may switch to other activi-
ties, and stop maintaining their trees. The processing units depend on just one 
buyer, but this is unavoidable at this early stage. Micro-credit is an important 
component of the programme, but also has inherent risks. 
Financial	 and	management AMODER offers loans to the processing-unit 
owners so they can build their businesses. But their lack of familiarity with loan 
schemes and their limited management capacity may affect the units’ profitability. 
To reduce these risks, the programme offers management training and monitors 
the units closely – in particular to ensure that the loans are indeed invested in 
the enterprises.
Chain A number of essential linkages have been established in a short time. 
If one of the chain segments collapses – or if one of the actors (or the business 
development service agencies) leaves – the chain will be endangered. Its survival 
will depend on the resilience of the other actors in the chain, and their flexibility 
to find solutions quickly.
If, due to one or a combination of above factors, the medium-sized processing 
plants were to fail, the farmers and small-scale plants that rely on them would 
lose their market.
More information: www.snvmz.org or contact Antonio Quinze, aquinze@snvworld.
org
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Chain	partners
Chain partners are speCialized in farming and exert influence over the management of the chain. These 
farmers start out offering a reasonably attractive product 
to the market; they have developed basic assets and farm 
management skills. However, they may feel unable to 
control their relations with the outside world. For in-
stance, they may sell to visiting traders – a new one each 
season. This leaves them uncertain whether they can sell 
their products, and at what price. These farmers want 
to exercise greater influence in the chain – they need to 
develop the abilities such as negotiating prices, developing technologies, setting 
quality standards, managing logistics, providing just-in-time deliveries, etc. 
To this end, they opt for a partnership strategy based on shared interests and 
mutual growth. By linking up with a buyer, the farmers can increase their busi-
ness security and gradually improve and expand their businesses. They want to 
make themselves an attractive business partner so that the buyer will be willing 
to pay better prices, listen to their demands, and invest in them. 
In the following case studies we see examples of how farmers have improved 
their capacities to manage the chain:
• Getting Mozambican pineapples to market
• Forging partnerships between Tanzanian sugarcane producers and millers
• The Cheetah story: Helping smallholders in Malawi access the paprika mar-
ket
• Honey, the liquid gold of the North Rift Valley in Kenya
• Developing mango market linkages through farmer field schools in Kenya
• Learning from challenges: Sunflower contract farming in northern Tanza-
nia
• Organic coffee from Kilimanjaro
• Farmer field school networks in Western Kenya.
Chain 
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Getting	Mozambican	pineapples		
to	market	
Mounds of unsold pineapples rotting in the fields: that’s a disaster for the farm-ers of Chibabava, a district in Sofala Province in central Mozambique. But it 
is also an untapped opportunity. If a market for the fruit can be found, the farmers 
will be able to benefit from the district’s good transport links: the main road from 
Maputo (the national capital) to the port of Beira passes through the district. 
Pineapples are the main cash crop in the district. Farmers also raise cashew as 
a cash crop, and grow sorghum and maize for subsistence, but dry years bring 
a risk of market failure and severe food shortages. Pineapple grows well: the 
district produces around 35,000 tons a year, split between two growing seasons. 
But farm-gate prices tumble at harvest time: farmers may get only a cent a kilo 
– €0.02 for a 2.5 kg fruit – at the peak of the season – if they can find a buyer at 
all. As a result, many fruit are left to rot in the fields.
They could fetch more if they are transported further away or could be processed 
nearby. The same fruit may be worth €0.40–0.75 at the local markets at the start 
and end of the harvest season.
The market could not cope with the flood of pineapples at harvest time – so traders would 
offer rock-bottom prices, and farmers left fruit to rot in the field.
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Many of the district’s pineapple farmers are organized into five associations. These 
associations have about 400 members, who farm a total of about 1000 ha of land. 
Together, they produce about two-thirds of the pineapples grown in Chibabava. 
About one-third of the association members are women. The associations are the 
only commercial farmers’ organizations in the district. The members usually sell 
fresh pineapples directly at local markets, or to small-scale traders who sell them 
locally or in the nearby town of Muxungue, or bring them to Beira or Maputo.
SNV started work with the associations in August 2004. It aimed to help the 
members generate a sustainable income as well as improve the associations’ or-
ganizational abilities. SNV chose the pineapple sector because it is the only crop 
with short-term potential to improve incomes. The amount of pineapples grown 
in Chibabava makes it worthwhile to develop markets and explore the possibility 
of processing farm produce in the district.
In the short term, the farmers and their associations wanted to get a reasonable 
price for their fruit. In the longer term, they wanted to find more profitable mar-
kets, add value by processing the pineapples, and spread their risk by diversifying 
their marketing and processing options. 
The associations asked SNV for three types of assistance:
•	 Training and capacity development in leadership and organization develop-
ment.
•	 Facilitation of market linkages.
•	 Identification of opportunities for pineapple processing that the associations 
themselves could do on a small scale (such as sun-drying), or in a plant that 
they might part-own, or in partnership with a larger processing plant.
SNV’s intervention evolved into an action-oriented and integrated capacity devel-
opment approach (see box on the next page). It is based on extensive consultation 
with the associations and other actors, and adjusts over time as more is learned 
and new opportunities emerge.
Training	and	capacity	development
In 2005 SNV began training the association leaders and a small group of the more 
proactive and entrepreneurial farmers. The courses have covered leadership; 
development of commercial agro-business associations; planning and adminis-
tration; business planning; marketing, bulking, quality control and certification; 
and maintaining institutional linkages. 
The last subject is important because the associations cannot do everything them-
selves: they need outside support, information or inputs if they are to identify 
and exploit new markets successfully. The training takes place in parallel with 
coaching and learning on the job. 
It remains a challenge to include women in the training because the vast majority 
(over 95%) cannot read or write.
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Market	linkages
SNV has helped the associations forge sustainable markets in various ways. 
•	 Links with a responsible buyer It linked the associations with a trader 
based in Manica, the neighbouring province. This trader has his own transport 
facilities, and has already bought about 35 tons of pineapples and exported 
them to nearby Zimbabwe. In 2005, the trader indicated he was willing to sign 
a long-term contract with the associations to buy 3–7 tons a week at a fixed 
price of €0.13 per kg (about €0.40 per fruit), a big improvement over the usual 
farm-gate price. The trader is also willing to offer the association members 
services such as free training on improved technologies to raise productivity 
and quality. This relationship has provided the farmers with an initial entry 
point into the wider market. 
•	 Seeking export markets SNV has helped the associations explore alterna-
tive markets, such as the international “fair trade” and organic markets, and 
the potential to ship to the Middle East. These possibilities are still being 
explored. This work has also highlighted the need to strengthen the national 
organization responsible for export quality and certification.
Several national and international buyers have begun offering higher prices than 
the trader mentioned above – but without the additional training services. So 
the associations are confronted with a dilemma – to continue with their existing 
trading partner, or to take up these new (but riskier?) opportunities. They realize 
they have much to learn about competitive business in international markets. 
Action-oriented, integrated capacity development
SNV’s work in Chibabava is an example of an action-oriented, integrated capacity develop-
ment approach. Here are some key features of this approach.
•	 Action-oriented The approach places local realities and the needs of the farmer 
associations at the centre. It involves gradually exploring and learning together with 
farmers to minimize the risks and ensure that efforts are sustainable. 
•	 Integrated capacity development It attempts to improve the associations’ economic 
performance at the same time as strengthening their internal organization and institu-
tional linkages. This is because one will not work without the other: a strong organization 
would be of little value without a strong core business, and business interventions may 
not be sustainable if they are not embedded in and owned by strong associations. 
•	 Contextual analysis The approach links local poverty and development constraints 
to their root causes – which may be outside the local area. Examples are external op-
portunities (such as alternative markets), other economic sectors (power supply, in this 
case), and the regional, national and international context (e.g., weak national institu-
tions, market opportunities, best practices for production, processing and marketing).
•	 Partnerships The approach strengthens institutional linkages (e.g., to gain access 
to markets and processing opportunities, or to develop organizations) and promotes 
concerted efforts by a broad range of actors (e.g., lobbying for power supply). 
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Exploring	opportunities	for	agro-processing	
Processing offers the associations opportunities to add value to their produce 
– though this obviously depends on the type of processing, how it is organized, 
and how the product is marketed. 
SNV has supported the associations in the following ways: 
•	 Feasibility analysis of a large processing plant A large pineapple processing 
plant in Muxungue could have a major impact on the town and the surround-
ing district. On behalf of the associations, SNV arranged through PUM (a Dutch 
organization providing senior experts’ advice) to send a fruit-processing expert 
to Chibabava in late 2005 to do a feasibility study. Preliminary analysis has 
revealed one major obstacle – the lack of an electrical power grid – but a donor 
has promised to fund the extension of the electricity grid to Chibabava within 
the next 3 years (see box below). The harvest peaks during just 4 months each 
year is another constraint to the feasibility of a large-scale pineapple process-
ing plant. 
•	 Other options for pineapples The associations and SNV are also exploring 
alternatives that do not require electricity, such as solar drying, and improve-
ments on the supply side (grading, storing, packing etc.) that could benefit 
partnerships with existing processors. 
Results	
What are the results of this work?
•	 Increased income The association members have profited from increased 
prices (up from €0.01 to €0.13 per kilo), as well as a more reliable income (a 
contract to supply up to 7 tons of fruit a week).
•	 Position of the smallholders in the chain The associations have begun to 
move from being mere chain actors towards the beginnings of a chain part-
nership. They are exploring the possibility of processing their output, so may 
have the opportunity to move towards activity integration too. 
Lobbying for electricity
The lack of an electricity grid is a big constraint to the development of Chibabava – and 
not just for agro-processing. SNV and the farmers’ associations have consulted with local 
businesses, banks, health and education organizations about the feasibility of linking the 
district to the national grid.  As a result, Danida and the Danish embassy have committed 
to start tendering and other procedures, so there is now a very good chance that the district 
will be connected to the grid within the next 3 years. 
This shows that organizing a diverse group of local stakeholders to articulate their needs in 
a persuasive way can convince outsiders (in this case, donors and provincial authorities) to 
invest in a key development intervention that will benefit all.
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•	 Capacity development The association leaders have developed new skills 
through training and on-the-job learning. They are now better able to manage 
their associations, as well as to identify new markets and explore processing 
opportunities.
Looking	to	the	future	
•	 The gradual approach of exploring and learning together with farmers has 
worked out well so far, and will be continued. There have been some initial 
benefits without too much risk. It is worth exploring additional income and 
value-adding opportunities. 
•	 The sharp peaks in pineapple production twice a year make it difficult to 
market the fruit. They may also reduce the viability of a processing plant. 
One way to overcome these problems might be to find ways to even out the 
harvest peak so fruit is available for a longer period, or even throughout the 
year. 
•	 Farmers traditionally clear a field from the bush, grow pineapple on it for 5 
years, then abandon the field and shift to a new plot. If pineapple production 
expands further in Chibabava, new, more intensive production systems will 
be needed that include rotations to maintain soil fertility. 
•	 Few women pineapple growers have attended training, and they play little 
leadership role in the associations. It is necessary to increase their involvement 
in both these areas.
•	 Solutions to marketing problems may come from other development sectors, 
based on partnerships with other actors. This is shown by the problem of 
electricity supply in Chibabava. Solving such problems may require collabo-
rating with a wide range of actors. Such collaboration could be formalized in 
a broader local economic development framework (see page 176), which may 
lead to much greater benefits for the whole area.
•	 Documenting the experiences provides evidence of the communities’ progress 
towards commercial production and improved livelihoods. It also produces 
Chain movements
Beginning as chain actors , Chibabava’s pineapple produc-
ers have started to improve their management capabilities and 
negotiate partnerships with other actors in the value chain, 
moving them towards the chain partnership quadrant . 
The associations may also start small-scale processing of some 
of their produce. This implies the associations will need to iden-
tify new markets, new partners, new quality control systems, 
etc. Therefore they may first move to the chain integrator seg-
ment . When they have further developed their management 
skills they might evolve to chain co-owners . 


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valuable input into the policy and institutional changes that are needed if 
people throughout Mozambique are to improve their livelihoods in the long 
term.
More information: www.snvmz.org, or contact Chabir Hassam, chassam@snvworld.org, 
or Danny Wijnhoud, dwijnhoud@snvworld.org
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Forging	partnerships	between	
Tanzanian	sugarcane	producers	and	
millers
privatization in the Mid-1990s has changed Tanzania radically. With the move from a state-led to a market economy, many formerly controlled agricultural 
industries needed to find ways to survive, expand and grow. This is the story of 
how sugarcane outgrowers in the Morogoro region overcame a series of crises 
and were able to strengthen their position in chain management. 
Morogoro, in central Tanzania about 200 km west of Dar es Salaam, is one of the 
main sugar-producing regions of the country. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, 
Morogoro’s farmers acted as cane outgrowers for government-run sugar mills. 
The mills had their own farms, but they could not supply all the mills’ needs. 
Under the outgrower scheme, farmers grew the cane; the mills provided seed 
cane on credit and the services of tractors for land preparation. Workers from the 
mill would harvest the cane and take it for processing. All these services were 
deducted from the amount paid to the farmers. 
When the mills began to be privatized in 1994, the outgrowers realized they needed 
an organization to represent their interests. Three associations in Morogoro were 
formed: the Kilombero Cane Growers Association, Ruembe Outgrowers Associa-
tion, and Mtibwa Outgrowers Association. When privatization was completed in 
1997–98, these associations became the outgrowers’ legitimate representatives. 
The associations have various functions: (1) they act as spokespersons for the 
farmers; (2) they source funds to extend as loans to the farmers; (3) they provide 
education and training on improved cropping practices; (4) they seek markets and 
better prices; and (5) they promote environmental conservation. Members fund 
their activities by contributing between TSh 200 and 250 (€0.14–0.18) per tonne 
of cane harvested. The three associations have a total of 14,000 members. 
In 2000, an apex organization, the Tanzanian Sugar Cane Growers Association 
(TASGA), was formed to represent the interests of all three associations. TASGA 
represents the associations in national and international forums, and tries to 
reduce the associations’ costs and improve their effectiveness, for example by 
sourcing funds to buy fertilizers and herbicides, negotiating loans with banks 
for the association members, commissioning feasibility studies on irrigation and 
infrastructure improvements, and providing leadership training. 
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Value	chain	activities
The Morogoro outgrowers are smallholders, owning an average of 1.4 hectares 
each. They are organized into production groups, which in turn make up one of 
the three associations. Most of the outgrowers hire tractors to prepare their land, 
though a few hoe by hand. The association members farm a total of 22,000 cane 
plots, covering about 17,000 ha.
Each association has a sales agreement with the sugar companies. At harvest 
time, a harvesting schedule is drawn up and the amount of cane to deliver each 
day is determined. A joint committee fixes the cane prices for the season. Mill 
employees cut the cane and load it onto lorries, but this is changing: the associa-
tions now have loading equipment, so load much of the cane themselves. Truckers 
transport the cane to the mill, where it is weighed at the company’s weighbridge, 
and samples are collected for laboratory analysis. 
The growers are linked with the millers through their associations and by exist-
ing contracts. They are reliant on the millers: there is no other market for cane in 
the region. The millers sell most of the sugar they produce locally, but exports 
small quantities to the European Union, where it fetches very high prices. Some 
10% of the 165,000 tonnes produced in the Mtibwa and Kilombero outgrower 
schemes in 2004/5 was earmarked for the export market. In this year, Tanzania 
earned €10.3 million in export sales.
Tanzania’s five major sugar millers are grouped into the Tanzania Sugar Produc-
ers Association. 
The Sugar Board of Tanzania is a government entity that includes representa-
tives of the millers and outgrowers. It has various functions: it oversees the im-
plementation of the Sugar Act of 2001, arbitrates on behalf of its representatives, 
oversees a development fund to support outgrower infrastructure, research 
and training, and exports sugar to the European Union on behalf of the millers 
(it receives a commission for this service). The Board is also financed through a 
levy on imported sugar, contributions from the sugar millers and outgrowers, 
and from rental properties. 
The Sugar Act of 2001 requires that all sugar millers and outgrowers be registered 
and licensed. Fines are imposed if millers buy from unregistered outgrowers, or 
if farmers sell to unlicensed buyers. 
Low	prices	and	mistrust
One of the main problems in the cane industry has always been the very low 
cane prices offered to the farmers. Most of the smallholders are poor and find it 
difficult to recoup their production costs. Other problems have included lack of 
skills in crop husbandry; a lack of capital to invest in expanding their enterprises; 
and the fact that their plots are not surveyed – pushing up the cost of loans. 
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The relationship between the associations and the sugar millers has been char-
acterized with mistrust for some years. The outgrowers feel that their cane is not 
graded honestly, that the weighbridge is tampered with, and that the millers 
often delay payments.
Many of these problems existed because there were no effective mechanisms for 
farmers and millers to resolve problems. For example, from 1999 onwards, the 
millers frequently delayed payments in violation of their contracts with the as-
sociations. The situation was particularly critical in Mtibwa, where some farmers 
had to wait 6 months or longer before they were paid. 
The farmers were forced to take drastic action. They surrounded the company 
premises and prevented the employees from leaving until they paid up. This hap-
pened repeatedly – no less than seven times. Most such protests resulted in timely 
payments to the farmers, but clearly did not solve the underlying problem. 
Relationships between the growers and the millers used to be poor
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Resolving	disputes,	building	partnerships
The implementation of the Sugar Act has created a mechanism for resolving 
these issues and building trust among the various players. For example, in the 
2005–6 cane season, there was a standoff over prices between the millers and 
the associations. “No better cane prices: no harvesting of outgrower sugarcane”, 
was the slogan. Within 2 months, an agreement was reached at Kilombero. At 
Mtibwa, the Sugar Board facilitated talks leading to the signing of memorandum 
of understanding.
Together, the associations, the millers and the Sugar Board have managed to put 
in place a series of mechanisms – contracts, forums, consultations and stakeholder 
meetings – to discuss thorny issues and come up with settlements. No outside 
intermediaries have been needed. The partnership works, though it consumes a 
lot of time and effort, so there is still room for improvement.
The government has provided six extension staff to assist the outgrowers, and 
the milling company has employed an expatriate outgrower manager to assist 
the farmers.
The partnership has produced various benefits for the farmers.
•	 Financial The outgrowers now get more for their cane. The number of 
growers in Mtibwa with revenue below TSh 240,000 (€178 a year, or about 
€0.50 a day) has fallen from 43% in 1997/8 to 22% in 2003/4. The number 
earning more than TSh 1 million (€710) has jumped from less than 100 to over 
800. Over 2700 Mtibwa farmers now harvest cane – twice as many as 6 years 
Income from sugar earned by farmers in Mtibwa Outgrowers Association
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previously. Their average revenue from sugar was over TSh 1,300,000 (€1014 
a year, or €2.78 a day). 
•	 Social Now they are paid on time, the farmers can afford to weed their cane 
fields at the right time, buy fertilizers and pay casual labourers – increasing 
job opportunities for others. They can also pay school fees, so their children’s 
schooling is not interrupted. The farmers are helping build two community 
secondary schools, and they are able to construct better houses for them-
selves.
•	 Management Farmers used to complain of malpractices at the weighbridge, 
but there is now an agreement to check its accuracy every 3 months. Every 
farmer’s load of cane is sampled and analysed to determine grades. Haul-
age, loading, transporting and offloading are coordinated closely with the 
mill’s crushing capacity to avoid delays and stoppages. Both the miller and 
the outgrowers realize they have a symbiotic relationship: their prosperity 
depends on each other. The outgrowers have some bargaining power because 
as a group, they supply over half of the cane milled. The farmers have some 
influence over the management of the chain: prices, amounts of cane supplied 
The intervention has greatly improved relations between growers and the millers – and 
has created a mechanism to solve problems in the future
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Chain movements
The outgrowers started as chain actors , with little influ-
ence over management. They now have control over many 
management activities, particularly in negotiating prices and 
supply quotas .

to the mill, and decisions made by the company. The payment system has 
improved: payments are now never delayed by more than 2 months. Relations 
between the farmers and the mill management have improved markedly. 
Challenges	and	the	way	forward	
•	 Domestic market The government has given the Mtibwa sugar millers some 
30,000 ha of land to grow sugarcane and raise livestock. This poses a threat 
to the outgrowers: they fear that the company will be able to flex its financial 
muscle in cane growing. 
•	 International market The European Union is in the process of ending the 
preferential trade status of Tanzania and other countries selling sugar. It is 
expected that this will lead to price cuts of 39% within 2 years. Tanzania may 
lose €11 million a year in exports.
Tanzania can meet these challenges in two ways. 
•	 The industry can diversify and modernize to make it competitive in regional 
markets. 
•	 It can also exploit the domestic market: Tanzanians now consume only 9 kg 
of sugar each a year, the lowest rate in East Africa. This implies there is op-
portunity to expand the sugar industry if the national economy continues to 
grow. The farmers have established an infrastructure fund to enable them to 
expand production. Each farmer pays TSh 500 (€0.36) per tonne into this fund, 
which is used to improve accessibility to the cane fields.
More information: Reuben Matango, rmatango05@yahoo.com
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The	Cheetah	story:		
Helping	smallholders	in	Malawi		
access	the	paprika	market	
Cheetah Malawi ltd is part of the Dutch-owned Cheetah group of companies, which operates in Zambia (since 1994), Malawi (1995) and Mozambique 
(2001). Cheetah started paprika production in Malawi with smallholder farmers 
in 1995 as a way of spreading its political, financial and geographical risks into 
a new country. With its large tobacco production, Malawi seemed ideal for the 
introduction of this new cash crop. Paprika can be grown in the same areas as 
tobacco; the two crops are from the same botanical family, and they are grown 
in similar ways. 
Paprika is another name for sweet pepper. It looks like a hot chilli, but lacks the 
pungency. It is used to make oil (used as a natural food colorant) or ground into a 
powder and used as a spice. Cheetah delivers mainly to the oil extracting industry, 
but has its own powder plant with a state-of-the-art laboratory in Zambia. 
The trade in paprika is based on its colour, which is measured in a laboratory. The 
oil extractors have stringent colour requirements, so Cheetah de-seeds its paprika 
and exports the dried flesh, which has better colour. Nearly all the paprika grown 
in Malawi is exported to Europe, South Africa and America. 
When Cheetah started in Malawi, the smallholder sector was relatively small, but 
it grew rapidly after tobacco production was liberalized. The firm first introduced 
paprika to larger farms in various areas in 1995. The following year, smallholder 
farmers nearby started growing the crop as well. Their line of thinking was, “if the 
estate makes money with it, we can make money too”. More than 15,000 small-
holders in northern and central Malawi now grow paprika under contract with 
Cheetah. The smallholders grow an average of about 0.25 ha, producing about 
85 kg of paprika, earning €60 each season. Better organized farmers plant larger 
areas – an average of about 0.8 ha, yielding about 640 kg, worth €425 a season. 
Malawi currently produces about 1.1 million kg of paprika (expected output in 
2006) – less than 1% of world production. Cheetah trades 90% of Malawi’s output. 
The country has the potential to produce about 7.5 million kg of paprika, of which 
Cheetah hopes to trade about 3 million kg. To reach Malawi’s full potential, other 
serious promoters, investors and buyers of the crop are needed in the country.
Paprika is normally grown in rotation with maize, soybeans, groundnuts or 
beans.
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Malawi’s change from a dictatorship to democracy in the early 1990s has made 
loan defaults by farmers a serious issue. During election campaigns, politicians 
frequently try to attract votes by offering to waive loans. Naturally, this encourages 
farmers to default, ruining the credit facility. Over 10 years, all the major micro-
credit facilities have closed, and few smallholders can now get an input loan. 
Extension	and	procurement
Cheetah provides extension services to farmers through paprika clubs. Each club 
has 20–25 members, who elect a chairman, treasurer and secretary. 
Cheetah employs extension officers who are allocated to specific areas. They 
organize meetings with the paprika clubs and provide technical know-how to 
farmers, government extension workers and NGO staff. Each Cheetah extension 
officer is responsible for distributing seed, providing extension, and procuring 
paprika in his area. The extension officer coordinates a number of field assistants: 
these are local farmers with several years of experience with the crop.
Extension messages cover sowing, transplanting, field management, harvest and 
post-harvest management. Quality issues are emphasized, and all lead farmers 
and field assistants are trained how to grade paprika. For Cheetah it is very im-
portant to keep in contact with the farmers to control the quality and quantity 
of output. Without such controls, Cheetah will lose its export market. For this 
reason, Cheetah contracts with the farmers, offering them a minimum guaranteed 
dollar price before they start sowing. 
Cheetah treats smallholder farmers as business people. This means the farmers 
need to have enough information to make sound business decisions before they 
start growing paprika. 
During procurement the extension officer and paprika clubs (or the associations 
into which the clubs are grouped) together decide where to set up a buying depot 
(open 6 days a week) or collection points (open a few days a month). Farmers are 
welcome to deliver their paprika either individually, in club or association to the 
company warehouse in Lilongwe. Club and association deliveries of over 500 kg 
attract a bonus of 5%. The extension officer makes the payments to the depots, but 
club committee members can also collect their members’ money from Lilongwe. 
Cheetah subsidizes the bus fare.
Facing	problems
Cheetah and the farmers have faced several problems. These include: 
•	 Communication Cheetah’s extension officers had too little contact time with 
the farmers to get to know all the issues. They typically have one meeting in 
the morning, then must rush off to another somewhere else in the afternoon. 
They may visit a particular group of farmers only once every month or so. That 
means they have little time to get to know the farmers and their concerns.
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•	 Market structure Traders and middlemen were disturbing the procurement. 
They told false stories about Cheetah not buying in a particular area, then 
offered the farmers low prices – sometimes as little as half the price Cheetah 
was offering. 
•	 Procurement fraud Some Cheetah employees have paid farmers less than 
the correct amount for their produce. One trick was to buy A-grade paprika 
from the farmer but tell him it was B-grade – then pocket the difference. An-
other was to pay the farmer for less than was actually received.
•	 Efficiency of payment Payments to farmers were often delayed because of 
poor planning by extension officers.
•	 Registration and identification Farmers are often registered under differ-
ent names – for example, because their names are spelled in different ways 
in various documents. There are no identity cards available. This makes it 
difficult to track suppliers, and means that farmers have been able to default 
on credit. Cheetah’s computer database has 55,000 names, but only 15,000 
actually deliver paprika to the firm.
Cheetah is dealing with these problems through various initiatives – some of 
them supported by Cordaid through its “access to markets” focus. This is a 
good example of how a private sector company (Cheetah, in this case) can work 
together with an NGO (Cordaid) to improve the situation for both farmers and 
the industry.
Extra	extension	level
From farmer meetings, Cheetah realized there was need for more transparency 
and better communication. The firm has introduced a network of field assistants, 
who are elected by farmers from the area. These field assistants are prominent 
local farmers with several years of experience with paprika. Each one is respon-
sible for looking after 300–500 farmers. The field assistants are not employed by 
Cheetah, but receive a small allowance, get a bicycle and stationery, and report 
to the firm’s offices every first Monday of the month. Their incentive for helping 
Farmers bring their paprika to the collection points – or to Cheetah’s depot in Lilongwe
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farmers? Cheetah pays them a bonus, 
depending on the amount of paprika 
produced in their area. This bonus can 
be substantial: up to €250 a year, in a 
country where the GNP per capita is 
only €145.
If farmers are not happy with the per-
formance of their field assistant, they 
can elect another one. They are free 
to do so at the end of every season in 
October–November, before the next 
season starts. Cheetah has no influence 
over the farmers’ choice. 
The field assistants provide more 
detailed feedback than was possible 
through the extension workers alone. 
Communication between Cheetah and 
the farmers has improved, and the firm 
is better able to respond to issues as 
they arise. 
Computer	technology
It may seem strange to try to improve 
transparency by introducing a new computer program in a country as poor as 
Malawi. But this has proved very effective. Cheetah has developed a program 
that prints out a detailed seller-sheet for each farmer who sells paprika. The sheet 
shows information such as the bag number, quality, price, deductions, cash ad-
vances and levies for each farmer. Cheetah’s extension workers have explained 
to farmers how to read and understand this sheet. The farmers now have a 
record of what they have sold and what they are owed, can ask questions about 
their deliveries and payments, and are much less likely to be (or feel) cheated by 
Cheetah’s own staff. 
This program has brought benefits for Cheetah too. It gives the firm better insight 
and control over what it is buying. It prevents downgrading and under-weigh-
ing. Each bag is given a unique number, so can be traced throughout the process. 
Cheetah now has a full tracking and tracing system, not because of its European 
clients, but because of its producers. 
Along with the information from the field assistants, the computer system has 
enabled the firm to generate data which can be used for management decisions. 
It provides weekly updates on quality and quantity per area, as well as depot 
stocks. This helps cut transport costs and product losses. Trucks now return to 
the depot with full loads rather than half empty. 
A new computer system gives farmers a 
printout showing details of what they have 
sold. That reduces misunderstandings and 
fraud.
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The program has also shown that women are better paprika farmers than men. 
Only 22% of the farmers selling paprika are women, but they produce 35% of 
the crop sold.
Paprika	Association	of	Malawi
The Paprika Association of Malawi (PAMA) was formed by the Export Promotion 
Agency of Malawi and got its first funding from Danida. It is now supported by 
the European Union. It has grouped the paprika clubs established by Cheetah 
into associations. 
Each year a buyer–seller meeting agrees on prices for the season and sets modali-
ties and standards for buying, transport and packaging. This ensures that the 
quality and quantity are what the market requires. 
PAMA has established standards for the industry, which will reduce confusion 
among farmers, as well as with other buyers in the market. Standards on grad-
ing (4 grades have been agreed), purchasing methods and administration are 
important for a new and growing industry.
PAMA’s involvement has also helped create transparency and reducing fraud 
against, or by, farmers. All issues raised by farmers are directed to PAMA for 
consideration. This gives farmers a feeling that they are treated fairly. 
As is perhaps inevitable, PAMA faces constraints. Many of the farmer associa-
tions lack cohesion: most farmers do not feel committed to them. (This is one 
reason Cheetah provides every farmer with an individual seller-sheet.) PAMA’s 
management is also relatively weak, and has limited knowledge of the paprika 
market. 
PAMA is trying to cover its operational expenses by introducing a 5% levy, but 
it is clear that farmers will not pay it unless the government makes it mandatory. 
The farmers seem to want to benefit from PAMA’s services, such as extension 
and price negotiations, without having to contribute to it. It is important for the 
farmers and for the industry as a whole (including Cheetah) that PAMA develops 
into a capable, effective association.
Costs and benefits
Farmers have benefited in various ways from these developments. They now have 
better access to the market because the collection points are closer to their homes. 
The price negotiations have raised the average price they receive by about 11%. 
Paprika is currently a better cash crop than burley tobacco, and more farmers are 
likely to start growing it.
Cheetah has not benefited directly, but stands to gain in the long run because 
the paprika industry is slowly but surely growing and maturing. Volumes are 
increasing, and higher prices paid to farmers will stimulate production. Greater 
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volumes mean that Cheetah can reduce its extension cost per kilogram it buys, 
allowing it to raise the purchase price further.
Furthermore, PAMA monitors procurement procedures, so increasing the amount 
and quality of information coming to Cheetah management about the perform-
ance of the firm’s buying staff. This has contributed to more transparent dealings 
and less fraud.
Lessons
What lessons can be drawn from Cheetah’s experience? Here are four.
•	 Communication at the field level is very important Field assistants provide 
detailed reports about the crop and farmers’ concerns. They have improved 
the efficiency of crop collections, and it is now easier to get messages to the 
farmers, resulting in good-quality paprika.
•	 Access to markets improves production Siting the collection points care-
fully (and in agreement with the farmers) reduces the farmers’ transport costs. 
That means more farmers are willing to grow the crop, as they know who and 
where the market is.
•	 Computer technology creates transparency Cheetah’s computer program 
has enabled the firm to evaluate production better, monitor buying, track 
batches of paprika and trace any problems. The seller sheets give farmers 
much better information about what they have sold. 
•	 Other crops affect the market Tobacco prices have an impact on paprika 
production: if the tobacco price falls, farmers switch to growing paprika. 
Shortages of maize, the staple food in Malawi, mean that farmers plant maize 
to eat rather than non-traditional crops such as paprika.
Challenges	and	ambitions
Identity cards Cheetah hopes that the introduction of a “chip” card with bio-
metrics (photo, fingerprints, and identity information) for payments will help 
reduce problems in identifying farmers and cut the default rate. This new status 
item in rural areas is promoted by the Reserve Bank of Malawi. It will change 
the way Cheetah makes payments, and it will reduce the risk of running around 
with cash in the bush.
Building the capacity of PAMA PAMA requires more managerial skills as 
well as better market information on which to base price negotiations. PAMA 
is currently run on an ad-hoc basis, which is unsuitable for a newly established 
industry. PAMA and Cheetah are bound to have different interests during the 
buying season, but the two organizations help each other during the growing 
and buying seasons. PAMA informs Cheetah of problems at depots or collection 
points, enabling Cheetah to respond quickly. Farmers find that their problems are 
dealt with quicker. Problems arise when PAMA tries to be the most important 
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player in Malawi, even though it lacks market insight and information. This often 
results in confusing information going to the farmers.
Farmer cohesion in their associations is poor, since farmers are unwilling to fol-
low instructions that do not benefit them immediately.
Co-operation with NGOs Cheetah wants to work with NGOs to develop the 
full potential of the paprika industry. Many different areas need investment, but 
cannot currently be financed by existing players. Examples include training of 
trainers, capacity building, funding of research, and establishing added-value 
processing and direct partnerships with producer associations. NGOs are im-
portant at the initial stage of establishing a sound foundation for the industry. 
When volume is achieved, their support is no longer required for the core ac-
tivity, but may be vital for other new activities. The role of NGOs is not to get 
involved in trading, but to focus on linkages with the private sector if the market 
is a problem.
More players in the market Cheetah currently has an overwhelming share of 
the paprika market, but it believes that other competitors are desirable for the 
industry to grow. The government, NGOs and donors now see a near-monopoly 
situation, which they find difficult to support. Malawi has potential to produce 
enough volume of paprika to support 3 or 4 large processing and trading firms, 
as well as various smaller ones.
More information: sanderdonker@cheetah.malawi.net
Chain movements
As a result of Cheetah’s work, farmers who previously merely 
grew their crop and sold it  have taken on new activities in the 
chain (such as grading) and have increased their influence over 
operational issues such as crop collection . Communication, 
transparency and trust have improved. 
Through PAMA, farmers have gained a larger voice in the 
industry, and can influence the price structure of paprika. 
This has moved the farmers towards the “chain partnership” 
quadrant .
If PAMA is not able to strengthen its effectiveness, the farmers 
risk sliding backwards to their previous position .



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Honey,	the	liquid	gold	of	the	North	Rift	
Valley	in	Kenya	
pastoralisM is the way of life for many people in West Pokot district, in the arid North Rift area of Kenya. But cattle, goats and camels are not the only 
animals that people here keep. Some of their livestock are small and brightly 
coloured, and alight gently on flowers to sip nectar rather than crushing them 
under their hooves.
Bees are important in West Pokot. In some parts of the district, nearly every family 
has a beehive. Honey is not only an important food; it also has many other uses: 
in medicine and brewing, to pay dowries, in rituals and ceremonies, and as a food 
preservative. It is given as gifts, sold for cash, or bartered for other items.
Owners harvest the honey twice or three times a year. Most of the producers are 
men, who may own anywhere between 5 and 40 hives. Relatively little honey is 
sold, but there is potential to expand this market, according to a 2004 study by 
SNV on alternative livelihoods in the area. 
Women play only a peripheral role in selling the honey, but this role is increas-
ing, especially where new technologies have been introduced. Some women now 
have their own hives – they may have inherited them, bought them or received 
them as a donation.
Honey	Care	and	PADO
Honey Care, a private company based in Nairobi, works with groups of beekeep-
ers throughout Kenya. The company collects, processes and packages honey for 
Kenya’s leading supermarkets. Honey Care sometimes finds it difficult to fulfil 
orders from its customers because of a limited supply of good quality honey. The 
firm has even had to source honey from neighbouring countries to make up this 
deficit. Honey Care needs to improve its supplies if it is to maintain its position 
as a market leader.
PADO (the Pastoralists Area Development Organization) is a community-based 
organization that represents and serves many of West Pokot’s farmers. PADO 
helps the farmers build their management capacity and improves their access to 
markets for livestock, honey and handicrafts. Farmers frequently ask PADO for 
advice on marketing honey. Production has been good recently, so farmers have 
stepped up such requests.
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Chain	analysis
A value chain analysis by SNV in April 
2005 found that the beekeepers process 
their honey using very crude methods. 
They scoop honey, comb, wax, brood 
and pollen from the hive and mix it 
all together. The process is not hygi-
enic, and the honey is so crude that it 
has no chance of being competitive in 
the market. One producer greeted the 
study team, then checked the honey by 
dipping an unwashed hand in it. The 
honey is typically stored in containers 
made of wood and leather, or in plastic 
buckets. For sale to consumers, it is 
poured into all kinds of recycled bottles 
– whisky, mineral water, Ribena and to-
mato sauce – or even soap containers. 
The study found that a large, complex 
distribution network, dominated by 
middlemen, moves honey to the market 
from distant areas, especially during 
periods of scarcity. The markets are 
both formal and informal, though the 
informal market is larger. Most of the 
few existing producer groups are not organized properly.
Most buyers are unable to meet the demands and volumes required by the super-
markets. The buyers have to go to Tanzania and southern Sudan to buy honey. 
This is despite the fact that districts in the North Rift produce organic acacia 
honey that can command premium prices. 
Getting	the	North	Rift’s	honey	onto	shelves
There was a clear opportunity for honey from the North Rift. SNV identified 
Honey Care Africa as a partner in a process that would see West Pokot honey 
on supermarket shelves in Kenya’s cities.
Honey Care staff visited West Pokot to map where honey was available. They 
also made an initial assessment of the pricing structures and honey quality.
Honey Care then brought in equipment such as buckets for storing honey, and 
trained the farmers how to harvest honey from log hives, and how to handle and 
store it properly. The firm then started initial trials: buying 1.4 tonnes of honey 
from West Pokot, processing it and putting it on the shelves of Nakumatt, one of 
the major supermarket chains in Kenya. 
Simple technologies can improve the 
quality of honey
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This process of training and initial trial has taken 3 months. Honey Care hopes to 
buy 10 tonnes of honey from West Pokot over the next year, and to gradually raise 
volumes over the following 3 years so more farmers in the district can benefit. 
The farmers have improved their handling somewhat, so have been able to 
increase their price per kilo. Prices used to be between KSh 40 and 80 per kilo, 
depending on quality, availability and other factors; farmers can now sell to the 
private sector at KSh 91–115.
PADO has established a collection centre where the honey is tested for quality 
and is stored under hygienic conditions. The organization has a revolving fund, 
supported by Cordaid, that enables it to buy honey from individual farmers. The 
organization adds a mark-up to sustain and increase this fund. 
These efforts are gradually increasing the farmers’ influence on the chain. Better 
handling already gives them some leverage as they can attract more discerning 
customers and negotiate better prices. 
PADO has asked SNV for assistance in drawing up a marketing plan for honey. 
The organization would like to add more value to the product so it can exploit 
other local retail markets. SNV intends to do a complete business plan with PADO 
as a way of strengthening the farmers’ influence in the chain. 
Lessons
Business opportunities equal motivation Farmers are motivated if they see a 
business opportunity: the faster they can translate it into cash income, the greater 
the motivation for learning and innovation. Only a short time ago, West Pokot’s 
beekeepers could only dream of putting their honey onto supermarket shelves. 
Once they have seen it there, they have started thinking of ways to make their 
product even better. PADO has asked SNV to help develop a plan to do just this. 
This plan envisages farmers adding value to their product and exploring other 
local retail outlets. 
Entrepreneurial attitudes are important right from the start It is not only the 
farmers who need to cultivate this; intermediary organizations which aim to cre-
ate a difference in the chain must also be entrepreneurially minded.
Involve the private sector early on The immediate involvement of Honey Care 
translated into faster results and practical solutions to problems.
Ensure that the private sector is committed The best private sector partners are 
those who share the principles and values of development. This does not mean 
they should neglect the bottom line; rather, it means they should be willing to 
go in for the long haul, and to support the production base.
Build on what the farmers already know Quick results come from dealing 
with commodities that the already farmers know, as opposed to coming up with 
entirely new products. It is easier and less risky to improve existing products and 
penetrate new markets than to develop entirely new products for new markets.
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Challenges	and	ambitions	
The aim of the collaboration between SNV, PADO, Honey Care and the beekeep-
ers is to forge sustainable business linkages between producer organizations and 
the mainstream buyers. Over the next 3 years it is hoped that 3,000 beekeepers 
will benefit directly from four districts in the North Rift. 
Traditional beekeeping is a male preserve because the log hives are mounted high 
in trees and are harvested mainly at night. Improved technologies should enable 
more women to become involved. Supporting linkages with credit providers will 
also help boost women’s role in the industry.
More information: Tito Arunga, tarunga@snvworld.org
Chain movements
The beekeepers used to produce and sell a low-quality product, 
. They have improved the quality of their honey by improving 
production and storage methods. They have also improved their 
management of the chain: through PADO, they have become 
involved in bulking the product and marketing it .


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Developing	mango	market	linkages	
through farmer field schools in Kenya
sweet and deliCious – mangoes are a popular fruit in Kenya, as well as in Eu-rope and the Gulf. Demand is high, and supplies are inadequate. So why are 
Kenya’s farmers finding it difficult to take advantage of this opportunity?
Quality is one reason. Pests such as the mango weevil – a larva that tunnels into 
the flesh of mangoes making them unfit to eat – are a serious problem. So is poor 
post-harvest handling: mangoes are easily damaged, and it is important to treat 
them carefully and keep them cool. 
Production constraints include poor farming methods, the high cost and low use 
of inputs, the old age of trees, price disincentives, weakened and uncoordinated 
marketing channels, limited adoption of improved technologies, lack of invest-
ment by farmers, and a lack of disease-free planting materials. Underlying these 
problems are limitations in the extension service advising farmers.
Processing constraints include a lack of capital, poor infrastructure and inad-
equate cold storage facilities, a preference to dispose of fruits in raw form, inad-
equate information on the market and available technologies, lack of promotion 
and support for processing on-farm, and a lack of a clear policy framework on 
the development of tree crops. There is an oversupply of fruit during the peak 
season, leading to low prices. Linkages among producers, exporters, agro-proces-
sors and consumers are poor, resulting in high transaction costs. 
Mangoes	in	Kenya
Kenya is only Africa’s ninth largest producer of mangoes, but ranks second in 
terms of exports (after South Africa). The Middle East is the main export market 
for Kenyan mangoes, where they compete with fruit from India and Pakistan. A 
few mangoes are air-freighted to Europe from Nairobi. Mango exports are worth 
around KSh 150 million a year (around €1.7 million), accounting for only about 
5% of total production. The low export volume is partly because export prices 
are lower than local market prices.
Most of Kenya’s mangoes are produced by some 100,000 small-scale farmers. 
Each farmer has only a few trees, so produces and sells very small amounts. The 
farmers typically sell to brokers, export agents or local traders. These tend to be 
unreliable trading partners: they offer low, unstable prices, and take an unpre-
dictable amount of produce. Farmers are not organized for bulk handling and 
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transportation, so they and the buyers cannot benefit from economies of scale. The 
farmers feel exploited, and would prefer longstanding commercial relationships 
with buyers who are able to buy in bulk at reasonable prices.
Tana River and Lamu, in Coast Province, are Kenya’s leading mango producing 
districts, with 8,230 ha out of the country’s 15,000 ha under mango production. 
Farmers sell mangoes in various ways:
•	 They sell small amounts of fruit directly to consumers at open-air markets 
and by the roadside.
•	 They sell to brokers who visit the farmers. These brokers in turn feed whole-
sale markets (such as Kongowea in Mombasa or Wakulima in Nairobi), local 
retail shops and supermarkets. 
•	 They sell at central collection points where producers, brokers, traders and 
middlemen meet and trade wholesale volumes. The fruits are sorted, graded, 
packaged and transported for sale to institutions, grocery stores and super-
markets.
•	 Agents and brokers buy mangoes at the farm gate and deliver to Milly Fruit 
Processors Ltd. This firm makes various products: mango juice concentrate 
for export, canned juice that is sold to tourist hotels and Unilever (K) Ltd., and 
a locally popular soft drink (Picana). The state-of-the-art plant at Mtwapa, 12 
km north of Mombasa, can handle 30,000 tons of fruits a year. It also proc-
esses pineapples, grapefruits, oranges, passion fruits and tomatoes into fruit 
concentrates. 
Before
Now
The goal
The evolution of the mango value chain in Tana River and Lamu
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•	 Some individuals have set up cottage industries producing mango juice for 
sale to the tourist industry. These are key suppliers to tourist hotels in Mom-
basa.
•	 Some farmer groups have invested in mango drying and juice extraction; they 
supply hotels and street vendors.
Intervening	in	the	chain
Recognizing the fruit’s high growth potential, Kenya Business Development 
Services (KBDS) (a USAID-funded programme) and two government agencies 
(the Ministry of Agriculture and the Coast Development Authority) decided to 
focus on improving the production, processing and marketing of mangoes. They 
introduced a new approach that emphasizes commercialization in production, 
marketing and provision of support services such as extension. The Coast De-
velopment Authority in collaboration with Fineline Systems and Management 
Ltd. were commissioned to implement this approach. 
A study of the mango sub-sector identified constraints and appropriate business 
development services, and led to the design of market interventions. The study 
found that smallholder farmers were unorganized, isolated, and detached from 
commercial market opportunities. They understood the benefits of collective or-
ganization, but they lacked the initiative to form producer groups. Such groups 
were needed to improve the producers’ market position in terms of quality and 
quantity, as well as increase their bargaining power and leverage over buyers. 
A strong, dynamic producer network would also streamline the mango supply 
chain.
Developing and honouring contracts between farmers and firms used to be a 
problem. Tempted by higher prices offered by “briefcase exporters” and preda-
tory brokers during the peak seasons, many farmers broke their contracts. The 
major firms, in turn, expended limited effort to sign contracts with farmers, or to 
help them form groups. The firms clearly saw the benefit of doing this, but they 
lacked the capacity to nurture such groups into reliable entities that would be 
capable of honouring their commitments.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Coast 
Development Authority and KBDS introduced a “farmer field school” approach 
to tackle these issues. Farmer field schools are an agricultural extension methodol-
ogy that empowers farmers’ groups to understand their production environment, 
identify production problems and develop solutions internally. Farmers analyse 
problems as a group, solve problems together, and learn by doing so. The field 
schools are held on the farmers’ own land. 
The field school approach was used to help the farmers learn various aspects of 
mango production, processing and marketing. The training covered: 
•	 Production: mango production and orchard management, pests and diseases, 
and induced flowering to reduce seasonality.
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•	 Post-harvest handling and processing.
•	 Marketing.
•	 Credit: establishment and strengthening of micro-credit facilities. 
•	 Networks: formation of district farmers’ networks to coordinate the mango 
sub-sector, deal with production, processing and marketing, and improve the 
bargaining power of mango farmers in marketing their produce.
•	 Extension: the need to pay for extension services.
Chain	upgrading
The farmers formed district-wide networks as a result of this training. These 
networks in turn attracted firms such as Cirio Del Monte Ltd. as a market for 
fruit juice concentrate. Other players have come in too: the United Nations De-
velopment Programme and the Poverty Eradication Commission will provide 
small-scale processing plants to the networks so they can process mangoes into 
concentrate, which they will supply to Del Monte.
Building	engagement
The farmers have greater access to demand-driven extension services, resulting 
in increased productivity as well as product quality. The networks are registered 
as legal entities and can sign contracts with bulk mango buyers. Traders and 
brokers buying mangoes have to go through the networks, which has increased 
the farmers’ bargaining power and pushed prices up. Fresh markets have opened 
through contracts with new buyers. The buyers have also benefited, since their 
transaction costs have fallen. 
The facilitating agencies established microcredit schemes to ensure the pro-
gramme could continue after the donor funding ceased. The networks in both 
districts opened bank accounts and started raising funds from registration fees 
(KSh 2500, or €28 per group) and monthly subscription fees (KSh 200, or €2.25 
per individual member). They hope to raise KSh 2.2 million (about €25,000) so 
they can buy a lorry.
Outcomes	
The farmers have made significant gains from the improved supply chains and 
linkages with buyers. Prices have risen in the last 2 years from KSh 0.30 to KSh 
5 per fruit (from less than half a euro cent to 5 cents). Production and marketed 
volumes have more or less doubled, and quality has improved significantly. 
Many development agencies used to avoid the Tana River district because of se-
curity concerns. The mango project has shown it is possible for outsiders to work 
in this area, so there is increased interest to implement other projects there.
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Lessons
•	 Farmer field schools can be used as a participatory tool to promote market 
linkages. They ensure sustainability, and both private and public sectors are 
willing to support them.
•	 The public sector, NGOs and donors may have to take the initiative to pro-
mote pro-poor market linkages. The initial social costs involved may make it 
impossible for farmers or the private sector to act on their own.
•	 Private-public sector partnerships are easily achieved through the farmer 
field school approach since it offers a participatory, inclusive approach to 
marketing initiatives.
Challenges	
The project was implemented in one division in each district. It has benefited 
about 2,000 farmers. Its positive impact has raised the hopes of other divisions 
and other farmers – but donor funding will be needed to support the start-up 
costs for further up-scaling.
Much was achieved during the 2-year life of the project. But continuity is threat-
ened because the institutional structures are still very young. Brokers and traders 
who have been dislodged from the supply chain may compete or interfere with 
the new marketing arrangements. 
More information: contact Masai Masai, ffsprogm@africaonline.co.ke or shmasai@yahoo.
com
Chain movements
Before the intervention, farmers were chain actors: they were 
disorganized, had little bargaining power, and had limited con-
trol of marketing and processing . 
Through the project, they have signed contracts with the buy-
ers, so are moving into a chain partnership .

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Learning from challenges: Sunflower 
contract	farming	in	northern	Tanzania
farMers have to adapt in order to survive. The farmers of Mwada Ward, 140 km west of Arusha in northern Tanzania, know this from bitter experience. 
Up to the 1980s, Mwada was a major cotton-growing area. The smallholder farm-
ers there used to sell their cotton to the Rift Valley Cooperative Union, which 
provided them with all their inputs and marketed the cotton they produced. 
When it collapsed, the farmers were forced to sell to private traders. These proved 
unreliable partners: they offered such low prices that the farmers could not make 
any money, and sometimes did not turn up to buy, leaving the farmers with large 
stocks of unsold cotton.
So the farmers looked around for other sources of income. The local soils are light 
sandy loams, good for growing oilseeds. So the farmers started planting peanuts, 
sesame – and sunflower. 
The crops produce well, but in terms of markets, things have not improved much. 
The farmers still sell their produce at the farm gate to middlemen who collect small 
amounts from each farmer. The farmers have no control over prices, weights or 
measures. Instead of using kilograms, the traders use over-filled bags as the unit 
of measure (see also page 22). The farmers are forced to take whatever price they 
can get, and bow to the traders’ dictates. Demand and prices fluctuate wildly, 
depending on the season and yields. Sometimes the farmers are still unable to 
sell their produce. 
The traders transport the sunflower and sell it to processors in Arusha, Moshi and 
Dar es Salaam. Small-scale processors in Babati town also buy sunflower through 
the same middlemen, process and sell it to wholesalers or consumers in Babati. 
Most of the farmers cultivate 1–3 ha of rainfed land. They are not organized into 
producer groups, and have no direct link to the processors. Extension services, 
credit facilities and other types of support are poor or absent. 
Supporting sunflowers
Faida MaLi, a non-profit organization working on market linkages in Tanzania, 
analysed the sunflower seed market and the problems faced by farmers and 
buyers. Sunflower processors complained that their seed supply was unreliable, 
while farmers were planting low quality varieties and did not have an assured 
market outlet for their produce. Faida MaLi decided to help the farmers find 
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better markets. The idea was to link them with reliable buyers under long-term 
business agreements. This intervention proceeded along the ten basic steps of 
the Faida MaLi market linkage approach (see page 178). 
Part of Faida MaLi’s analysis was to identify potential buyers (Step 1 in the ap-
proach). Faida MaLi found that most companies are not interested in working with 
small-scale farmers and do not have the capacity to set up outgrower schemes. 
But more important, they have little interest in developing the capacities of farm-
ers in the first place. 
However, Hai Investments, a firm based in Arusha, heard of Faida MaLi’s ac-
tivities in oilseeds. Hai Investments was involved in gemstone mining and the 
petroleum business, but became interested in sunflower processing. 
Faida MaLi assisted Hai Investments to develop a business plan. The company 
decided to set up two small plants to process 8 tons of seeds per day. A memo-
randum of understanding was drawn up, stating that Faida MaLi would facilitate 
the linking and contracting process with the sunflower farmers. 
Faida MaLi did a detailed location survey to map out specific villages with suit-
able agro- ecological conditions. The district and village governments helped 
mobilize farmers in these villages. Faida MaLi organized about 180 interested 
farmers into three groups so they could benefit from economies of scale and 
market their produce collectively. The farmers were trained on contract farming 
schemes, how to negotiate and make sure the contract covers everything (seeds, 
transport, etc.). Faida MaLi also helped the farmers to calculate their costs so they 
would know the price they would need to be profitable.
The farmers discussed the contract arrangements
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Faida MaLi also helped Hai Investments draft a contract for the outgrower 
scheme. The firm discussed this draft with the farmer groups. The farmers were 
able to negotiate changes in some of the contract conditions: for example, rather 
than the farmers’ having to transport the produce to the city, the company would 
come and collect it at village collection centres. The fixed price was set at TSh 120 
(€0.09) per kg. This was a good price for the farmers because it gave the farmers 
certainty: market prices would fluctuate between TSh 50 and 150 (€0.04–0.11), 
depending on the season. 
Faida MaLi played a crucial role: to ensure a smooth and transparent business 
engagement, and to build trust among the farmers and between the farmers and 
the firm. Hai Investments signed production contracts with the farmer groups. 
Every farmer signed an annex to the contract indicating how much he would grow. 
Each farmer agreed to pay to Faida MaLi 5% of the value of what they sold to Hai 
Investments, while the firm also agreed to pay Faida MaLi a 10% commission on 
the amount it bought. It was important for both the company and the farmers to 
understand the essence of ownership and commitment to the partnership. 
Season	by	season
The first season went well as far as contracting arrangements were concerned. 
However, yields were well below expectations (only 5 tons), and incomes low 
(around TSh 608,400, or only €440) because many farmers, despite joining the 
group, did not grow the crop, and others planted only test plots for fear that the 
company would not honour the contract – like other traders before. Despite the 
shortfalls, the company liked the arrangement – it was highly committed to the 
contract scheme. Farmers started to trust the company when it came back in the 
second season. 
The second season saw more farmers joining the scheme. Seven producer groups 
with 104 farmers (75 men, 29 women and 5 primary schools) produced 137 tons 
of sunflower, worth TSh 16.5 million (€12,000). The price per kilogram stayed at 
TSh 120 (€0.09) – still a competitive price on the market. 
During the harvesting season a problem arose. A buyer from Dar es Salaam 
came, offering double the price. The buyer could offer these high prices because 
he mixes the sunflower oil with bad quality, unpurified, imported oils. Faida 
MaLi warned the farmers that the new buyer could not be trusted. Still, two of 
the seven farmers groups decided to sell to him, breaching their contract. The 
buyer bought 7 tonnes and never appeared again. 
Hai Investments was disappointed and decided to withdraw from the contract for 
those groups who had sold on the side. But now they had nowhere to sell. They 
came to the Faida MaLi for help. Faida MaLi advised them to talk to the company 
and if possible, negotiate new terms. Through Faida MaLi’s mediation, Hai Invest-
ments agreed to buy the crop, but at the prevailing low market prices. 
Yields were very high and Hai Investments had too little working capital to buy 
all the produce. Faida MaLi facilitated access to a commercial short-term loan to 
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help it manage its cash flow problems. 
In the third season the farmers negotiated with the company to pre-finance 
production activities such as ploughing, the supply of higher yielding seed with 
high oil content, and weeding. The farmers paid 40% upfront into a group savings 
account to be used as collateral, while the company covered 100% of the produc-
tion costs, to be recovered from farmers’ sales after harvest. A total of 572.5 acres 
(232 ha) were ploughed, all through the pre-financing scheme. Over 500 farmers 
(410 men, 122 women) joined the scheme.
Unfortunately, the seed did not germinate well, leading to very poor crop stands. 
Faida MaLi mediated once more in this conflict and advised the group leaders to 
report the issue and discuss it amicably with the company, based on the stipu-
lated contract conditions. They reached a consensus: the company visited the 
fields to check on the crop, and then supplied better quality seed and harrowed 
the fields. 
The weather was very dry, leading to total crop failure in many places. Only 49.4 
tons were harvested, and the farmers could not repay the loan. The situation was 
made worse when the market was suddenly flooded with cheap imported cooking 
oil, rendering locally processed oil uncompetitive. Faida MaLi facilitated Hai In-
vestments to boost demand for its oil by promoting it at a trade fair in Arusha. 
Despite this, in the fourth season, the company decided to pull out of the sun-
flower business, sold off its remaining stocks, and closed the factory. Most of the 
farmers stopped growing sunflower, while others had to sell again to traders.
Outcomes
The farmers were disappointed about losing this business opportunity. But they 
were satisfied about the experience itself. They could count various achieve-
ments:
•	 Their incomes had gone up within a short period because of the better market 
and higher prices: TSh 120 (€0.09) instead of the prevailing price of TSh 70 
(€0.05) per kilogram.
•	 They could plant improved sunflower varieties and produce quality seeds. 
Their yield per unit area rose from 180 kg/acre to 480 kg/acre (from 440 to 
1000 kg/ha).
•	 They were better organized into groups and had acquired basic managerial 
and business skills. Five of the women farmers now participate in local gov-
ernment councils. 
•	 The intervention created jobs: each family employed at least two casual work-
ers to supplement the family’s own labour. 
Despite Hai Investment’s withdrawal, the farmers were satisfied with growing 
sunflower, and they requested to be linked to a new buyer. Faida MaLi has already 
identified another interested buyer based in the city of Moshi. 
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Faida MaLi must also improve the farmers’ capacity so they can identify new 
market opportunities without depending Faida MaLi’s services.
Lessons
•	 Build farmers’ entrepreneurial capacity The farmers did not have the ca-
pacity to find new market opportunities by themselves. Without Faida MaLi’s 
assistance, the farmers would stay as chain actors. Bringing the farmers into the 
process at an earlier stage, particularly during the initial sub-sector analysis, 
might have avoided this problem. 
•	 Choose partners who are committed The crop being promoted should 
be the main source of income for the company. Hai Investments had other 
businesses to attend to (gemstones, petroleum), so investment in marketing 
and promoting sunflower were not a priority for it after a losing season. The 
facilitator should avoid building linkages with start-ups or companies that 
are new to a particular line of business.
•	 Ensure all sides are committed Initial commitments are crucial for building 
engagement, and to ensure continuity and expansion of the scheme. All parties 
must honour contracts. Total commitment by the company and farmers is a 
prerequisite for success. Side-selling by farmers to other buyers is a problem, 
as is a sole buyer that can dictate unfair conditions.
•	 Choose commodities carefully Realize that a crop with a single buyer poses 
high risk that needs to be compensated for by a higher price. Alternatively, 
crops need to be identified that have several buyers to reduce risk.  
•	 Be prepared to mediate One of the most important roles that Faida MaLi 
played was to mediate conflicts. In situations where contracts are not hon-
oured (e.g., farmers side-selling, companies not delivering inputs on time), 
the market facilitator must spend a great deal of time to re-establish trust 
between the partners.
More information: www.faidamarketlink.or.tz or contact Tom Sillayo, tom.sillayo@
faidamarketlink.or.tz
Chain movements
The intervention helped the farmers to develop from chain ac-
tors  into chain partners. The farmers were able to negotiate 
contract conditions and influence the management of the chain 
by negotiating for the company to collect the seed from village 
collection points, demanding high-quality seeds, having their 
fields re-ploughed, and getting production loans .
However, now that Hai Investments is out of the sunflower 
processing business, the farmers are back to being chain 
actors .

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Organic	coffee	from	Kilimanjaro
volatile priCes, high input costs, high overhead costs, unhappy coop members – these are problems familiar to many cooperative managers. The manag-
ers of the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU) knew they had to do 
something to stop even more of the union’s members from selling the coffee they 
had produced to private buyers rather than to the coop.
KNCU’s solution? Go organic. The organic and fair trade markets offer better 
prices than the regular coffee market. But penetrating these markets is not simple: 
they have strict conditions, and it is necessary to develop linkages with different 
players.
The	coffee	chain
KNCU’s 120,000 smallholder members 
are grouped into 90 small groups or 
primary societies. Individual farmers 
grow coffee, harvest the cherries, re-
move the pulp that covers the beans, 
then wash, dry and grade the beans. 
They bring the dried beans to their 
primary group, where the amount each 
farmer brings is registered. The coffee 
is then taken to KNCU’s curing factory, 
where the beans are further processed, 
graded and packaged. Each batch is 
labelled so its origin can be traced. The 
primary groups are paid according to 
the amount of coffee processed. Most 
of the coffee is exported to the USA, 
and a small amount is sold as a finished 
product. 
KNCU’s management organizes the ex-
ports and negotiates the farm gate and 
export prices. The difference between 
these prices is intended to cover the 
coop’s overhead costs. Organic coffee fetches higher prices – but 
must overcome many hurdles before it can 
be certified
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Founded in 1929, KNCU is the oldest cooperative in Africa. It was originally set 
up by the government in a rather top-down way, with limited participation by 
the farmers. This legacy is still reflected in a feeling among members that the 
management does not take their interests fully into account. This gets worse when 
world market prices drop, causing farm gate prices to fall. The farmers complain 
about the coop’s high overhead costs. They feel that the formula used to calculate 
prices is unfair and they have limited involvement in “their” coop. Many started 
selling to private buyers who offered better prices. The coop was in a crisis.
Converting	to	organic
KNCU learned through its contacts that going organic and obtaining “fair trade” 
certification would open new opportunities to access better markets. For support 
it approached Epopa, a private consultancy company that specializes in market-
ing organic products. 
Epopa’s approach is to work with a small group of farmers and use them as a 
catalyst for innovation. The idea is that other farmers will see their good practices 
and higher incomes, and will want to learn from them and join in the project.
KNCU did not have organic expertise, so Epopa assisted the farmers convert 
their farms to organic production. Epopa conducted mobilization meetings with 
primary society members. Seven primary societies, with 1700 farmer members, 
were selected based on their willingness and readiness to join the project. The soils 
and microclimate on the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro are ideal for coffee production, 
but the farmers were applying high doses of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides. 
These inputs were expensive, and converting to organic production took quite 
some effort. At first, some of the farmers were sceptical about making a profit, 
while others did not comply with organic farming standards. For these reasons, 
two of the seven primary societies, with about 500 members, dropped out.
Each of the five remaining groups has a permanent technical field officer. They 
are supervised by a manager who is responsible for making sure that the organic 
standards are kept to. The Epopa consultant spends an average of 4 days per 
month coordinating the project activities. This includes technical advice, training, 
field visits to identify problems, and searching for solutions. 
Epopa also implemented internal quality control procedures, paid the certifica-
tion costs, and found new markets.
•	 Certification Epopa agreed with KNCU to share the costs of organic certi-
fication. The certification procedure requires a 3-year conversion period: in 
the first year, Epopa paid 100%; in the second year, 50%; and from the third 
year onwards, KNCU paid 100%. During this period Epopa trained KCNU’s 
technical staff, who in turn trained the farmers how to farm organically.
•	 Internal control system Epopa has helped the farmer groups get organic 
certification. The farmers have had to stop using synthetic inputs, relying 
instead solely on naturally available inputs and environmental restoration 
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principles. Epopa facilitated this conversion and developed an internal control 
system to ensure that farmers comply with it. 
•	 Marketing assistance Epopa has linked the KNCU management with po-
tential buyers. It surveyed the market provided market information to enable 
the management to adjust to market dynamics. Epopa takes the management 
to trade fairs where they can meet with interested importers and strike busi-
ness deals. 
Epopa does not take part in the chain itself. Rather, it facilitates the links between 
KNCU and the rest of the chain, hoping that during the 3 years of the project 
funding these links will grow and become sustainable. 
In the second year, KNCU applied for and was granted certification under the US 
Department of Agriculture’s National Organic Program. In 2004 the cooperative 
exported about 40 tons of organic coffee to three firms in the USA, at a price of 
TSh 400–500 (€0.28–0.36) higher than the conventional price.
Outcomes
The intervention has resulted in many benefits:
•	 Quality and price of product The quality of the members’ coffee has risen 
through the conversion to organic production. This has led to higher farm gate 
and market prices. The farmers make more money and are more motivated, 
and the cooperative earns more revenue. 
•	 Lower costs Now they no longer have to buy synthetic inputs, the farmers’ 
production costs have sunk, and they have revived neglected fields. 
International buyers (USA)
KNCU
Organic coffee growers
KNCU management and technical staff
Structure of the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union
Primary 
society
Primary 
society
Primary 
society
Primary 
society
Primary 
society
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•	 Increased competitiveness KNCU has increased its competitiveness and 
is now able to compete with the local private traders by offering higher farm 
gate prices to its members. 
•	 Stronger market position With organic coffee as a unique selling point, the 
position of the coop in the market has improved.
•	 Strengthened capacity The coop staff are capable of ensuring compliance 
with organic standards, and the management has become more responsive 
to the needs of its members.
•	 Environmental benefits Abandoning the use of synthetic chemicals has 
helped restore nature and enhance biodiversity.
Challenges	and	the	future
The farmers’ interest in organic agriculture has been driven by their need to 
make a profit in the short term. Yet the switch to organic farming promises to 
have many environmental benefits that will continue into the future. In the short 
term, the switch may lower yields and discourage farmers. The conversion period 
offers a good way for farmers to adjust since they can get higher prices for their 
produce.
As farmers come to appreciate the benefits of organic farming, more can be 
expected to join the scheme. Including them is possible because it would not 
significantly increase the costs of the consultancy or KNCU’s overhead. 
The intervention has improved KNCU’s responsiveness to its members, and 
has enabled the coop to seek new markets by itself. The technical staff can now 
provide training and control quality on their own. 
Even after phasing out, Epopa still keeps an allowance to provide support to its 
former clients. This enables it to address minor problems that might threaten 
long term sustainability. The idea is not to make an abrupt exit without provid-
ing some limited support. 
Organic coffee is not the end of the road for KNCU. The coop is now moving 
into finished products and tourism, further diversifying and strengthening the 
income base of its members.
Lessons
•	 Transparency More transparency within the cooperative would help to 
improve the image of the cooperative among the members. There should 
be clear communication between the management and the farmers’ groups 
on issues such as delayed payments and price differences among the farmer 
groups.
•	 Seeing is believing Initially farmers are understandably sceptical about 
new ventures. They need assurance about the market and trust before the 
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real business starts. Many would like to see the benefits first before they join 
in a project. 
•	 Difficulty of including poorer farmers Poor farmers initially do not meet 
the minimum requirements of joining in projects like this. But they can qualify 
later on as the project expands.
•	 Need for short-term benefits Farmers adopt an innovation if they can get 
quick returns. If there is only a small difference in the price of organic and 
conventional coffee, farmers are less likely to see a reason to join even if the 
longer term benefits are apparent. A number of farmers dropped out during 
the lengthy conversion period. 
•	 Competition helps The presence of private traders within the project area 
forced the KNCU management become more responsible to its members.
More information: www.epopa.info or contact Rainard Mjunguli, ray.mjunguli@agroeco.
net 
Chain movements
The coffee farmers of KNCU started off as chain actors, with 
little control over their marketing or over the coop that suppos-
edly represented them. Their only way of influencing the market 
was to sell to private traders rather than to the coop .
The intervention has strengthened the coop’s linkages with 
the market and control over the prices it obtains. It has also 
made the coop management more responsive to the members’ 
needs .
The coop is now moving into vertical integration by diversifying 
into finished products and tourism .

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Farmer field school networks in 
Western	Kenya
sMall-sCale farMers in western Kenya produce mainly for their own use, and tend to sell any surplus quite close to home – often less than 30 km away, 
according to a study by the Kenya Agricultural Commodity Exchange (KACE) 
commissioned by FAO. Many farmers sell at the farm gate, or in open-air or 
roadside markets. 
Cities such as Mombasa, Nairobi, Nakuru and Kisumu offer a very high potential 
for farmers to market their surplus. So do smaller towns and the export market 
(especially for fruits and vegetables). Farmers grumble that they have limited 
market outlets for their fresh produce – while at the same time supermarkets 
such as Uchumi and Nakumatt complain that supplies are inconsistent in terms 
of both quantity and quality.
Identifying	the	problem	
Since 1996, FAO has supported farmer field schools in three districts (Bungoma, 
Busia and Kakamega) in Western Kenya. This work has been in close collaboration 
with the Ministry of Agriculture’s district offices, and has been funded by IFAD. 
The programme has provided field schools with grants to carry out experiential 
learning activities on agricultural production.
Initial phases of the programme succeeded in helping farmers orient themselves 
towards commercial farming, but individual farmers had limited opportunities 
to market their output. Selling as individuals resulted in fluctuating prices and 
high transaction costs such as transport. The situation can be summarized as 
follows:
• Poor access to reliable and competitive produce markets, coupled with low 
and fluctuating prices as a consequence of underdeveloped and inadequate 
market outlets and limited market information.
• Unexploited market opportunities because farmers lack the know-how and 
skills to take advantage of value-added activities such as grading, cleaning, 
sorting, packaging, storage, bulking and processing. Poor access to marketing 
services and facilities is also a major limitation. 
• Poor understanding of supply and demand among farmers, and how these 
forces create markets.
• Limited financing and credit facilities, so farmers have no capital to invest 
in jump-starting business-oriented farming. Part of this problem is that many 
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farmers tend to look for grants and not to consider loans. However, most loans 
offered to farmers in Western Kenya carry high interest rates, so present them 
with significant risks.
• High farm input costs, coupled with poor distribution services and long 
distances to input outlets have resulted in low use of farm inputs. Inputs 
come in bulk packages that smallholders cannot afford. Good quality seed is 
hard to find. Many outlets sell fake seeds, and input suppliers play on this to 
promote their own varieties.
• Lack of effective organizational and managerial capacity to meet the de-
mands of agribusiness development. There is no one who can identify and 
access service providers in agribusiness and establish linkages with the private 
sector. 
• Poor access to current market price information on any commodity.
• Poor communication among members of field schools and between field 
school groups, resulting in the failure to use their marketing power by selling 
as a group.
Individual field schools were not able to share information and best practices 
among themselves. They needed ways to increase their competitiveness in the 
market. 
The majority of the field school members sell small amounts of surplus produce. 
They do not deliberately plan to grow crops to satisfy particular consumer require-
Farmer field schools: A successful approach to organizing 
and empowering farmers
A “farmer field school” is an agricultural education and empowerment approach often used 
in extension programmes. Groups of farmers learn together; they study their production 
environment and constraints, and identify and develop solutions to problems. The approach 
emphasizes joint problem analysis, learning and problem solving. All the activities are done 
in the farmers’ own fields. 
The field school approach has been very effective to help farmers to test and develop im-
proved farming practices and to support each other through their groups. It provides farmers 
with tools and skills they need to improve their farm production. It is also very effective in 
empowering farmers and developing transparent leadership. 
The field school approach has been introduced in various African countries by FAO since 
the mid-1990s. It is now widely applied throughout the continent in a broad range of en-
terprises. Field schools are currently running in 27 countries in Africa, with support from a 
large number of organizations. 
Successful field school programmes have markedly improved production in both food and 
cash-oriented enterprises. But surpluses create a new need – for better marketing linkages 
and strategies, and to reorient production to meet market demands. 
In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, this has led to the formation of field school networks to 
bring the members into commodity or producer associations so they can improve their 
agri-business linkages. In Mali, groups of field schools have formed apex organizations, 
organized around value chains. 
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ments. Many farmers tend to sell similar produce, flooding the market during 
the harvesting season. They are forced to be price takers, as they have limited 
access to market outlets and information. They add very little extra value, though 
simple grading, product differentiation and convenience packaging are becoming 
increasingly important, especially for the urban consumers.
Another problem in Western Kenya is that field school members are the victims 
of the current “hot commodity”. Farmers tend to plant what they hear is a good 
commodity, without checking the market for it. Sometimes farmers in other ar-
eas with different growing and marketing conditions pass on news about these 
commodities. 
Chain	activities	
Most of the field school members in Western Kenya are still in the process of 
organizing themselves into commodity marketing or common-interest groups 
under a field school network. They are yet to have a significant influence on 
pricing structure and other value chain activities – though they do appreciate 
the potential to do so. 
Interventions
Farmer field schools were initially formed to address agricultural production con-
cerns. But it quickly became clear that members needed sell their extra output they 
were now producing, so had to strengthen their agri-business linkages. Most of 
the field schools have evolved to meet these new challenges and opportunities. 
After the initial stage of the field school programme ended, the graduates wanted 
to carry on. So they formed networks in 2000 (Busia) and 2001 (Bungoma and 
Kakamega). Farmer field school networks now exist in ten districts in Kenya. Most 
of the networks also act as intermediary or apex organizations linking farmers to 
service providers, markets and information.
On the upstream side, the field schools have been linking farmers to suppliers 
of seeds and fertilizers. They have also forged ties to extension and research 
agencies to learn about and test new technologies with commercial potential. 
The Kakamega field school network,  for instance, has been taking orders to buy 
bulk seed from the Western Seed and Kenya Seed companies. This should give 
its members low-cost, quality. The Bungoma network has opened its own input 
supply centre, which sells good-quality seeds and fertilizer at below the market 
price, in small packs that farmers can use and afford. The Farm Inputs Programme 
Support, a USAID-funded service provider has been a major partner in this proc-
ess. Some of the field schools have also supported initiatives in accessing credit 
and agro-processing activities.
On the downstream side, the field schools have started to link members to major 
buyers of fresh produce, such as supermarkets, hotels and restaurants and even 
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export markets, especially for fruits and vegetables. The Kakamega network, 
for example, has facilitated a marketing arrangement between its members and 
supermarkets (Uchumi, Nakumatt) and grocers in Nairobi through an interme-
diary market facilitator, the Kenya Agricultural Commodity Exchange (KACE). 
KACE links producers to non-traditional market segments without increasing 
their transaction costs. In the Coast Province, field school activities resulted in 
improved mango quality, leading to a contract to supply Del Monte (a large fruit 
exporter and processor) with concentrated mango juice (see page 79).
Adding value is becoming increasingly important. Farmer field school networks 
in Western Kenya have been collaborating with local service providers in bulk-
ing, cleaning, drying and packaging of maize and other grain legumes to sup-
ply major flour millers. Similarly, the Kakamega network has collaborated with 
service providers on bulking, cleaning, drying and packaging orange-fleshed 
sweet potatoes. It has also procured five hand-operated stainless steel shredders 
so members can produce dry sweet potato or cassava chips. The price of good-
quality dry chips in Nairobi through KACE is seven times higher than of the fresh 
produce. In addition, the chips can be stored longer until a buyer is found who 
is willing to offer the right price. The fresh product, on the other hand, can spoil 
during storage and transport.
Interventions to add value are promising for the networks as they reduce risks 
as well as increase commodity values. Continued efforts in this area help force 
the networks to sell as a group, open markets for the farmers, and increase their 
net income from commodity sales. 
Registering	the	right	way
When they were established, all the field school networks were registered as com-
munity-based organizations with the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. But 
this form of registration does not allow them to operate as a legal entity, so they 
are disqualified from buying and selling on behalf of their members, or register-
ing with brokers such as KACE. 
Some of the networks have sought legal advice on the most suitable form for 
registration. The Kakamega network concluded that the requirements of the 
Cooperative Act meant that it would not be suitable to register as a cooperative. 
So the network was advised to register as a limited company.
Chain	upgrading
Progress in transforming and re-orienting production to market-driven demand 
has been varied among the farmer field schools, enterprises and market outlets. 
Most of the field schools and their members are still chain actors. But in Western 
Kenya, efforts are more advanced because of efforts of various development 
partners: training in “farming as a business” (through FAO), market development 
facilitation (KACE), resource mobilization and business development.
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New and critical focus areas include building capacity in marketing, agribusiness 
development and farm management. Training modules on marketing linkages, 
“farming as a business” and other topics have been developed, and are being 
improved and incorporated into the field school curriculum.
Lessons	
The field school networks, especially in Kakamega, have been undergoing a major 
learning process as they have moved from chance marketing to more organized 
and formal marketing channels. The Kakamega network learned a major lesson 
when it experienced major problems in fulfilling a contract with KACE. The net-
work could not estimate the amount of sweet potatoes its farmers had in their 
fields. As a result, the farmers harvested one-quarter of the number of bags they 
needed, and they had to ask the Busia network  to help make up the shortfall. The 
Kakamega network realized it needed better data, so developed a crop inventory 
database to enable it to decide what trading offers and arrangements to make. 
Other problems occurred when some Kakamega network members provided 
shipments of mixed varieties and poorly graded tubers. The members have since 
received training in sorting and grading.
More serious was the transportation issue. The network hired a closed truck, 
leading to high temperatures in the load during transport. When the truck took 
too long to reach Nairobi, its load started to deteriorate. In future the network will 
hire an open truck. In the long run, it wants to acquire its own truck to overcome 
transport problems.
Despite these problems, KACE was still interested in working with the Kakamega 
network, and expressed interest in a new delivery of fresh sweet potatoes and 
quality chips. In December 2005 the network was in a position to deliver 6 tons 
of quality sweet potato chips at KSh 85 (about €0.80) per kilogram to a miller in 
Nairobi – worth half a million shillings. Despite the glitches in the first contract, 
the network still believes it can fulfil a contract for KACE. Its “learning by doing” 
strategy is a key principle of the field school approach.
Challenges
The three field school networks in Western Kenya (Kakamega, Bungoma and 
Busia) show clear differences as a consequence of differences in leadership and 
financial and technical resources. The Kakamega network, for example, benefits 
from the presence of a Peace Corps market facilitator. While the Kakamega net-
work is significantly ahead, it still has a lot to learn. The three districts will be 
receiving more major support through a second phase of the IFAD-supported 
field school programme. 
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Major challenges will include:
• Ensuring demand-driven market facilitation.
• Diversifying by seeking markets for other products.
• Continuing to search for value-adding opportunities. For sweet potatoes, 
these might include producing products such as fortified flour, mandazi (a 
sweet pastry), doughnuts, chapattis, uji (porridge) and juice, as well as buy-
ing mechanical chippers.
• Upgrading transport arrangements.
• Improving communication on market information among members of the 
field school networks.
• Improving the match between contracted amounts and the amounts delivered 
through crop surveys and the crop inventory database.
• Furthering understanding of the marketability and timing of commodities by 
working with marketing organizations such as KACE.
• Improving marketing strategies to eliminate unnecessary links in the chain.
• Setting up revolving funds to support new field schools and commercial 
activities by group members.
• Accessing capital to invest in inputs, farming operations and processing 
equipment.
• Training members on “farming as a business” and a general understanding 
of markets.
More information: 
• General: http://farmerfieldschool.net; Arnoud Braun, arnoud.braun@farmerfield-
school.net; Masai Masai, shmasai@yahoo.com
Farmer field school networks:
• Bungoma: Peter Waboya, bungoma-umbrell@farmerfieldschool.net
• Busia: Nelson Rapando, buffin@farmerfieldschool.net
• Kakamega: Habakkuk Khaamala, kakaffsnet@farmerfieldschool.net
Chain movements
Before the interventions, field school member farmers were in 
the segment chain producing mainly for home consumption 
and selling whatever surplus they produced. Field schools were 
not organized, had low bargaining power and limited control 
of marketing and processing along the different market outlets 
or channels . 
As result of the interventions by development partners and 
the networks, the field schools are now able to get into large 
contractual arrangements with bulk buyers, as well as engage 
in value addition, including processing. The production is more 
organized with a market-oriented approach, so is moving into 
chain partnership .

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integrators
Chain aCtivity integrators not only farm; they also have moved into other activities in the chain, such 
as processing, marketing, or exporting of produce, yet 
without exerting more influence on the management 
of the chain. 
These farmers may start out by offering an attractive 
product to the market, and they have developed basic 
assets and farm management skills. But they may feel 
that they get little return from the market. They sell their 
product as raw material at low prices, while at the end 
of the chain the consumer pays a price that may be many times higher. 
These farmers can increase their income by adding business activities – usually 
together with other farmers. They organize themselves (for example, in coopera-
tives) to bulk their produce, process it to some extent, and then sell it as a group. 
They may also purchase inputs as a group. This allows them to get a larger share 
of the revenues in the value chain. 
In the following case studies we see examples of how farmers have integrated 
chain activities:
• Stepping back to move forward: Fruit juice in NW Tanzania
• Trading and milling to help HIV-affected households in Kenya
• Honey and beeswax value chain development in Same, Tanzania.
Chain 
partners
A
ct
iv
iti
es
Management
Chain 
actors
Chain 
activity 
integrators
Chain  
co-owners
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Stepping	back	to	move	forward:		
Fruit	juice	in	NW	Tanzania
Muleba assoCiation for agriCulture and Local Industries (MALI) is an as-sociation of over 1800 farmers in Muleba District, in the Kagera region of 
north-western Tanzania. MALI runs a processing factory in Muleba, which pro-
duces juice from the farmers’ fruit. The farmers bring their output to the factory 
on a set timetable. The factory workers receive and weigh the fruit, sort and clean 
it, cut it and extract the juice, measure the natural sugar content, add sugar and 
water, and pasteurize and bottle the juice. The bottles are cooled, labelled and 
packed into crates before they are marketed.
The association currently produces about 1500 crates a month – though it could 
double this if there is demand. It distributes its products directly to retailers in 
Muleba and Bukoba. 
The factory produces various flavours: mango, pineapple, orange, mandarin, 
lemon and passion fruit. It has also developed a mango-pineapple mix, which is 
one of the most popular products in its range, and is attempting to blend more 
fruits and to introduce hibiscus (roselle) into its product portfolio. 
The juices are delicious, and customers like them. But MALI is finding it hard to 
make ends meet. Here are the major problems it faces:
•	 Competition  Since the association was founded in 1997, Tanzania has under-
gone significant economic changes. The national market has opened up, and 
juices from Kenya and South Africa have flooded in. The soft-drinks giants, 
Coca Cola and PepsiCo, have become more competitive and have penetrated 
even remote rural areas of Tanzania. 
•	 Packaging  MALI uses recycled glass bottles; workers sterilize them by hand 
before refilling them. The bottles are expensive, so MALI operates with a very 
small stock. There is no system of recycling bottles from retailers. When the 
bottles run out, the juice is packed in plastic bags – but this reduces the qual-
ity and shelf life. 
•	 Seasonality  Fruit production is seasonal, and volumes fluctuate from month 
to month, so the factory lies idle for significant periods during the year.
•	 Costs and efficiency With its high production costs, inefficient labour-in-
tensive technology and limited volumes, MALI finds it hard to compete. Its 
only comparative advantage is its natural ‘health’ qualities.
•	 Distribution  system  MALI juice is sold within a radius of about 70 km 
from the factory. There is one sales point in the town of Bukoba (the capital of 
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Kagera region), and ad-hoc sales to 
Muleba-based buyers. The distribu-
tion system is weak, and there is no 
order acquisition and management 
system. Unsold inventory some-
times accumulates in the factory 
store.
•	 Overstretch  MALI is active in all 
various stages of the value chain: 
processing, distribution and mar-
keting. But it has limited technical, 
financial and human resources to 
perform all these functions. 
The	History	of	MALI
How did MALI get into this predica-
ment? To understand this, it is neces-
sary to look back in time.
MALI was formed in 1997 as a project 
by Agency for Co-operation and 
Technical Assistance, a Belgian NGO. 
In 1999, guidance shifted to another 
Belgian NGO, Ieder Voor Allen, and in 
2003 it moved to yet another, TRIAS. 
When the project started in 1997, the focus was to improve the farmers’ productiv-
ity. By 1998, the farmers were producing far more than the local market for fruit 
could absorb, so a fruit-processing factory was established. The juice was at first 
packed in plastic bags, but since 2001 bottles have been used. 
TRIAS, the NGO currently supporting MALI, currently meets roughly two-thirds 
of MALI’s processing, distribution and marketing costs. The NGO was consider-
ing a way to phase out this support so it could concentrate on extension activi-
ties, where it has greater interest and competence. This is not unusual among 
development agencies, which tend to tire of this kind of project. 
From	analysis	to	recommendations
This looming withdrawal put a lot of pressure on both TRIAS and MALI’s man-
agement. They agreed to look for ways to reduce the subsidies gradually so the 
factory could become fully independent from a commercial point of view. So they 
engaged Match Maker Associates Ltd. (MMA), a development consulting firm, 
to do a marketing/value chain analysis and business plan.
The MALI association has over 1800 
members
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This study included a market scan for juice within and beyond the Kagera region, 
research on possibilities to diversify the products and improve packaging. It also 
identified other ways to generate income from product diversification based on 
what the member farmers can produce. 
MMA recommended that MALI move from its present practice of trying to do 
everything, to one that depends on strategic collaboration among key actors. This 
move has to be deliberate, and has to be planned for and governed effectively. 
This is the essence of the value chain approach that emphasizes an understanding 
of the market dynamics and strategies to meet market needs. MALI should focus 
on its core competencies (producing juice) and acknowledge that other actors are 
better placed to perform other critical functions. 
Refocusing of MALI’s activities requires the ability to upgrade along three dimen-
sions: process, product and function.
•  Upgrading processes  MALI should increase the efficiency of its internal 
processes to make them significantly better than its rivals. This means improv-
ing efficiency within individual links in the chain (e.g., increasing inventory 
turnover, cutting wastage), and between the links in the chain (e.g., more 
frequent, smaller and on-time deliveries). 
 Challenges include rebuilding the MALI team, rescheduling the procurement 
and juice-production plan, designing a distribution system, and sourcing fruit 
from non-member farmers.
•  Upgrading products  MALI has to introduce new products or improve 
old products faster than its rivals. This could involve blending more fruits; 
introducing hibiscus juice, jams and marmalades; improving packaging and 
labels; and complying with certification standards.
The bottles are sterilized and then dried
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The processing plant employs mainly women
•  Upgrading functions  MALI should increase the value added to its products 
by changing the mix of activities it conducts. For example, it could take on (or 
outsource) distribution, logistics and promotion. Or it could move activities 
to different links in the chain (e.g., from distribution to processing). It should 
use dealers (stockists who supply retailers) and distributors (who promote 
the juice in new areas), and get them to share transport and marketing.
Building	engagement
MMA advised MALI to outsource its distribution and marketing to distributors 
who are better positioned to link with retailers and consumers. These distributors 
have their own network of dealers and retailers, as well as storage and trans-
port facilities. The distributors are licensed by big companies to distribute their 
products in a specific area. Some even have the capacity to organize promotion 
campaigns when they introduce new products. The advantage of a distribu-
tor–dealer network is that the distributor offers its dealers a product portfolio (a 
variety of products which MALI cannot offer), and has the financial strength to 
extend dealers credit for up to a month. Distributors are ready to share transport 
and marketing costs with companies like MALI, so also share benefits. 
Financing	growth	
MALI’s business plan has shed light on the factory’s future performance. With 
financial support for investment, the factory should be able to break even after 
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2 years. The factory will have the capacity to buy all the fruit produced by the 
association’s member farmers. The farmers should see their incomes rise with a 
12.5% increase in the price of their fruit. The factory will also need to buy sub-
stantial amounts of fruit from non-members. Other beneficiaries will include 
distributors, dealers and retailers. The factory should be able to create jobs for 
about 35 staff and 17 casual workers. More than 90% of these jobs are expected 
to be for women.
The factory requires substantial financing before it can generate enough cash 
flow to reach this breakeven point. An extra €316,000 is needed, which MALI 
is requesting from TRIAS and its other partners. MALI itself will contribute an 
initial €30,000. MALI will not be able to access commercial loans at this point, 
for several reasons:
•	 Weak collateral  MALI is a medium-scale processing unit with low-cost 
equipment and limited fixed assets. The equipment has a very low resale 
value. Other ways of financing, such as hire-purchase or leasing, are not ap-
propriate because the processing technology and equipment are not advanced 
enough. MALI’s buildings are not movable and their location in Muleba is 
not attractive for most potential commercial buyers.
•	 High risk  The shift from a development project to a business approach is 
a big shift for MALI. It will take time to change the mindset of staff and the 
association members. Finance houses are likely to be sceptical of investing at 
this stage, bearing in mind that the factory has not been profitable during its 
first 5 years.
•	 Over-exposure of poor  farmers  MALI is an organization of small-scale 
farmers, who have low incomes. Taking a commercial loan now would expose 
these members to unacceptable levels of debt.
Lessons	and	challenges
MALI and its partners have faced a steep learning curve as they have tried to 
bring the farmers’ produce to the market. They are being forced to shift from a 
Chain movements
Before MALI was formed, the farmers were chain actors, in 
the bottom left of the diagram . With the establishment of 
the factory, they moved into activity integration . But this 
has not proved profitable because of difficulties in marketing 
the product. 
The solution is to outsource activities such as marketing and 
distribution, and to focus on MALI’s core competence of pro-
ducing fruit and making juice, and on managing relationships 
with the dealers and distributors in the chain .

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subsistence approach to a business focus. MALI will have to stop trying to per-
form tasks where it has limited capability, and focus on its core competencies of 
growing fruit and turning it into juice.
Developing the value chain is necessary for this, but it is not enough. MALI 
has found that support mechanisms (financial, capacity building, an enabling 
business and policy environment) are vital to give it the ability to implement its 
strategies. 
No amount of research can adequately capture the wide range of factors that af-
fect the various options open to small businesses such as MALI. The future is in 
any case uncertain. So MALI’s strategy must remain open to alterations. It will 
have to continue to monitor its business environment so it can respond to the 
challenges ahead. 
MALI’s efforts to upgrade are affected by the policy environment. It will have 
to fulfil food standards and safety requirements, register its brand, and acquire 
patents for its various blends. Support from the relevant authorities will be vital 
if these efforts are to succeed.
More information: Match Maker Associates Limited, www.mma-ltd.com, or contact 
Edmond Ringo, edmond@mma-ltd.com
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Trading	and	milling	to	help	HIV-
affected	households	in	Kenya
hiv/aiDs has hit afriCa hard. The disease strikes people in their prime work-ing years hardest – the very people who feed their families, raise children 
and care for the elderly. People who are infected need nutritious food if they 
are to stay healthy enough to work. If they fall sick, their families are hit with a 
double blow: they lose their main source of income, and they must care for their 
sick breadwinners. People who die of the disease leave their families distraught 
and destitute.
Governments – short of funds and skilled staff – can do little to help. But Africa’s 
communities respond generously. Extended families take care of orphans and the 
old. Friends and neighbours help by providing food, money and comfort. But try 
as they might, even these close-knit communities cannot cope.
The poor suffer most. They are concentrated in the slums that ring the big cities, 
and in semi-arid areas where growing food is difficult at the best of times.
Initiatives to provide support to people living with AIDS abound. Efforts to help 
them that rely on donor funding are not sustainable in the long run. So local com-
munity organizations are trying to find other ways – approaches that enable these 
people to earn enough to survive and help their sick relatives and neighbours. 
Families of AIDS sufferers fight a losing battle to make ends meet
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GROOTS Kenya (Grassroot Organisation in Sisterhood – Kenya), a local NGO, 
has been helping three self-help groups of women in different parts of Kenya 
face this challenge. 
•	 Tei wa w’o Self-Help Group  The Tei wa w’o (“true mercy”) group comprises 
10 independent sub-groups, each with about 30 members in Yatta Division in 
Kitui West. The area is dry, depends mainly on grain and livestock produc-
tion, and is prone to persistent droughts and food deficits. It has a narrow 
economic base. Farmers tend to sell their produce at throwaway prices soon 
after harvest so they can pay off their debts and buy their immediate needs. 
They then buy back the same grain later at higher prices.
•	 Mathare Mothers Development Centre  This centre is located in one of the 
most populated slums in Nairobi. It consists of over 30 self-help groups in ten 
“villages” within the slum. Most people in the area have very low incomes 
and find it hard to feed their families. Many are unemployed and have no 
other way of earning money.
•	 Mwihoko wa Rironi Women’s Group  The Mwihoko wa Rironi (“hope of 
Rironi”) group is based in Limuru Division, 35 km from Nairobi. This is a 
densely populated rural area with very small farms (less than 1 ha) that can-
not produce enough food for their owners’ needs.
While each of the three groups is located in a very different part of Kenya, they all 
work in similar ways. Members of each group contribute cash, food and time to 
help families affected by AIDS. They earn money from trading. Some run merry-
go-round savings schemes, where each member puts a small amount into a kitty 
each month; the pooled kitty is given to a different member in turn.
The three groups’ biggest problem has been to make enough money to support 
their own needs, make sure that HIV/AIDS sufferers get enough nutritious food, 
and to take care of the families of the AIDS victims. They have been looking for 
business ideas to earn money. 
One approach they have tried is to buy grain and sell it to people in the commu-
nity. But they can handle only small amounts and the costs are high. The groups 
are still not well organized and have not established strong marketing links, so 
they cannot compete with local traders. 
So the groups plan to expand their marketing operations and start grinding the 
grain to make fortified flour. They hope this will not only earn them money; it 
should also improve access to cheap, nutritious food. That should benefit the 
members’ families, as well as people affected by HIV/AIDS.
Through GROOTS, the groups asked FAO to help them assess whether their 
ideas were feasible, profitable and sustainable, and to determine how they could 
develop viable grain marketing and flour processing activities. An agribusiness 
specialist helped each group:
•	 Review their options for businesses to engage in, focusing on areas where 
they already had some basic knowledge.
•	 Identify appropriate business strategies and targets, in terms of specific prod-
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ucts and services, pricing structure, capital investment needs and cash flow 
projections.
•	 Identify technical and managerial skills they would need to run the busi-
ness.
Each group has developed its own business plan. The Tei wa w’o group plans 
to establish a grain consolidation centre by buying grain (maize, sorghum, mil-
let, beans, cowpeas, pigeonpeas, lablab, greens grams, etc.) at the beginning of 
the harvesting season. The group will then store the grain in a warehouse where 
economies of scale mean they can fumigate it more cheaply and effectively than 
if individual members were to do this. The group will then sell the grain in the 
local market when the prices are higher.
Tei wa w’o will try to sell the grain at low, stable prices so the poor can afford it. 
They hope to stay profitable and competitive by attracting a lot of demand, so 
maintain a high volume. 
The Mathare Mothers plan to buy a posho mill (a hammer mill) to produce dif-
ferent nutritious product lines based on fortified flour (mixtures of maize and 
sorghum, plus grain legumes such as beans, pigeonpeas, green gram, cowpeas, 
etc.). Though there are already many posho mills in Mathare, most of them produce 
ordinary maize flour. The group’s business edge is in packaging nutritious flour 
and pricing it for a niche market. They plan to sell to their members and families 
A posho mill can make flour to sell, as well as nutritious food for the group members’ 
families
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affected by HIV/AIDS at a price that covers their costs plus risks; they want to 
retail to the larger community at competitive prices. 
The Mwihoko wa Rironi group will buy high-quality maize at harvest time from 
the main growing areas, especially the Rift Valley. They will then resell the grain or 
mill it to make fortified flour, which they will sell locally at competitive prices.
The three groups plan to set up strategic alliances with other groups. The group 
that buys and consolidates grain (Tei wa w’o) will sell the grain at wholesale 
prices for milling. The Mathare and Mwihoko groups will be able to sell flour to 
groups that have no mill of their own.
Chain	management
The groups need to improve their managerial skills to operate their proposed 
businesses. Their business plans set out their capacity building requirements, 
focusing on developing their skills for running business as a group. A training 
programme was designed with the assistance of the agribusiness specialist and 
in collaboration with the group members. This programme is an adaptation of 
existing curriculum and materials. The modules cover the following topics:
•	 Action learning  This is a learning-by-doing approach. It provides the group 
members with the skills they need to explore and clarify their problems, and 
helps them develop strategies they can put into action. 
•	 Leadership, management and group governance  This aims to strengthen 
group leadership, management and decision making. It also aims to ensure 
that the business is run professionally and democratically, is accountable to 
members, and with well-defined partnership principles. 
•	 Business management  This part of the training programme takes the group 
through different aspects of business planning, resource mobilization and 
implementation strategies. It also includes tailor-made management modules 
depending on the business, such as:
o	 Marketing business development (grain marketing and warehousing) 
o	 Farming as a business
o	 Developing agro-processing business (e.g., posho milling) 
o	 Savings and credit mobilization
o	 Contracts, arbitration and legal entities 
o	 Post-harvest handling and value addition
o	 Transport and logistics management
o	 Pesticide management.
The group members have already attended training on some of these topics. They 
will cover the remaining topics in the next few months.
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Chain movements
The business group approach provides entry points for the 
group members into the value chain . The Tei wa w’o group 
has started trading in addition to farming. Mwihoko wa Rironi 
has added trading and milling. The Mathare women are not 
involved in farming, but have also started trading and process-
ing grain .
As they gain in experience, the groups could evolve towards 
co-ownership of the value chain. They will gradually establish 
business partnerships with other local actors as they are 
targeting the market in their communities. They are close to 
their final consumers, so be able to develop products that their 
customers demand .

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Outcomes
The groups have been able to identify the different upstream and downstream 
linkages – for example, their main sources of grain, transport providers, manage-
ment requirements in processing, packaging and distribution arrangements, and 
so on. Each group will negotiate long-term agreements with its upstream and 
downstream partners.
The intervention is still in its early stages. But the group members have already 
gained confidence; they have realized that they can set up viable businesses 
and do not have to wait for handouts. Going through the business planning 
process has also allowed them to develop an entrepreneurial attitude, and they 
now appreciate that expanding slowly, in steps, will ensure social and economic 
sustainability.
Challenges
The groups are entering a business area which is dominated by well-established 
traders. The business plans had to take competition and sustainability into ac-
count. The intended strategic alliances between the groups should give them an 
edge as they compete with other traders. 
The main challenge is in accessing the initial capital to buy the mills, warehouses 
and other equipment, as well as in purchasing grain. 
Establishing a commercial milling and packaging facility is particularly challeng-
ing given that these are low income people with a weak socio-economic base. 
More information: contact Susan Minae, susan.minae@fao.org
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Honey	and	beeswax	value	chain	
development	in	Same,	Tanzania
four thousanD beekeepers, 35,000 hives, and a potential of over a million litres of honey and 20 tons of beeswax a year – impressive statistics for Same District, 
in the Kilimanjaro Region of northern Tanzania. 
But in fact, Same – the largest and poorest district in the region – produces less than 
200,000 litres of honey and only about 400 kg of the high-value wax. The district 
does not even appear on the national map of honey producers in Tanzania.
Understanding	the	honey	sector
Why the poor performance? How can Same’s farmers benefit from this promis-
ing but neglected opportunity? Two development organizations in the district 
– the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania (ELCT) and VECO Tanzania 
(Vredeseilanden Country Office of Tanzania, a Belgian NGO) have been grap-
pling with these questions. 
The two organizations have supported the development of beekeeping in Same 
since 2003. As a result of their work, the district’s beekeepers realized they needed 
to organize themselves into an association. They founded SABEA, the Same Bee-
keepers Association, in June 2004.
ELCT and VECO Tanzania conducted studies with the beekeepers and other play-
ers in the sector in order to understand the sector. They found that beekeeping is 
dominated by elderly men. They build hives, site them, and harvest the honey. 
Young people are seldom involved: sons inherit hives only when their fathers 
die. Owners of many hives may hire other men (and sometimes women) to help 
site the hives and harvest the honey. 
Women are involved mainly in selling honey from their homes or at the local 
market. They sometimes also attend meetings, prepare and clean equipment, and 
help carry equipment and the honey that has been collected. A few women own 
their own hives and do most of the work themselves, but the distance to many 
hives and the need to climb trees limits the involvement of women. Since honey 
is often used for medical and religious ceremonies it has to be pure. Women are 
traditionally seen as “impure”, further limiting their involvement.
Much of the crude honey is sold to local brewers. Distribution is dominated by 
middlemen who buy directly from the farm or at local markets.
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Few beekeepers add value to the honey by processing or packaging it. They say 
such processing is not needed because buyers are willing to buy the crude prod-
uct at a reasonable price. But they are missing an opportunity: an unprocessed 
mix of combs and honey fetches only about TSh 1000 (€0.71) per litre, while the 
same amount of purified honey would bring more than three times this amount 
at the local market. Beeswax is also a valuable product, fetching almost as much 
as purified honey.
Chain	management
Honey production in Same is constrained by various problems: 
•	 Production problems  Farm chemicals can harm the bees and reduce honey 
output. Production methods restrict output, and traditional harvesting meth-
ods using smoke reduce the quality, since they leave unpleasant off-flavours 
in the honey. 
•	 Processing techniques  Beekeepers do not process their crude honey. They 
could earn much more by removing the high-value beeswax and selling it 
separately.
•	 Low volumes  Honey volumes are currently too small to interest buyers. 
Improved beehives would make it easier to boost production, and individual 
beekeepers could bulk their honey and sell it collectively.
•	 Unpredictable markets  There are no reliable honey buyers in Same. Few 
producers understand the market: the ELCT/VECO Tanzania study found 
that around 78% were uncertain about the market and complained of lack of 
transparency. On the other hand, traders and consumers do not know where 
to get a reliable supply of honey. This points to a clear gap between supply 
and demand, and so a huge potential for a successful intervention. 
Building	a	consortium	to	promote	honey
Two other organizations, Faida MaLi and SNV Tanzania, also have an interest 
in developing beekeeping in Same. In January 2005, they joined ELCT, VECO 
Tanzania and SABEA in signing a memorandum of understanding to support the 
development of a sustainable value chain for honey and beeswax. The roles and 
responsibilities of each organization were defined right from the beginning:
•	 SABEA (Same Beekeepers Association) is the main organizer of producers. 
It aims to coordinate the buying and selling of honey to markets outside the 
region; this includes processing, packaging, storing and wholesaling.
•	 ELCT (Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania, Pare Diocese) provides 
group strengthening and organization support to the primary producer groups 
and to SABEA. It also provides extension on beekeeping in close collaboration 
with the local authority staff. 
•	 VECO Tanzania provides financial, capacity building and advisory support 
to producer groups and to SABEA in partnership with ELCT.
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•	 Faida MaLi  (Faida Market Link Company Ltd.)  trains trainers on farmer 
economic empowerment, subsector mapping and market linkages. It is devel-
oping special training materials for farmer groups on how to adhere to Fair 
Trade standards.
•	 SNV (Netherlands Development Organization) provides advice and facilita-
tion to all actors involved in the consortium. It also facilitates collaboration 
with partners and acts as an “honest broker” with external parties such as 
trading companies.
The consortium holds regular monthly meetings to monitor progress and assign 
tasks to each partner.
The partners decided to implement the following activities jointly:
•	 Analyse the honey and beeswax subsector in Same and other related markets, 
as a start towards developing a value chain.
•	 Assess the capabilities of producer groups and SABEA, in order to plan how 
to strengthen these organizations and assess their ability to comply with “fair 
trade” standards.
•	 Improve the quality and quantity of honey produced.
•	 Investigate and design ways to link honey producers with potential long-term, 
reliable buyers.
•	 Build relationships with service providers who are not yet collaborators (such 
as microfinance institutions and local government).
Each member of the consortium offers its own expertise
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Improving	the	position	of	producers	
The consortium’s ultimate goal is to help the honey producers become owners 
of their product value chain. It should be possible to empower SABEA to make 
informed decisions and control the whole process, from production to sale in 
local markets. 
The partnership is still in its infancy, but progress is already being made. Beekeep-
ers are acquiring improved hives and other equipment on a cost-sharing basis. 
They are also strengthening the association and its component groups through 
frequent meetings, writing a constitution, and collecting contributions and data 
from members.
First	lessons	leading	to	more	focused	actions
The consortium partners have drawn some lessons from their work so far:
•	 Women and young people  These currently play only a limited role in honey 
production and marketing. However, some communities are increasingly 
welcoming them into the business. The partners plan to discuss these issues 
with community members and introduce appropriate technology to encour-
age more women and young people to take up honey production.
Facilitators such as NGOs and the government can play a key role in bringing farmers 
and other partners in the value chain together
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•	 Production skills  The lack of skilled management and harvesting techniques 
affects the honey quality. The partners are seeking ways to work with local 
artisans and other service providers, as well as a socially responsible trading 
firm that is willing to invest in quality assurance. 
•	 Spraying  Spraying close to beehives harms the quality of the honey. The 
partners are lobbying government agencies responsible for land and forestry 
to give beekeepers permits so they can access forest reserves. This should help 
solve the recurring conflicts between beekeepers and other farmers.
•	 Processing  The Same beekeepers process very little of the honey they pro-
duce. They are not aware of the money they are losing because they do not 
separate the honey and beeswax and sell them separately. The partners hope 
to introduce modern harvesting and processing techniques (such as bee smok-
ers and centrifuges). They also envisage that honey and beeswax exports will 
bring in more money than the current markets.
•	 Improved hives  Introducing improved beehives aims to improve both the 
volume and quality of honey. But technical setbacks (such as using the wrong 
type of wood to make hives) have led to fewer swarms colonizing the hives. 
It is necessary to revise the design and monitor colonization closely.
Finding	a	reliable	partner
Two of the consortium members, SNV and Faida MaLi, identified a potential buyer 
for the Same producers’ honey and beeswax. This buyer, Honey Care Africa, has 
operations in Kenya (see page 75), and has recently opened a branch in Dar es 
Salaam. Honey Care staff have visited Same and met SABEA and its partners, and 
the firm has indicated its interest in buying honey from SABEA producers, and in 
developing a long-term business relationship. It has taken samples of honey and 
beeswax, and has made detailed suggestions on how to improve quality.
According to the plan of collaboration, SABEA will provide bulk table honey 
to Honey Care, while the firm will help survey the location of hives, provide 
harvesting equipment, and train beekeepers on harvesting methods. The firm 
plans to buy honey and beeswax at collection centres, and would like to work 
with a micro-finance institution to provide credit. The parties are now reviewing 
a draft contract.
However, Honey Care has raised two concerns:
•	 SABEA’s organization is still weak, and its base in the producer groups needs 
to be strengthened.
•	 Many hives are too close to sprayed areas. Honey Care would like to see them 
at least 5 km away, preferably close to the district’s forest reserves.
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Sustainability	
The consortium partners have different roles to play if they are to enable farmers 
to improve their incomes from honey in the long term. Key for this will be efforts 
to access export and “fair trade” markets. 
Another crucial factor is developing a long-term relationship with the buyer with 
a price that producers will accept.
Ownership by the farmers themselves is important: the consortium members 
must not work on behalf of the farmers, but together with them.
Challenges
•	 Regional and international market prices for honey and beeswax are not neces-
sarily better than local prices – even for “fair trade” and organic products.
•	 Exploiting other markets is likely to involve new costs (such as certification) 
that beekeepers have not so far had to consider.
•	 Some extension workers who are part of the consortium are also involved in 
honey trading. This is a conflict of interest: they may provide farmers with 
incomplete or distorted information about the market.
•	 The volume of honey currently available is not attractive to bulk buyers. Honey 
Care, for example, wants to buy at least 10 tonnes, while current production 
is less than 4 tonnes.
•	 Building trust within an organization and with partners is a long-term proc-
ess. SABEA is a young organization, and information sharing (an indicator 
of trust) is still limited. There is a risk that SABEA may become dependent 
on other partners in the consortium.
•	 Despite the memorandum of understanding, the running of the consortium 
has not been smooth. The five partners have now recognized the need for one 
of them to take the lead. 
Ambitions
•	 SABEA and its partners aim to work with 250 farmers initially, and expand 
membership to about 1000 beekeepers within 3 years. At the same time, the 
consortium aims to forge unity with other beekeeping associations in northern 
Tanzania so they can take advantage of economies of scale. 
•	 The consortium plans to develop a framework for collaboration with service 
providers (such as quality control and input supply services). This is necessary 
so producers and other actors in the chain can develop sustainable markets.
•	 Long-term, reliable buyers are vital if Same’s beekeepers are to prosper. The 
consortium is investigating potential buyers, and will seek ways to link them 
to producers.
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•	 Further investments are needed to help the beekeepers control product qual-
ity, introduce innovations, develop their communication skills, obtain market 
intelligence and make informed decisions.
More information: www.vredeseilanden.org/emc.asp?pageId=1034, or contact Jeroen De 
Wilde, jeroen@cats-net.com, or Nsanya Ndanshau, nndanshau@snvworld.org
Chain movements
The consortium aims to help SABEA first strengthen its forward 
and backward linkages, for example by processing honey to 
improve product quality and gain a better price for the products. 
This is represented by a move from  to . 
It also aims to improve SABEA’s management, knowledge of 
the market and ability to control the chain – moving it into the 
chain ownership quadrant .

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Chain	co-owners
Chain Co-owners have moved upstream in the chain, increasing both their activities and their influence 
to manage the chain. The farmers are not only special-
ized chain actors with an attractive product, basic farm 
management skills, some understanding of markets, 
and a willingness to innovate and take risks. As chain 
co-owners, they have also organized themselves into 
recognized, visible business organizations, capable of 
penetrating existing markets, developing new products 
or markets or diversifying their activities. They reach 
the end-consumer of their products, and with them they initiate a dialogue to 
dynamically improve the product, based on consumer demand. Such farmers’ 
organizations are empowered to negotiate lucrative prices and earn a fair share 
from the chain. 
In the following case studies we see examples of how farmers have become chain 
co-owners:
• Improving shea and empowering rural women in Mali
• Finding a niche for vanilla in Uganda
• Bringing Kaffa forest coffee to the German market
• Expanding dairying opportunities in Thika District, Kenya
• Linking potato farmers to restaurants in Uganda.
Chain 
partners
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Chain  
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Improving	shea	and	empowering	rural	
women	in	Mali
Farmers in the dioila area of southern Mali traditionally grow cotton for sale on a contract basis to CMDT, the government’s cotton marketing monopoly. 
The area is ideal for various types of farming: it has good soils and enough water; 
services such as extension and credit are readily available for cotton production, 
and the region has roads, electricity supply and cotton processing plants. Local 
people are literate and are used to working together in producer cooperatives. 
They grow food for their own consumption as well as cotton for the market.
Problems began when the world price of cotton fell, and cotton processing and 
marketing began to be privatized. Farmers were faced with a new situation, and 
found that they could sell their cotton only at a loss. So they began to look for 
alternative sources of income. Cotton production and marketing were traditionally 
dominated by men, so the uncertainty in the cotton industry made it necessary 
to find new sources of income for their families. Women were in a particularly 
difficult situation because they are traditionally tied to their homes, so have few 
other income opportunities.
Hope	from	shea
SNV, a international NGO, sought ways to help local farmers affected by this un-
certainty. It saw shea, a tree growing widely in West Africa, as a potential source 
of income. Butter made from shea nuts is used in cooking and to protect the skin 
(see box on the next page). Shea butter 
is a key ingredient in many traditional 
medicines. The trees are traditionally 
protected for cultural reasons, so are 
common in fields and the bush.
A Malian independent agricultural 
economist (consultant) analysed the 
potential of shea butter as an income 
source. He presented his findings to 
women who harvest and process shea, 
and to other local people, government 
agencies and other stakeholders. The 
women decided to follow up this op-
portunity.
The old method of processing produced 
low-quality butter that was difficult to sell
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SNV contracted a local NGO to organize the women into groups to improve the 
quality of their butter and to start selling collectively. This would enable them to 
tap new markets and increase their income. The implicit goal was to empower 
women so they could gain more control over the entire process, from collecting 
the nuts to the sale of the product to urban consumers – in other words, to enable 
them to become chain owners.
The NGO organized 1500 women producing a higher quality shea butter into 40 
community-based groups, which later formed a district union. These groups buy 
the improved butter from individual group members, then sell it to the union, 
which in turn sells it to other areas in Mali or exports it other countries in West 
Africa. The groups also buy traditionally produced butter from their members 
and sell this in the local area. By selling directly, they cut out traders from the 
chain.
The women improved the quality in several ways. Instead of allowing the fruit 
to rot in pits and drying the nuts by roasting, the women now de-pulp the fruit 
before crushing the nuts, then boil and sun-dry the kernels. This results in an 
odour-free, clean, white butter. This is a high-quality product that appeals to ur-
Traditional shea processing
Processing shea nut is a complex process. Traditionally, individual women collect the fruits 
from wild trees. They put them into large pits until they have time to process them. The fruits 
rot, leaving the nut inside. They clean off the flesh of the fruit, and then crush the nut to 
remove the kernels. They boil the kernels and then roast them over a fire to dry. They then 
crush the nuts in a mortar or mill to make a paste. They wash the paste in water several 
times to make an emulsion and separate the fat from the residues. They then filter the fat 
and boil it to remove the water. The fat cools and solidifies into butter, which they sell in the 
village markets.
This procedure has various problems. 
•	 The processing results in a low-quality, yellowish-brown butter with a pungent smell. 
This can be consumed locally, but is difficult to sell in urban or international markets.
•	 The women have no control over the price, which is set by traders and their agents. The 
traders gather large stocks for sale in urban and semi-industrial markets – but demand 
is falling because of changing consumer preferences in the towns. 
•	 The women can get only low prices, so they keep their best shea butter for their own 
use and sell their worst quality butter. This results in a vicious circle of low prices, bad 
quality, and mutual distrust between the producers and traders.
•	 There are no quality standards. The traders determine not only price but also how much 
to buy, under what terms, and when. They like to buy when the price is lowest and the 
women’s shea butter stocks are highest. The women have no control over any of these 
transaction conditions.
•	 The production and processing has stayed the same for centuries. Unitl recently, there 
was no innovation, no targeting of consumers, and no way for either the women or the 
traders to improve the product or the way it was marketed. Short-term opportunism 
prevailed over long-term cooperation.
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ban consumers and can be sold to the local and international cosmetic industry. 
It has to be sold quickly before it begins to degrade.
SNV invested in storage facilities and equipment for each group. The local NGO 
made information on market prices available to the women, so they could sell 
their butter when the price was right. This improved their bargaining capacity 
with traders. 
SNV also attempted to facilitate access to commercial credit to give the groups 
some working capital. This effort failed, though: local financial institutions do not 
look favourably on loan applications from women, and the credit institution the 
women applied to did not attempt to help them. After some misunderstandings 
and frustration, the women decided to go ahead without credit.
Benefits
These quality improvements had a marked impact on the women’s income. The 
women’s stronger skills and negotiating position have enabled the union to more 
than double the price from CFA francs 300 (about €0.45) per kg for traditional 
butter to francs 700 (€1.07) per kg for the improved butter. The group members 
receive francs 500 (€0.76) per kg; the union retains the remainder to pay for its 
operations, as a reserve, and for social activities. The union sells about 15 tonnes 
of improved shea butter in a typical year.
Even though their individual incomes are still very modest, the women have 
benefited in other ways. They are now organized, control their production and 
trading activities, and enjoy recognition in the community and in their families 
as income earners as well as good wives and mothers. There are environmental 
benefits too: the new procedure (which is based on sun-drying) uses only a third 
of the firewood compared to the traditional technique.
However, the new technique has drawbacks: it takes 30–40% more time than 
traditional processing, and requires more discipline from the women members: 
they have to follow the procedures exactly in order to keep quality high.
Stepping into the chain
Despite all the benefits, the intervention was unsustainable. It was based on a 
short-term (4 years) project approach. When the funding ended, the women 
were unable to take over the activities themselves. Because of the project’s short 
timeframe, SNV’s partner NGO felt forced to step into the marketing chain it-
self. It took control of the marketing of the shea butter: it controlled transaction 
conditions, quality standards, innovation, and consumer targeting. But it failed 
to transfer this capacity to the women’s groups. The management skills stayed 
within the local NGO. The women were passive clients of well-intentioned advice 
and direction.
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The implicit goal was to make the women chain owners, controlling the whole 
process from producer to consumer. But what actually happened was forward 
integration – the women added collective marketing to their business activities, 
but did not gain control over the management of the chain. This is because the 
project design neglected the dimension of chain management. It tried to enhance 
the women’s control over chain activities, but the women were not empowered 
on chain management issues. 
Towards sustainability
The end of project funding jeopardized the many achievements. The women 
responded by hiring the NGO’s commercial advisor as a staff member of the 
union. They were able to find enough money to pay half his salary. SNV helped 
the union obtain funding from a donor to pay the rest of his salary so they could 
continue operations. 
The women make more money from the better quality shea butter, and they have started 
exporting high-quality processed nuts to Europe
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The donor imposed two conditions: 
•	 The union had to develop a sound business plan as an independent com-
pany
•	 It had to improve its knowledge and understanding of other actors in the 
chain, their role and constraints. 
Doing this would allow the union to pursue partnerships with other actors such 
as traders, transporters, importers and quality certification agencies.
For the women’s groups, this was the starting point of a new strategy for their 
chain positioning. 
The women know they are still in a capacity strengthening process, so they de-
cided to exploit only half of the resource potential they might reasonably exploit 
during the next 5 years. It is hard to get medium and long-term credit, so they 
have managed to negotiate a mixed credit-and-subsidy package on favourable 
terms with another local financial institution. This will cover all of their investment 
needs over the 5 years. It will also cover some of the union’s operational costs, 
but the proportion will fall in steps, from 23% in the first year, down to nothing 
in year 4. The women expect to earn their joint earnings to rise from CFA francs 
30 million to 58 million (from about €46,000 to €89,000) in 5 years.
The women have also decided to not share out the union’s annual surplus, but 
to reinvest it into upgrading operations and to create an investment fund. The 
union expects its surplus to rise from francs 11 million in year 1 to francs 31.5 
million in year 5 (from €17,000 to €48,000). 
The union also initiated a multi-stakeholder team involving traders, middlemen, 
government agencies, transporters, and an exporter to interview all actors in-
volved in their chain to identify their roles and constraints. The results were shared 
in a series of meetings involving many different stakeholders. These meetings 
allowed the women to address chain management issues, such as quality control 
of the product at various stages in the chain, information sharing on prices, final 
use of the products and emerging market opportunities. 
Chain movements
The initial project tried to take the women’s groups from being 
chain actors  to chain owners, controlling the whole process 
from production to the consumer . But it did not invest enough 
in the women’s management capabilities, so while they started 
processing shea butter using the improved methods, they had 
little control over the value chain .
Current efforts focus on helping the women organize them-
selves and develop their ability to manage the chain . 

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Lessons and opportunities
SNV learned that NGOs can play an important role in the initial stages of a mar-
ket development intervention – for example, in organizing groups of producers 
and in providing technical training. But it may be better to support the produc-
ers’ groups directly at later stages of the intervention, especially to pay for key 
personnel (such as the commercial advisor in the women’s union).
As soon as the economic viability, institutional sustainability and social equity 
conditions were set out in a business plan, the women began to be seen as cred-
ible economic actors and partners in the shea value chain.
The women aim to develop as a fully-fledged chain partner, consolidating their 
own business, increasing their influence on the management of the chain, and 
negotiating chain co-ownership with other actors upstream and downstream (e.g., 
in consumer targeting, information sharing and quality management).
One of the unexpected outcomes has been a new business opportunity. A Malian 
exporter advised the women to sell boiled, sun-dried kernels, rather than shea 
butter. He said they would be able to sell this easily to chocolate and cosmetics 
producers in Europe. A European importer wished to develop a direct partner-
ship with the women’s union. The union committed to deliver as many high-
quality kernels as possible; trial exports are due to begin in 2005. If this business 
relationship is mutually satisfactory in terms of price, costs, reliability, etc., the 
European firm may be willing to invest in a processing plant in the Dioila area, 
as well as in research and development. 
More information: http://snvworld.org or contact Bernard Conilh de Beyssac, bconilh@
snvworld.org
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Finding	a	niche	for	vanilla	in	Uganda
CheCk the ingredients on the next cake or tub of ice cream you buy, and you’re likely to find the word “vanilla”. This tropical bean is one of the world’s most 
popular flavourings, and traditionally commands high prices in international 
trade. The main producers are Madagascar and Indonesia, along with Mexico 
and various Indian and Pacific Ocean islands. Uganda is a minor producer, ac-
counting for only about 1% of world production.
In the first few years of the millennium, two cyclones devastated Madagascar’s 
vanilla plantings, and political unrest further disrupted production. Vanilla prices 
soared. This offered an opportunity for Ugandan farmers to increase their share 
of the market in this speciality crop.
Vanilla	in	Kasese
Farmers in Kasese District, on the slopes of Mount Rwenzori in western Uganda, 
plant vanilla mainly as an intercrop with banana or coffee. The Kasese Small-
holder Income and Investment Programme (KSIIP) has been working with these 
farmers to improve their vanilla production and marketing. The goal is to raise 
Vanilla beans must be carefully selected and cured before they can be exported
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the farmers’ incomes at least fourfold by increasing their productivity and selling 
selected high-value crops. 
KSIIP is a collaborative effort between eight Kasese-based smallholder grower 
associations, Cordaid (a Dutch NGO), Highlow Supermarkt BV (a Dutch firm 
trading in horticultural products), two specialist horticultural consulting firms: 
US-based Fintrac Inc. and its Ugandan affiliate Agribusiness Management As-
sociates (AMA). 
Before the start of KSIIP, Highlow already enjoyed a good relationship with one 
farmers’ association that grew hot pepper in Kasese District. The pepper farm-
ers asked Highlow to help them buy equipment and bulk inputs. Highlow ap-
proached Cordaid and Fintrac for a loan facility for the farmers. Cordaid agreed, 
but asked Highlow to support a larger group of farmers and a wider range of 
crops. 
Kasese’s vanilla farmers grow the beans for export; they typically maintain 100–200 
vines in a half-acre plot. The vanilla takes 2 years to come into production and can 
stay productive for 5 years. The farmers used to sell their beans to traders from 
From vanilla garden to buyer
Betty Basisa, a member of the Kisinga Vanilla Growers Association, harvests 10 kg of beans 
from her garden, and carries them in a basket to the collection centre in Kisinga. This cen-
tre is run by the Kisinga Farmers’ Association, which bulks the produce and arranges with 
KSIIP to pick up the beans. 
Annet Masika, a KSIIP staff member at the centre, checks the beans for quality. Are they 
mature? Are they the right length? Are they split or scratched? She sorts and weighs the 
beans, checks how much money Betty owes the cooperative, and calculates how much 
to pay Betty for her beans. She hands over the money, and Betty goes away with enough 
cash to pay for her daughter’s school fees. Maybe she will be able to afford some new 
shoes for herself too.
Annet hires a truck to transport the bags of vanilla to the warehouse for processing. She 
invites Betty and other members from the farmer associations to help in the processing. The 
women dip the beans in hot water, then wrap them in cloths and leave them to “sweat” in a 
storeroom for several days. They then take them out to dry in the sun for 1–2 hours before 
returning them to the storeroom. They repeat this process several times until the beans have 
reached the correct moisture content and the vanillin flavour has fully emerged. The women 
then pack the beans into cartons, each holding 30–50 kg of beans, ready for export.
Annet also sends a sample of beans to the lab in Kampala for analysis. She forwards the 
report, along with another sample of beans to they buyer in the USA. The buyer checks the 
quality, and calls AMA to negotiate a price. AMA then arranges to air-freight the beans from 
Entebbe to Dulles Airport in Washington, DC. When the beans arrive in the USA, the buyer 
checks their quality and arranges payment. 
AMA controls the chain throughout the process. It provides the farmers with technical advice 
on crop production, training the plants and soil conservation, especially through establish-
ment of demonstration plots. It also negotiates prices with the buyer and coordinates and 
trains KSIIP staff.
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Kampala, 400 km away. They were at the mercy of these traders. They needed 
a reliable buyer with a processing facility nearby. Besides vanilla, the farmers 
also grow coffee and cotton, but these fetch very low prices. These farmers were 
already organized into seven associations that advise them on vanilla production 
and help other farmers to start growing the crop. 
Fintrac analysed the vanilla value chain, and found that there was room to increase 
the productivity and profitability of the crop through improved technology and 
proper marketing. This would significantly increase the farmers’ incomes. Fin-
trac/AMA discussed with the farmers’ associations, vanilla buyers, the district 
government, and managers of an irrigation scheme in Kasese. All agreed to sup-
port the proposed programme, and KSIIP was launched in April 2004. Cordaid 
agreed to provide a loan to these associations; Highlow guarantees the loan.
The Ugandan government’s Plan for Modernization of Agriculture emphasizes 
the rapid expansion of high-value crops to reduce poverty in the country. So 
KSIIP was supplementing the government’s efforts.
Chain	upgrading
KSIIP’s staff in Kasese provide support for vanilla production (for example, they 
manage demonstrations of good practices), offer post-harvest services to main-
tain quality, and manage buying, processing and exporting of the product. KSIIP 
provides this assistance to more than 2000 members of the farmers’ associations. 
In the two years since KSIIP was launched, more small-scale growers have joined 
the associations and have attended KSIIP’s training. 
KSIIP has negotiated a contract with each of the seven associations. The contract 
states that KSIIP will purchase all the vanilla beans that members produce, at the 
prevailing market price. The beans must be of high quality. KSIIP can provide 
advance payment to members of up to 25% of the value of beans each member 
expects to harvest. The farmers, for their part, agree to sell all their vanilla to 
KSIIP, and to conform to the required standards. 
AMA helps the farmers learn how to process the beans. This is a complex and 
delicate task – one that must be done right in order to produce the highest quality 
beans that will command a premium price.
The vanilla chain
KSIIP 
AMA
7 producer  
associations
2000 members
Vanilla buyer 
(USA)
Procures vanilla beans 
from collection centres, 
processes and exports
Grow vanilla
Bring to collection 
centre
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Monitoring and evaluation
KSIIP conducted an initial baseline survey of the farm families’ economic situ-
ation. The farmers meet twice a year to discuss the programme and to provide 
feedback to KSIIP staff. The programme also monitors activities each year, and 
staff visit the field regularly to check whether farmers are using the recommended 
practices. These visits are a chance for farmers to explain why they have not 
adopted a particular technique, and allow staff and farmers to find solutions to 
problems.
Learning and innovation
KSIIP has established demonstration plots as field schools for farmers. KSIIP and 
each association organize field days to view demonstrations of good practices. 
Similar field days are held at the processing facility so farmers can see how their 
vanilla is processed, recognize the importance of quality, and realize the costs 
involved in processing.
Outcomes
KSIIP buys vanilla beans from farmers at the market price. Although AMA 
currently controls the value chain, it is seeking ways to strengthen the farmer 
associations.
The farmers have benefited in several ways. They are able to sell their vanilla 
to a reliable buyer close by, unlike the situation before where they were at the 
mercy of traders from distant Kampala. They can get advance payment for up to 
a quarter of the value of their crop. Whenever KSIIP makes a profit, the farmers 
receive a bonus. 
KSIIP is building the capacity of the farmers in other ways. It links them with the 
national vanilla producers’ association, which provides information about internal 
market prices. The KSIIP field staff are lead farmers from two of the associations; 
after the programme has ended (in 2009) these lead farmers will continue to of-
fer technical assistance at a reasonable cost. And KSIIP is further developing its 
skills in vanilla processing.
Lessons
•	 Market analysis should consider historical data. The decision to expand va-
nilla production was based on high vanilla prices resulting from weather and 
political problems in Madagascar. The initial income figures were projected 
on high vanilla market prices. But these prices could not be sustained: a fall 
was inevitable. Decisions should be based on average figures, taking past 
price fluctuations into account. 
•	 Uganda saw a strategic opportunity in 2003 to become known in the world 
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vanilla market. Now that costs have fallen, it must increase its productivity 
and keep production costs down to retain its market share.
•	 Marketing contracts should be negotiated between buyers and farmers. This is 
currently done by AMA, but AMA is expected to withdraw from the market 
at the end of the programme. It must transfer its skills and functions to the 
farmers’ associations to avoid a collapse.
•	 Farmers should be involved in processing. This is an important aspect of 
capacity building.
•	 Farmers are able to adopt new practices if the benefits are higher than the 
costs involved. 
•	 Modern communication is important for marketing. KSIIP has received several 
inquiries after potential buyers had visited its website (www.vanillamoon.
org). These inquiries may lead to fresh market opportunities.
•	 Rural development programmes take time to achieve results. The few years 
in a typical project cycle is probably not enough. 
Challenges and ambitions 
At the moment, AMA is involved as a chain actor (a processor, logistics organ-
izer and exporter), as well as a chain service provider. There is a need to clarify 
its roles within the chain. Someone else needs to take over the chain actor role 
from AMA before the end of the programme’s life. This may be either a private 
firm or the farmers’ associations themselves. A business plan will be needed for 
this “new” enterprise. 
Vanilla is a risky crop because of the price fluctuations on the world market. The 
programme must help farmers to diversify into new products (passion fruit is 
under consideration). 
More information: www.vanillamoon.org or contact AMA, ama@infocom.co.ug 
Chain movements
Before the start of KSIIP, the farmers sold their vanilla beans 
to traders. They had no control over prices, and did not do any 
processing .
They have gained some control over the management of their 
value chain, and have started processing their produce. So 
they are beginning to move from being a chain actor towards 
chain co-ownership .

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Bringing Kaffa forest coffee to the 
German market
kaFFa, in southern ethiopia, is the original home of coffee. Coffee still grows wild in the rainforest here, even though the forest has shrunk to less than 5% 
of its original size. Farmers harvest cherries from the wild bushes, and produce a 
rich coffee that is highly prized on the international market. Individual farmers 
manage between 1 and 5 hectares of forest coffee.
The Kaffa Forest Coffee Union (KFCU) is an umbrella organization for 17 farmer 
cooperatives, some more than 15 years old, that used to meet to discuss marketing 
problems, incomes, harvesting techniques, and quality. KFCU was formed in 2004 
with assistance from SUPAK, an NGO promoting poverty alleviation in Kaffa.
KFCU started with over 4200 farmer members. By 2005, 9 new cooperatives had 
joined, bringing the total membership to more than 6600 farmers – about 20% of 
whom are women. 
KFCU processes and exports coffee on 
behalf of its members. This produces 
more income for the members than if 
they were to sell their produce on the 
open market. KFCU ensures high prod-
uct quality and is seeking new markets 
to spread risk and to improve members’ 
incomes further. 
The government encourages the farm-
ers to produce better quality coffee. It 
supports this by facilitating access to 
export markets and by providing exten-
sion advice and training.
Looking for markets
Finding suitable markets was impor-
tant for the Kaffa farmers, especially 
at a time when local and world coffee 
prices were falling. In their search for 
a solution, SUPAK and Department of 
Agriculture officials consulted widely 
The coffee ceremony is an important part 
of traditional culture in Kaffa, the original 
home of coffee
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with the cooperatives, KFCU staff, government officials, and importers in Europe. 
They were able to identify a suitable premium market in Germany. In 2004, the 
union was granted a license to export coffee. Previously it had to export through 
another cooperative. 
Chain management
The farmers dry, select and grade the coffee cherries they harvest. All export 
coffee is sun-dried and unwashed, because this fetches a premium export price. 
Quality is controlled throughout the chain. The development agent (the govern-
ment extension officer) and the cooperative pay unannounced visits to farmers to 
check on the drying process. An expert from the agricultural department checks 
the beans brought by cooperative to the processing factory for moisture content 
and colour. 
The farmers have indirect control over the price because the union negotiates a 
price (in dollars) with the importer in Germany. The farmers may receive a low 
price when they sell their coffee, but they collect a bonus every year (200% in 
2003) once the coffee has been sold to the importer.
How Ato Imito’s coffee gets to Germany
Each morning, Ato Imito and his children 
walk the 2 km to his forest plot to harvest 
coffee. The bushes are scattered across their 
2 ha of land, and it takes them the whole day 
to pick 50 kg of mature red coffee cherries. 
They carry the cherries back home, where 
Imito’s wife, Abeba, prepares a coffee cer-
emony so the family can taste the results of 
a long day’s work. 
Imito and Abeba invite their neighbours to 
drink the coffee and discuss the latest news. 
The current coffee prices are high on the 
agenda. After the neighbours have gone, 
Imito and Abeba lay the rest of the cherries 
out to dry on raised trays, being careful to 
keep dirt away. 
When the cherries are dry, Imito selects the 
best quality to sell, leaving the lower quality for sale on the local market. He takes a 30 kg 
bag of the best quality cherries to sell to the cooperative store, about half an hour’s walk 
away. 
Ato Getachow, who runs the store, registers Ato Imito’s 30 kg. Once he has bought 2000 
kg from the local farmers, the Kaffa Forest Coffee Union will send a truck to bring it to the 
processing factory. There, the beans are processed and the best are selected for export. 
They are packed in 100 kg bags and taken to a warehouse in Addis Ababa, from where 
they are exported to Europe. 
The coffee is dried on a raised bed to 
keep it free of dirt.
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Outcomes 
In 2003, the local price of coffee was birr 9/kg (€0.85). KFCU was able to get 
double that (birr 18, or €1.70/kg) for the beans it exported. Farmers receive 60% 
of this for their crop – part when they deliver their beans to the coop, and part 
later as a dividend. The remainder pays for transport and other costs to the port 
of Djibouti, and the costs of running KFCU and its member coops.
In 2005, the KFCU exported 108,000 kg of beans, generating over €85,000 in 
revenue. 
The farmers are owners of the un-
ion, which has already twice paid a 
dividend. The union controls chain 
activities such as logistics, processing, 
marketing and exporting. It negotiates 
prices, coordinates the producers, and 
organizes quality control throughout 
the chain. 
Lessons
•	 If private sector firms willing to buy the product are engaged from the begin-
ning, it is possible to build a value chain very quickly.
•	 The paperwork is important. Without an export license, KFCU had to export 
through another organization. It now has its own license, allowing it to get 
much better prices for its product.
Forest coffee produced in 
Kaffa
Year
Prepared 
for export 
(kg)
Export-
ed (kg)
Sold 
locally 
(kg)
2003 36,000 36,000 -
2004 138,823 108,000 30,828
2005 203,400 108,000 95,400
Primary coop-
erative share
9%
Farmers’ payment 
(initial plus dividend)
60%
Farmer Union share 
13%
Direct cost for 
coop to Djibouti 
18%
Distribution of income from wild coffee in Kaffa, 2004
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The Kaffa Forest Coffee Union makes 
surprise visits to growers to check on 
quality
Coffee quality counts
Results of cup tests by independent 
laboratories in Germany. KFCU exports 
coffee from wild varieties grown in un-
managed forest – the very best quality.
Coffee 
variety Where grown
Quality 
of coffee
Improved Garden, full sun Poor
Improved Garden, shade Poor +
Wild Transplanted to garden Good
Wild Managed forest Better
Wild Unmanaged forest Best
Challenges and ambitions
The KFCU has decided to improve its market intelligence by establishing a mar-
keting office in Addis Ababa. This allows it to look for other clients in Europe 
and the USA that may be interested in buying Kaffa coffee. 
A further possibility would be for KFCU to roast the coffee directly at its process-
ing plant. A study would be needed to assess financial, technical, and managerial 
feasibility of such a venture.
More information: Engida Mekonnen, engidamekonnen@yahoo.com
Chain movements
Farmers used to sell unprocessed coffee to traders, and had 
little control over prices . 
Through KFCU, they now not only process and package their 
beans; they also have a much greater ability to manage various 
aspects of the value chain .

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Partners pulling on the chain
KFCU’s success is the result of collaboration with a range of private-sector, non-government 
and government partners. These include the following:
•	 GTZ’s Public Private Partnership programme supported a study of market opportuni-
ties for the coffee union and provides funding. 
•	 Original Food and Kraft Foods, two German companies, have undertaken to buy 36 
tons of coffee. 
•	 The Amber Foundation has improved the quality process.
•	 GEO Saves the Rainforest (a project associated with the magazine GEO) certifies the 
coffee. 
•	 The University of Bonn has helped with improving coffee production and in forest 
conservation.
•	 The Jimma Bonga Catholic Secretariat provides training and distributes improved 
drying technologies. 
•	 Farm Africa works on participatory forest management. 
•	 The Kaffa Rural Development Department is helping on cooperative formation and 
extension. 
•	 The Rural Credit Fund provides credit to the farmers.
It has been possible to mobilize assistance from such a large number of organizations for 
two reasons: the ready market in Europe for high-quality forest coffee, and the importance 
of conserving what remains of Ethiopia’s rainforest and the valuable biodiversity it contains 
(including, of course, the wild coffee varieties).
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Expanding dairying opportunities in 
Thika District, Kenya
CoFFee used to be the economic backbone of rural Thika District, in central Kenya, so the collapse of coffee prices has hit farmers there hard. The situa-
tion has been made worse by the liberalization of the dairy and cereal markets. 
Milk prices were so low that farmers could not break even, and milk buyers 
bought only limited amounts when production was good. Small-scale farmers 
in the district were in dire need of alternatives.
The district’s dairy farmers could sell their milk in three ways.
•	 They could sell fresh milk to local consumers for KSh 14 (about €0.16) per 
litre. The customers would pay either each day or at the end of the month.
•	 They could sell larger amounts to traders who would sell it in the towns. The 
traders paid KSh 14 per litre either each day or at the end of the week.
•	 They could sell to a large dairy products firm, which paid KSh 16 (€0.18) per 
litre at the end of the month.
Farmers complained that all three customers delayed their weekly or monthly 
payments, or refused to pay because the milk was “spoiled”. The farmers realized 
that the traders were making a lot of profit – from KSh 6 to 15 (€0.07–0.17) per litre 
(not counting their costs), while the farmers were making only KSh 1–4 a litre. 
Credit would have helped the farmers in this situation, but very few qualified for 
it because their businesses were not profitable. In 2001, for example, 88 farmers 
in one area applied for credit, but only four met the micro-finance institution’s 
criteria. Faced with this dilemma, the farmers approached the government exten-
sion service for advice. 
The	NALEP	approach
The National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Programme (NALEP) offered 
an ideal way to address the Thika farmers’ problems. This programme works in 53 
of Kenya’s 70 districts. It provides free technical services on crops and livestock, 
as well as integrating crosscutting issues. Its strategy is to concentrate on a par-
ticular area for 1–2 years, and sensitize farmers there on an issue or technology. 
It typically helps the farmers to form “common-interest groups” to focus on a 
particular crop or technology, and coaches these groups in the necessary skills. 
Once the groups can manage themselves, NALEP staff leave them on their own 
so they can move on to other groups. 
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The programme recognizes the important role played by other extension pro-
viders, and strives to target the poor. It is easy to target better-off households. 
Serving the poorest is harder. NALEP realizes this, so it links farmers it cannot 
serve to other organizations that are better able to help them.
From understanding to intervention
When the farmers of Thika approached them, NALEP staff first had to understand 
the situation. So they conducted a survey to identify the problems and potential 
opportunities, and to set up indicators for participatory monitoring and evalua-
tion. This survey showed the need to build the farmers’ capacity in various areas 
so they could overcome production, management and marketing problems.
NALEP staff and others then outlined various options for the farmers to discuss 
and choose from. They used posters and other approaches to promote these 
and to elaborate the advantages of each, giving the farmers an opportunity to 
understand before they chose. The options covered a range of crop and livestock 
production, marketing and value addition.
Many of the farmers settled on dairy farming. They formed marketing-based 
common interest groups, and extension staff trained them in the various technical, 
management and leadership skills they would need, and worked with them on an 
action plan. The groups elected their own management committees – 40% of the 
committee members are women – to take them through their plan. NALEP also 
facilitated visits by the Thika farmers (on a cost-sharing basis) to other parts of 
the country so they could learn how other groups had solved similar problems.
The outcome: chain management
The Thika farmers organized themselves, had their premises inspected by public 
health officials, and obtained a license from the Kenya Dairy Board. They rented 
a stall in a town nearby and started collecting milk. Within a week they were 
able to sell 250 litres per day to the public – and there was demand for another 
150 litres. They usually ran out of milk by 11.00 a.m. each day, so had to turn 
customers away. Demand was such that they had to strike deals with 600 more 
farmers, and even had to buy milk from wholesalers.
The farmers could now break even – something they had not done for a long time. 
To boost their production and increase their profits, extension staff helped them 
formulate their own feed ration rather than buying commercial feed. This made 
it possible for them to cut their production costs per litre from KSh 13 to KSh 10 
(from €0.15 to 0.12). They also raised their sale price to KSh 18 (€0.20) at a time 
when the main buyer was offering KSh 17 (€0.21). The group has asked the exten-
sion service for help in improving their breeds to boost production further.
The farmers found they could diversify their product lines: they could sell not 
only fresh milk, but also mala (sour milk) and boiled milk. They started making 
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NALEP proposed various options; many of the farmers chose milk marketing 
and packaging yoghurt for various market outlets. Women farmers began baking, 
cooking ugali (maize meal), and selling along with the milk. This in turn attracted 
new customers who wanted snacks with their milk. The groups’ processing and 
selling activities have created jobs for other family members too. 
The large dairy products firm felt threatened by the grouping of 1000 Thika 
farmers – as most have stopped selling their milk to the firm so they can sup-
ply their own organization. It tried to woo the farmers back in various ways: 
by providing feed on credit, by grading roads, and by selling the farmers good 
heifers. But the farmers saw their own welfare as a priority, and the organization 
has held firm. 
Why they succeeded
This is the farmers’ project: they were involved all the way through, from 
baseline survey and problem analysis to planning and implementation. During 
problem analysis stage, they realized that most of the traders had only one func-
tion – transport – and made over 50% profit, while the producers languished 
in poverty. The analysis revealed that the large firm processed and packaged 
the milk before selling it – giving the farmers an opportunity to sell fresh milk 
at a lower price. The farmers also realized they had land and labour; what they 
needed was organization. And they were also able to diversify into selling other 
products to attract customers.
This sense of ownership is vital for sustainability. To ensure the farmers remain 
active, even after the extension staff depart, all the procedures are agreed upon 
– including the amount of time the extension workers will spend with the group. 
Training of leaders on their roles ensures good management all though and this 
has been an added advantage.
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Farmers
Dairy 
company
Traders, local consumers
Processing, value 
adding, packaging
Consumers
Diversification
The product chain before and after the intervention
BEFORE
BEFORE AFTER
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Benefits
•	 The farmers raised their income from an average of KSh 13 (€0.15) per litre to 
KSh 18–24 (€0.21–0.28) a litre.
•	 The farmers are fully employed, and they treat their farming as a business.
•	 The women earn money by making and selling food.
•	 The community as a whole has become more cohesive because of its collabo-
ration on a common activity. 
Lessons	
•	 The Thika farmers’ experience shows that it is possible to assist farmers by 
presenting them with opportunities and helping them choose those where 
they have the greatest comparative advantage.
•	 The “common interest group” concept can be used for other types of enter-
prises too. 
•	 Organizations give the farmers a stronger voice, allow them to take advantage 
of economies of scale, reduce their costs, and enable them to access credit and 
attract training opportunities.
•	 Farmers can take on tasks such as procurement, processing and bulk packag-
ing. They can also introduce technical innovations such as the introduction of 
new varieties or breeds. In time, such commodity groups can be transformed 
into bigger farmers’ organizations with the capacity to export their prod-
ucts.
•	 A major challenge remains: how to bring other farmers (especially the poor-
est) on board so they too can produce for the market and improve their in-
comes. 
More information: Lincoln Mwarasomba, l.mwarasomba@nalep.co.ke
Chain movements
The farmers have added milk collection, transportation, process-
ing, retail, cattle breeding, feed formulation and processing to 
their activities. They have also organized themselves, adding 
a wide range of management functions to their activities. From 
being chain actors , they are now firmly in the chain co-owner 
quadrant .

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Linking potato farmers to restaurants 
in	Uganda
Farmers in the southwestern highlands of Uganda and neighbouring Rwanda grow potatoes (known locally as “Irish potatoes” to distinguish them from 
sweet potatoes), mainly for food security. The low temperatures and absence of 
potato blight disease (which prevents production at lower altitudes) have allowed 
potato production to rise. But the area’s steep slopes, difficult terrain and poor 
roads mean that transport and communications are limited.
The farmers traditionally produce and sell ungraded, mixed varieties of potatoes 
at the farm gate. They are poorly organized and have limited storage facilities, 
so sell most of their crop at peak harvest times. That means they get low prices, 
and have little incentive to invest in improved production. 
However, with the rapid expansion of towns, particularly Kampala, food habits 
are changing, creating new market options for better organized farmers. One such 
group, the Nyabyumba Farmers’ Group in Kabale District, has started selling 
graded, high-quality chipping potatoes directly to a fast-food outlet in Kampala. 
To meet the stringent quality parameters for this contract, the farmers have had to 
innovate in their production, organization and marketing. They have been able to 
do so because of effective support from research and development services, and 
because the group has invested its increased income in further improvements. 
The Nyabyumba Farmers’ Group
The farmers of Nyabyumba village have been growing crops such as potatoes, 
sorghum and beans for many years. In 1998, with support from local NGOs, they 
formed a group based on a farmer field school focusing on seed potato production. 
They joined the Uganda National Seed Potato Producers’ Association in 1999, 
and for several years successfully produced potato seed. But by 2002, demand 
for potato seed began to fall as the market became oversupplied. 
The main problem for the farmers was a lack of a decent price and market outlet 
for potatoes grown for eating (known in the trade as “ware potatoes”), rather 
than for seed. Poor demand meant they could not benefit from their investment 
in seed production. The Nyabyumba group asked the Regional Potato and Sweet 
Potato Improvement Network (known as PRAPACE) to help them find alterna-
tive markets. 
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In response, CIAT’s Agro-Enterprise team trained staff from Africare, an interna-
tional NGO that provides services to farmers in Uganda, in how to analyse supply 
chain and develop business plans. Africare in turn helped the farmers develop 
a new potato enterprise by analysing the supply chain, identifying a range of 
market options, and so linking themselves to a more sustainable financial future. 
This intervention consisted of three phases.
Phase 1: Planning and preparing for the market 
The Nyabyumba group worked with the Africare market facilitator to study the 
changes in demand for potato, the current production status, profitability, the 
group’s organizational strengths, and the types of support they could obtain from 
their research and development partners. A marketing team was established, 
which comprised members of the farmers’ group and service providers to evalu-
ate market opportunities. 
Phase 2: Analysing the supply chain and 
designing the enterprise 
The marketing team conducted a participatory supply chain analysis to assess 
the actors and services involved in producing, handling, and selling potatoes 
to various market outlets. The team identified several market opportunities for 
potatoes: the local market, the Kampala wholesale market (450 km away), small 
shops in Kampala, or a fast-food restaurant in the capital. 
The farmers decided to take on the most profitable market option, even though 
they knew it involved the biggest challenge. The offer was to sell potatoes to Nan-
dos, a multinational fast-food restaurant which buys 5 to 10 tonnes of potatoes a 
month. The farmers and market facilitator held further meetings with Nandos staff 
to undertake a cost–benefit analysis and confirm the viability of direct sales. 
The farmers and Africare then developed an action plan. This involved identify-
ing critical points in the production–sales process, and making provisions for the 
types of actions and investments required to supply the Nandos contract. 
Phase 3: Establishing the enterprise 
After developing their enterprise plan, the team returned to Kampala to negoti-
ate contractual terms with Nandos. This included aspects such as price, variety, 
volume, quality, frequency of supply and terms of payment. This part of the 
process required careful planning and rigour in analysing costs, payments, roles 
and responsibilities. 
The market analysis and enterprise planning process revealed changes the farm-
ers would have to make. These included the following.
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Finance Africare was willing to facilitate the process, but its policy of “no hand-
outs” meant it would not finance them. So the farmers had to find the money 
themselves. They had to open a bank account so they could accept payments by 
cheque from Nandos. To bridge the first 3–4 months, they had to draw on their 
own resources and on savings. They also had to borrow about USh 3 million 
(€1,400) from within the community. 
Organization The group formed a management committee, and members 
received basic training in record keeping and accounting. To ensure quality, the 
group selected lead farmers to monitor production and to participate in market-
ing. 
Communication Nandos asked the group to buy a mobile phone to reduce 
communication problems. This was vital in maintaining links with Nandos and 
transport firms. 
Consistency of supply The farmers were used to two harvests per year, and had 
to make radical changes to ensure a regular supply of 10 tonnes per month. They 
did this through a combination of adopting new varieties, staggered planting, 
planting in wetlands, using drip irrigation, building stores, and buying potatoes 
from other farmers when their stocks were low. 
Quality The farmers had to learn how to sort and grade their potatoes quickly. 
Potatoes transported to Kampala that did not meet the Nandos grade, had to be 
sold on the wholesale markets, where they fetched a much lower price. Failure to 
meet the grade was costly: 80% of the initial delivery of potatoes were rejected. 
This was a major loss in income. So over the next 8 months, the farmers worked 
hard to reduce the level of rejects. This effort paid off, and rejection rates fell from 
80% to less than 10%. By December 2004, the farmers were consistently supplying 
potatoes that met Nandos’ stringent quality requirements.
Experimentation and innovation To achieve this performance, the farmers 
adopted several innovations, such as micro-irrigation in upland areas, which 
significantly improved the quality of off-season tubers. To synchronize produc-
tion, members have taken on strict planting schedules specifying planting times, 
amounts to be planted, availability of planting materials, harvest date and ex-
pected yield at harvest. They changed the planting density to increase the size of 
the potatoes. Farmers also cut off the plants above the ground a few days before 
harvesting; this reduces the tuber moisture content and extends storage life. This 
experimental work was supervised by experts from the National Agricultural 
Research Organisation (NARO). 
Outcomes
From July 2003 to April 2004, the farmers managed to deliver 76.5 tonnes of po-
tatoes to Nandos, earning them USh 24 million (€11,000). By May 2005, they had 
supplied 190 tonnes of potatoes to Nandos, bringing their total income to USh 
60 million (about €30,000). 
146
Chain empowerment 
Deliveries and income are likely to rise, and more farmers will become involved. 
By May 2005, the group had expanded to 120 members, 80 of whom are women. 
More women are getting involved in production, and both the secretary and 
treasurer of the management team are women. 
The group has progressed from serving an oversupplied seed market to being an 
active supplier of high quality, graded ware potatoes. It has improved its position 
in both chain activities and chain management.
Chain activities
The group was already involved in several chain activities, including supplying 
seed potatoes, organizing for land management issues, irrigation, production, 
financing of production, negotiating contracts, and delivering products to vari-
ous buyers. 
The farmers have increased their control over chain activities. They grow high-
quality seed and have developed strong links with NARO. They have increased 
their ability to experiment with support of research and development partners. 
Transportation from remote Kabale District is a key issue. The management team 
have tackled this by arranging for empty trucks returning from Rwanda to Kam-
pala or Mombasa to pick up loads of potatoes in Nyabyumba. This significantly 
improves their ability to deliver the product on time. 
Chain management
The major innovations have been in the area of chain management. 
Social capital and organization innovations
• A small farmer group was accepted as a farmer field school and at first fol-
lowed FAO’s field school approach. It morphed into a commercial farming 
association when the farmers learned new marketing skills.
• The organization has established various committees and elects members to 
the posts of chair, secretary, treasurer, marketing officer, lead farmers, and 
so on. It has developed a simple business and a longer term vision – one that 
members can articulate easily.
• Participatory approaches have significantly improved the group’s ability to 
take collective action.
Finance innovations
• The group was able to save more than USh 1 million (€460) in the 2 years lead-
ing up to the business becoming profitable. They used this money to improve 
their ability to produce and market their product effectively.
• The group opened a bank account, giving them financial credibility.
• The group was able to access credit through the buyer at zero interest. 
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Technology innovations 
• The group has tested new potato varieties for local adaptability and market 
demand. The farmers have switched from a mix of varieties to one specific 
variety suitable for making high-quality chips.
• The group has improved its seed supply system to cover its own needs as 
well as supplying other farmers in the area with high quality, disease-free 
seed potatoes.
• The farmers are re-investing their profits invest in improving production. 
For example, they have installed micro-irrigation systems so they can grow 
potatoes year round, enabling them to supply the buyer with a consistent 
volume each month.
• They maintain bunds on slopes to control erosion, and apply fertilizers to 
maintain soil fertility.
Market linkage innovations 
• The group strengthened their links to buyers by buying a mobile phone, by 
being pro-active in seeking new trading relationships, and by making personal 
contacts in the market place and with other supply chain actors. 
• The group continuously assesses its market options and is seeking ways to 
diversify its buyers. 
• The group also continuously analyses its profit and the quality of its pro-
duce.
Lessons
The Nyabyumba farmers’ enterprise is now more firmly established. Although 
they face many challenges, they are seeking to develop strategies for growth. The 
group’s experiences demonstrate that:
• The process of linking farmers to markets was based on a long-term (10 year) 
process to build social capital. This has included support from various service 
providers: NGOs such as Africare (which focused on group dynamics and 
Chain movements
The farmers have moved from being chain integrators  with 
an emphasis on seed potato production, to a highly organized 
supplier of quality, bulked product to a specific processor/retailer 
on an informal contractual basis . The major shift was to 
greater horizontal integration; they also increased their vertical 
integration through improvements in sorting and grading.

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leadership), FAO (farmer field school approach), PRAPACE (research insight 
and business linkage options), NARO (new storage methods and varieties), 
and CIAT (agro-enterprise support). 
• The 10-year timeframe is important: groups with less social capital and lead-
ership would have been unlikely to have succeeded in such a venture. 
• The participatory market orientation enabled these smallholders to play a 
leading role in identifying a market and successfully linking themselves to 
a higher-value market option. This required strong support from the service 
providers, but it showed that farmers could learn rapidly not just how to 
supply a chain but also to innovate and respond to new challenges as they 
emerged.
• Taking a market orientation enabled the farmers to increase their income and 
to invest in better agronomic practices. 
• The ability to test and adopt new innovations at critical points in the enterprise 
process, such as at production, post-harvest handling and marketing, are vital 
for success. 
• Enterprises must be based on the collection and analysis of sound technical 
and economic information. 
• Participatory approaches permit actors in the supply chain and service pro-
viders to achieve a better understanding of the challenges met by each actor 
in the chain.
• Farmers can gain confidence and improve their negotiating power by consoli-
dating relationships with their buyers and establishing effective communica-
tion channels. 
• In this case, women were able to play a key role in developing and sustaining 
the business. 
Ambitions
• The group is undertaking periodic analysis of the market. They have identi-
fied a new market to supply a potato crisp factory in Kampala. 
• Many other people are now seeking to be involved in this new market area. 
This will increase competition for the Nyabyumba group.
• The group is considering diversifying into other products. 
More information: Shaun Ferris, CIAT, s.ferris@cgiar.org
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Strategies	
for	chain	
empowerment
Chapters 3–6 have disCussed examples of four strategies for empowering farm-ers in chain development (see figure on the next page). In this chapter we 
will look more closely at the case studies for each strategy to derive lessons and 
recommendations that can be used by intermediary organizations and chain 
facilitators.  For each strategy we describe the current situation, the goal and ra-
tionale, the timeframe, how to monitor progress, and the set of skills and assets 
the farmers need.
1	 Upgrading as a chain actor The farmers become crop specialists with a clear 
market orientation.
2	 Adding value through vertical integration The farmers move into joint 
processing and marketing in order to add value to the product.
3	 Developing chain partnerships The farmers build long-term alliances with 
buyers that are centred on shared interests and mutual growth.
4	 Developing ownership over the chain The farmers try to build direct link-
ages with the consumers.
1	 Upgrading	as	a	chain	actor
This section draws especially on the cases in Chapter 3.
What	is	the	current	situation?
Currently the farmers are not well connected with markets. They stay on the 
farm to wait for traders who come and visit them to buy. The traders offer low 
prices and do not buy all of the output. Of course, the farmers are angry with 
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this – their time and effort are not well rewarded. They blame the traders for 
their problems. The traders give low prices and sell in the city for much more. 
The world is unfair! 
What the farmers do not realize is that they are part of the problem. Their produc-
tion is not well tailored to what the market needs. They produce mangoes (say) 
of all different qualities – some are healthy and big, others are small and spotty. 
But they put them all together in the same crate. The trader does not know what 
quality to expect, so offers a low price. 
What	is	the	goal,	and	why?
The idea is to make the farmers crop specialists with better farming skills, so 
that they can produce a better crop of a higher and more consistent quality and 
quantity, which is better suited to satisfy the buyer. In this way the farmers can 
make more money and improve their livelihood.
Chain
(co-)owner
Chain 
partner
Farmers do many  
chain activities
Farmers specialized  
in production
Farmers 
participate 
in chain 
manage-
ment
Farmers do 
not partici-
pate in chain 
manage-
ment
Chain
actor
Chain activity 
integrator
Horizontal integration 
(management)
Vertical integration 
(activities)
Strategies for empowering farmers 
1
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as a chain 
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4
Developing 
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over the 
chain
3
Developing 
chain part-
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2
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Becoming crop specialists is a necessary first step, prior to any other form of chain 
development. Unless the farms are well run it makes no sense to invest in process-
ing or to seek chain partnerships. However, when the farmers have consolidated 
themselves as specialized farmers, then other options open up.
For example, in the case of the pineapple outgrower scheme in Ghana (page 
34), the farmers first develop farming skills as an employee before they become 
independent farmers. In the future, when they are specialized farmers, they may 
build up a farmer organization and increase their control over the value chain.
Another example comes from the case of cashew in Mozambique (page 47). The 
farmers have planted new varieties of trees, and have learned how to improve 
production. As a result, their yield and quality of their output have risen, and 
they now get better prices.
How	much	time	does	it	take?
The time it takes to become a specialized farmer depends on the existing assets 
and capacities of the farmer, the type of product, and the type of market. To pro-
duce for export markets is far more demanding than to produce for local markets 
– it may take many years to develop the necessary skills. In the pineapple case 
(page 34) it takes four years before the farmer may produce for the export market 
Upgrading as a chain actor
Intervention focus Ensure that farmers have the basic assets they need to im-
prove their production 
Improve farmers’ farm management skills: crop and livestock 
production, planning, record keeping, financial management, 
etc.
Improve farmers’ understanding of markets, chains, competi-
tion, consumer demands and contracts
Identify and develop markets and products
Promote and strengthen farmers’ organizations
Chain model Organized farmer groups with stable relationship with buy-
ers
Type of farmer 
organization
Farmer cooperatives, farmers’ schools or study groups
Key competencies 
of the organization
Good agricultural practices
Continuous improvement in farm production
Farm record-keeping
Strong organizational skills
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alone. But for in some circumstances, such as in the honey case in Kenya (page 
75) huge improvements were achieved in only 3 months. To improve quality in 
mango production may take 3–4 years – while in dairying big improvements 
can be achieved within 3 months through simple training in hygiene in milking 
and storage.
How	to	monitor	progress?
Progress can be measured in two ways. It is possible to collect quantitative data 
on quality, yields, average price, turnover, etc. 
It is also possible to observe the state of the farm (tidiness) and develop a simple 
questionnaire that farmers can use to measure improvements in farming and 
management skills. The scores in such a questionnaire can be based on a series 
of simple questions about farm management.
What	skills	and	assets	does	the	farmer	need?
Producing for a market requires some basic assets. There must be basic infrastruc-
ture such as roads and communication facilities. The farmer must have access to 
productive resources – land, water, seeds, capital, etc. Unless these conditions 
are met, it makes no sense investing in commercial farming. In other words, to 
improve the livelihoods of farmers, it may be necessary to invest not only in the 
farmer but also in other parts of the chain.
To become a crop specialist, the farmer should have farm management skills. This 
includes not only technical production skills – irrigation, integrated crop and pest 
management, land preparation, etc. It also includes skills to plan activities, steer 
workers, maintain accounts, manage cash flows, keep records to gain a proper 
understanding of the costs involved, etc.
The farmer should develop an understanding what it means to produce for a 
competitive market. Other farmers are producing the same products for the 
same market, so the farmer must offer something special to attract a buyer. It is 
common to see farmers in the same area all planting tomatoes at the same time. 
Everybody does what the others are doing. Of course, this results in a glut and 
low prices at harvesting time. Hence, instead of just producing tomatoes because 
it is a tradition, the farmer should rather ask herself what the market needs.
Farmers should also understand that to produce for a market implies risk. The 
profit an entrepreneur makes is a return for the risks that she has taken. Farming 
is in itself a risky business – a drought may destroy the crop, or a goat may eat it. 
But farming for a market poses additional risks because the investments in farm 
production are higher, and the farmer makes herself dependent upon the buyer. 
Prices may fluctuate widely throughout the season. The farmer must have the 
capacity and willingness to take such risks.
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One way to reduce these risks is to sign a production contract. The buyer and 
seller both reduce their risks by agreeing early in the season to supply or purchase 
a given volume of produce. However, other traders may come by at harvest time 
and offer higher prices. The farmer should resist such temptations and honour 
the contract. An example comes from the sunflower case in Tanzania (page 84) 
where farmers sold on the side to an unreliable trader. The contracting company 
was furious and withdrew from the contract, leaving the farmers unable to sell the 
remainder of their produce. They ended up with lower prices for their produce 
than agreed upon in the contract.
The farmers should be willing to learn and innovate constantly. Conditions in 
the market change rapidly as new competitors pop up, new technologies are 
introduced, and consumer preferences change. The farmers must be capable of 
doing new things, or doing old things in a new way. In this way the farmers can 
grow and evolve as the market changes. A good example of this comes from the 
jatropha case (page 41), where the farmers organized as groups, took up a new 
crop, and started processing it into oil.
All these skills and assets imply that the farmers are organized. Unless farmers 
are already organized, or are willing to organize, the facilitator does not even 
come into the picture. Many private companies also prefer working with organ-
ized farmers because it reduces their risks and transaction costs. Organization 
is therefore a basic asset that needs to develop – it is the backbone of the whole 
process of chain development. This cannot be rushed – organizations that are 
artificially created from above will soon or later fall apart.
2	 Developing	chain	partnerships
This section draws especially on the cases in Chapter 4.
What	is	the	current	situation?
The farmers are already professional chain actors. They offer a fairly attractive 
product, have organized among themselves, and have developed basic assets, 
farm management skills, understanding of markets and willingness to innovate. 
In other words, the farmers are crop specialists and have something good to of-
fer to buyers. 
However, the farmers feel out of control in their relations with the outside world. 
For instance, they may be selling to visiting traders – each year a new one. This 
leaves them in considerable doubt whether they can sell their produce, and at 
what price. Or they may be producing under contract for a processing company. 
This gives them a secure market outlet, but they have to follow the instructions 
of the company to the letter, and they lack power to bargain over prices or other 
contract conditions. The farmers feel that they are left to the whims of others 
– out of control.
154
Chain empowerment 
What	is	the	goal,	and	why?
The farmers would like to build more stable relationships with the market. They 
would like to move to the point where they have greater influence in the chain 
– influence on factors such as pricing, technology, quality standards, logistics, 
timeframes, etc. To this end, the farmers opt for a partnership strategy based on 
shared interests and mutual growth. By linking with a buyer, they can increase 
their business security and gradually improve and expand their businesses. They 
want to make themselves an attractive business partner so that the buyer will be 
willing to pay better prices, listen to their demands, and invest in them. 
How	much	time	does	it	take?
It takes several years to build chain partnerships. Just identifying a good partner 
may take a year. Another year is needed to get to know each other, develop trust 
and shared visions, and agree on a joint business plan. Then comes implementa-
Developing chain partnerships
Intervention focus Make the farmers an attractive business partner both tech-
nically (quality, yields) and managerially (entrepreneurial 
mentality, understanding of the chain)
Organize continuous learning and innovation (farmer schools, 
exchange of best practice, etc.)
Empower the farmers organizationally (including information 
systems for improved bargaining)
Facilitate chain cooperation with the buyer (exchange of 
information, bargaining, joint action plans based on shared 
interests, etc.)
Chain model Specialized, organized farmer groups cooperating with proc-
essors, traders or retailers
Type of farmer 
organization
At grassroots level: farmers’ schools or study groups
At chain level: representation in a chain platform
Key competencies 
of the organization
Good agricultural practices
Continuous improvement in farm production
Farm record-keeping
Independent information on market prices and trends
Understanding of the supply chain 
Communication and bargaining with a focus on shared in-
terests
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tion of the joint business plan. A real partnership is only in place after 2 or more 
years of mutually satisfactory implementation. Hence building a partnership 
will take at least 4 years (assuming that the farmers are already crop specialists). 
Rushing the process tends to lead to unstable partnerships (as in the sunflower 
case page 84).
How	to	monitor	progress?
Quantitative data include the volume of the transactions between the business 
partners, and the amount of investment in the joint business plan. 
Progress can be measured in a qualitative way using evaluation forms in which 
the partners evaluate the other party (e.g., commenting on each other’s trustwor-
thiness) and aspects of the business relation (e.g., commenting on quality control 
procedures, pricing formulas, etc.). 
What	skills	and	assets	does	the	farmer	need?
We assume that the farmers are already crop specialists, because that is a basic 
requirement for entering into business partnerships. The cases about the farmer 
field schools (pages 79 and 94) show that first the farmers worked for many years 
on technical training and innovation. Later, when they had a good product and 
were ready to develop market alliances, they started improving their business 
skills and linkages to business partners. This is the shift from “farmer field schools” 
to “farmer business schools”.
In this transition, the farmers improve their entrepreneurial skills – costing and 
pricing, production planning, understanding of market demands, marketing plan-
ning, negotiation skills, etc. Of particular importance is managing information. 
Information systems are needed to improve the farmers’ management decisions 
and bargaining position. By keeping records of the use of labour and inputs 
at farm level, the farmers get a proper understanding of the costs involved, so 
can make better-informed decisions and calculate prices more precisely. These 
records can also guarantee the buyer about the product’s traceability – where it 
came from and the inputs that were used. Another important aspect is market 
information. If the farmers are well informed of updated prices and trends in the 
market, they are better able to bargain with potential buyers.
The farmers should develop a chain vision – an understanding of how value 
chains work. They should understand the chain as a network of specialized 
companies that need each other to make money. They should acknowledge the 
position of other chain actors, and respect that their interests are also legitimate. 
They should understand the need for cooperation rather than fighting against 
each other. They should understand that sellers and buyers will always have 
opposed interests – a high price and a low price, respectively. Nevertheless, they 
also have a shared interest – that is, to satisfy the consumer in an effective and 
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efficient way. When the consumer is satisfied, the businesses of both the seller 
and the buyer will grow. The chain can only satisfy the consumer when all chain 
actors cooperate. That is the essence of the chain vision that underlies any attempt 
at building chain partnerships. 
Another necessary asset is an appropriate structure and approach to dialogue with 
the partnering company and to agree on joint business plans. The farmers must 
be organized and have democratically elected representatives who can meet the 
partnering company when needed. Furthermore, to build trust, shared visions 
and joint business plans, an external mediator may be needed to ensures that the 
dialogue between the two parties is fair, transparent, concrete, and fruitful. A good 
example is Faida MaLi’s role in the sunflower case (page 84). More information 
on Faida’s approach can be found in the resource section (page 178).
Finally, it is important to develop the farmers’ ability to mobilize savings for 
growth and investment. Because the sunflower farmers had no savings, they opted 
to go for the quick cash buyers, and in the process affected relationships with 
longer-term buyers who would have probably been more useful in moving them 
to the chain partnership level. Apart from mobilizing savings, the intermediary 
organization needs to build the farmers’ capacity in accessing loans and attracting 
investment. This aims to ensure the farmers have enough capital to upgrade.
3	 Adding	value	through	vertical	
integration
This section draws especially on the cases in Chapter 5.
What	is	the	current	situation?
The farmers are already specialized chain actors to some extent – they offer a 
reasonably attractive product, have organized among themselves, and have 
developed basic assets, farm management skills, understanding of markets and 
willingness to innovate.
However, the farmers feel that they get few returns from the market. They sell 
their produce as raw material at low prices. At the end of the chain the consumer 
pays a price that is five to twenty times higher than the farmers receive. They see 
that other players further down the chain make money by grading the product, 
cleaning it, processing it, packaging it, and making it ready for use by the con-
sumer. The farmers also see that they could get better prices if they could sell 
directly to wholesale or retail markets instead of selling through traders. But they 
produce too little volume to do this. Moreover, they have no access to processing 
technologies, trucks, packaging machines, etc.
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What	is	the	goal,	and	why?
The farmers want to move from merely farming into additional business activi-
ties. They want to put their farm produce together, process it to some degree, and 
then sell it as a group. This will allow them to get a larger share of the revenues 
in the value chain. It may increase their incomes and generate more jobs in their 
villages. Another motivation to start processing may be to prevent losses when 
fresh fruits and vegetables cannot be sold, as in the case of Muleba fruit juice 
(page 102). 
How	much	time	does	it	take?
In all cases it took 3–4 years for the farmers to integrate new activities. But it is 
unclear whether they will be able to maintain them, so it is likely that more time 
is needed. The case of jatropha (page 41) is a good example – without additional 
project support, the farmers’ groups are moving backwards.
How	to	monitor	progress?
Some impacts can be measured in a quantitative way. They include:
•	 The economic performance of the new business venture: turnover, profit, 
capital assets, return upon capital
Adding value through vertical integration
Intervention focus Invest in facilities for processing, marketing and distribution 
(infrastructure and professional staff)
Develop market outlets
Design and implement management systems (operational 
procedures)
Develop organizational discipline
Chain model Farmer cooperatives adding value through joint input procure-
ment, processing, marketing, etc.
Type of farmer 
organization
Farmer cooperatives adding value through joint marketing, 
etc.
Key competencies 
of the organization
Quality grading
Market outlet development
Logistics management
Organizational discipline
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•	 Increases in income at household level and the number of new jobs created. 
In addition, qualitative assessment tools can be developed to monitor organiza-
tional capacities such as human resources, information systems, decision-making 
processes, joint planning capacities, bargaining capacity, etc. Client satisfaction 
with the product, delivery conditions, packaging, etc. can also be monitored.
What	skills	and	assets	does	the	farmer	need?
We assume that the farmers are already crop specialists, because that is a basic 
requirement for moving from farming into other chain activities. To do so the 
farmers’ organization should build assets such as warehousing, conditioning and 
packaging, logistics and quality control equipment and systems. The organiza-
tion has to develop the ability to plan and run these new business ventures. This 
includes the development of bankable business plans, obtaining investment 
capital, the identification and implementation of appropriate technologies, the 
operational management of the new business processes, the assurance of quality, 
targeting of buyers, management of client satisfaction, and continuous upgrading 
of the product and the production processes. 
In other words, moving from farming into downstream business activities requires 
an elaborate set of new managerial skills. Operational management becomes high-
ly complex – for example, the organization should ensure that input procurement 
is synchronized with production, processing, packaging and marketing activities. 
Specific technical skills may be particularly important, such as quality control 
and upgrading. Collective equipment and infrastructure must be managed in a 
professional and responsible manner. Decision-making processes, administrative 
procedures and information flows also become far more complex. This points 
to the need of recruiting professionals – farmers themselves are unlikely to be 
able to perform these functions. Professionals need to be in charge of marketing, 
administration, and management.
Besides professional management, strong group cohesion and organizational dis-
cipline are needed. Involvement in a joint business venture requires the members 
of the farmer organization to be able to trust and rely upon each other. Individual 
members must adhere to operational procedures and quality standards. Manage-
ment decisions have to be transparent and understandable to group members. 
Unless there is real ownership by the farmers, the business venture will not be 
successful. This also implies that the members must invest their own resources 
in the business venture, and thus run risks. Dependency upon outside support 
is a major cause of failure.
A final area where the farmers’ organization needs to develop capacities is public 
relations. The organization not only deals with suppliers and customers, but with 
a whole range of actors: financial institutions, service providers, certification agen-
cies, local authorities, labour unions, etc. The organization must be able to man-
age this diversity of stakeholders and influence relevant elements of the business 
environment, such as registration, certification, standards, and infrastructure.
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4	 Developing	co-ownership	over	the	
chain
This section draws especially on the cases in Chapter 6.
What	is	the	current	situation?
The farmers are already specialized chain actors with a fairly attractive product, 
basic farm management skills, some understanding of markets and a willingness 
to innovate and take risks. They experience the same problem as in the previous 
strategy – they feel that they get too little return from the chain and that they 
have no control over what happens to their produce.
The cases start from a variety of situations. The Malian farmers (page 122) were 
isolated women processing low-quality shea butter for their own consumption. 
The Ugandan vanilla producers (page 128) were individual struggling smallhold-
ers, as were the Kenyan dairy farmers (page 138). The Tanzanian and Ethiopian 
coffee producers (pages 89 and 133) were already organized, though the Tanzanian 
regional cooperative was not operational.
Developing co-ownership over the chain
Intervention focus Enter into joint ventures downstream in the chain for the 
development of new consumer product lines
Develop and market branded consumer products
Chain model Farmer cooperative gaining chain co-ownership in partner-
ship with processors or retailers, or through direct marketing 
to consumers
Type of farmer 
organization
Business cooperative
Key competencies 
of the organization
Total quality management
Product/market development
Consumer targeting
Joint venture cooperation
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What	is	the	goal,	and	why?
The goal of the intervention strategy is similar to vertical integration – i.e., to em-
power the farmers’ organization to deal with technical as well as managerial issues 
on behalf of its members. However, chain co-ownership goes further than vertical 
integration. It implies that farmers organize themselves in recognized, visible 
business organizations, capable of penetrating existing markets, developing new 
products or markets, or diversifying their activities. It also means they can reach 
the end-consumers of their products and to initiate dialogue with the consumers 
to improve the product, based on consumer demand. Such farmers’ organizations 
can negotiate lucrative prices and take a fair share from the chain. 
Such a value chain may not be too long or complex, since co-ownership requires 
good coordination skills and capabilities. For African farmers the most acces-
sible markets are local, national or regional. Reaching the end-consumer may be 
very difficult in an export chain. However, importers can be considered as the 
end-consumer since they take over all the rest of the chain in a distant country. 
Coffee and vanilla producers in Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia are involved 
in export markets to Europe and the USA (pages 89, 128 and 133), while Malian 
shea butter producers are targeting a regional export market in Senegal (page 
122). Meanwhile, dairy product producers in Kenya are essentially targeting a 
local urban market (page 138).
How	much	time	does	it	take?
This intervention strategy will take a lot of time, especially if it starts with indi-
vidual farmers. However, it may be possible to achieve results within 4–5 years 
if farmers already master their production techniques and aim at local markets 
where they are easily in contact with the end-consumer. The case of dairy farmers 
in Kenya (page 138) shows this.
How	to	monitor	progress?
Hard quantitative data can be collected on turnover, profit, capital assets, income 
increases, etc. 
Other ways to know when a farmers’ organization is becoming a chain co-owner 
is when parties start to recognize that it functions in a fair, transparent and trust-
ful manner – for example, guaranteeing an acceptable price to the farmers and 
ensuring that they are paid in time. Honoured contracts, quality certification 
and satisfied clients are also good indicators of an empowered chain co-owner. 
Finally, a cooperative that initiates or negotiates research and development initia-
tives for the benefit of the entire value chain should be considered as co-owner 
of the chain.
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What	skills	and	assets	does	the	farmer	need?
The farmers’ organization needs to develop the same skills and assets as in the 
vertical integration strategy – e.g., professional management skills, organizational 
discipline and the ability to mobilize funds for investment in new business ven-
tures. However what distinguishes the two strategies is the ability to coordinate 
the whole chain in order to satisfy the end-consumer. The organization must be 
able to understand consumer demands and to translate them into product and 
process upgrading and operational processes. The organization must be on top of 
what consumers want and what competitors do, and try always to stay one step 
ahead. This requires constant research and innovation. For example, the dairy 
farmers in Kenya (page 138) added a new product to their range: besides selling 
milk they started selling the snacks that consumers like to eat while drinking 
milk. 
The shea butter chain in Mali (page 122) is an example of fragile co-ownership. 
Though the shea butter union negotiates its price with the Senegalese importer, it 
still relies on one importer only. The union does not yet reach the end-consumer 
because the importer processes the butter into a final product that is sold to 
mainly French consumers. The farmers are currently developing a partnership 
with a Dutch company to sell shea kernels. This partnership includes negotiat-
ing the price, product and process upgrading through improved processing 
techniques. 
In the case of vanilla (page 128), the Ugandan farmers negotiate directly with 
American importers on price and quality. However, they are not in contact with 
American vanilla consumers, and they have no information on how to upgrade 
or brand their product in the US market.
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8	
Facilitating	chain	
development
IntermedIary organIzatIons can play a vital role in developing value chains that benefit small-scale farmers. The previous chapter presented strategies that inter-
mediary organizations can follow to improve the capacity of farmers to manage 
chains or to integrate chain activities. This chapter draws lessons from the cases 
in Chapter 3–6 about the roles of the intermediary organization in implementing 
chain interventions. The lessons are grouped into the five components of chain 
interventions that were discussed in Chapter 2 (page 28).
The intermediary organization needs to ensure that all smallholders can take 
advantage of a pro-poor marketing approach. In poor areas of developing coun-
tries, most communities and service providers face serious challenges in invest-
ing in new marketing interventions and sustainably raising incomes. Typically, 
rural communities produce low-value commodities, which face declining real 
prices and increasing competition from medium- to large-scale producers. Sim-
ply increasing production may not be enough to raise incomes in the long run. 
There are few examples of smallholders developing new, lucrative markets with 
undifferentiated products – except for traditional export crops, which have lost 
most in terms of value. There are, on the other hand, examples where improved 
productivity and better management have enabled smallholders to sell into exist-
ing markets, expand the area where their products are sold, and offset imports. 
Smallholders rarely make enough money to invest in higher-value or valued 
added products – though it is value addition that offers real opportunities. 
This book shows how intermediary or-
ganizations have supported smallhold-
ers to confront the marketing situation 
in various ways:
• Improving their competitiveness in 
producing local products (such as 
jatropha in Tanzania, page 41).
The small diagrams 
in this chapter refer 
to the five phases in 
chain interventions 
(see the figure on 
page 28).
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• Improving group-based organizations, achieving economies of scale through 
collective action on inputs, production, marketing and access to services (milk 
cooperatives in Kenya, page 138).
• Diversifying into higher-value crops or livestock products, linked to identified 
market demands (vanilla in Uganda, page 128).
• Adding value to products by accessing higher-priced markets, enhancing 
product quality, or incorporating processing activities that meet consumer 
needs (organic coffee in Tanzania, page 89, or potatoes in Uganda, page 
143).
• Entering new types of contractual agreements, based on forward sales that 
help to “lock in” buyers over a longer time at advantageous rates (pineapples 
in Ghana, page 34).
When implementing these interventions, they need to consider the following 
issues during the various phases of chain development: chain mapping and as-
sessment, building engagement, chain development, monitoring and evaluation, 
and learning and innovation. The remainder of this chapter covers each of these 
in turn.
Chain	mapping	and		
assessment
Market-orientation	and	risk	assessment
A market orientation implies that an intermediary organization supports small-
holders, often in a particular geographical area, to identify and access remunera-
tive opportunities for existing or new products, in existing or new markets (see the 
box on the next page). Smallholder farmers with limited resources cannot afford 
a lot of risk. If farmers depend on the sale of a single commodity, or on a single 
buyer, there is a significant risk that their project will ultimately fail. This was 
shown by the case on sunflower from Tanzania (page 84). On the other hand, if 
producers try to improve their production and marketing of multiple commodi-
ties at the same time, they may lose focus and not succeed with any. 
The intermediary organization should involve the farmers in selecting the prod-
ucts they want to invest in, based on what they see as an acceptable exposure to 
risk. The marketing strategy enables community members to gather information 
on potential market options. They can thereby build a portfolio of products or 
market options requiring more or less investment and embodying various levels 
of risk. 
If people in the community want to identify new marketing opportunities, the next 
task is to review their level of food security and be sure that they are equipped to 
take on more risk. Then help them select products, supply chains and new busi-
ness options that take into account a level of risk appropriate for them.
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However, the intermediary organization needs to consider the impact that a mar-
ket-oriented approach may have on food security. In the case of vanilla in Uganda 
(page 128), for instance, farmers may not have planted enough food crops to feed 
themselves when world prices for this new high-value crop drop in the near fu-
ture. The vanilla chain currently relies heavily on the intermediary organization, 
leaving the farmers at great risk when it withdraws from the chain. The case of 
sunflower in  Tanzania (page 84) provides an example where the combination of 
a new product and a new market was too risky, resulting in a failure to set up a 
sustainable value chain. Therefore, an intermediary organization needs to strike 
a balance between market orientation and food security.
The Ansoff matrix
The Ansoff matrix (below) is a way to categorize risk options by comparing types of products 
and markets. 
Risk increases from 1 (low risk) to 4 (highest risk). 
Existing products New products
Existing 
markets
 
Market penetration  
(lowest risk)
 
Product  
development
New 
markets
 
Market  
development
 
Diversification  
(highest risk)
Products in high demand tend to be highly profitable, but also very risky. So if groups look 
for market opportunities based on demand and profitability, they are likely to be steered 
towards risky undertakings. Group members need to be aware of the risks and benefits 
from these options. 
The facilitators can use the Ansoff matrix to guide groups towards a sensible level of risk. 
They may advise newly formed groups to promote existing products in existing markets (the 
“market penetration” option,  in the diagram above), since this has the lowest risk. 
As it gains experience and cohesion, the group might go on to test their existing products 
in new markets (“market development”, ) – perhaps by sending a trial shipment to the 
new market before engaging in larger scale supply. 
For groups with more experience in marketing, higher risk strategies (product development 
and diversification –  and ) are likely to be more attractive. 
More information: Lundy et al., 2005 
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Local	versus	international	markets
Most smallholders produce both for home consumption and the local market. It 
is important to strengthen their ties to local markets before linking them to much 
more complex international markets. The cases of mangoes in Kenya (page 79) and 
pineapples in Ghana (page 34) are excellent examples where larger agri-businesses 
have provided a local market for smallholders. Also, intermediary organizations 
should always assess the potential to scale up from initial pilot work. Interven-
tions will be biased towards those that can reach larger numbers of beneficiaries at 
the outset, as it is easier to scale up from a larger starting point, i.e., many farmer 
groups, than from a smaller pool of beneficiaries. In the case of shea nuts in Mali 
(page 122), there are currently about 1400 women involved in the production and 
processing of about 1000 tons of nuts; however, the potential for upscaling exists, 
because demand for shea nuts from Mali is more than 25,000 tons.
Fostering	an	enabling	business	environment
African farmers and the organizations that serve them are often poorly informed 
about policies, rules and regulations and development programmes. They are 
typically isolated from decision makers. So rural people and organizations need 
to organize so they can lobby for a better business environment. The facilitator 
may undertake a policy benchmarking study on the particular product or crop 
where it is considering intervening. This information can form the starting point 
for a dialogue between the national and local authorities, government agencies, 
donors, the private sector, NGOs and community organizations. The facilitator 
may develop the farmers’ organization’s pleading and lobbying capacities, or 
advise them to join an established pressure group. Strategic themes for lobby-
ing may include encouraging authorities to recognize farmers’ organizations as 
credible business groups that should be supported; promoting agriculture and 
industry services with a balanced package of grants, subsidies and incentives; 
promoting rural private-sector development policies; adjusting or enforcing 
rules, laws and tax systems; or developing national standards and strengthening 
certification procedures. 
Governments should also be actively involved in defending smallholder farmers’ 
socioeconomic interests in global discussions and negotiations. Governments may 
be the only institution able to influence banks to provide medium and long-term 
loans to farmers’ organizations.
The case studies in Chapters 3–6 showed some successful examples of lobby-
ing. In Same, Tanzania, beekeepers pressed the local government to delineate 
bee reserves that would protect their property rights, prevent tree felling and 
prohibit spraying (page 113). In the Coast Region of Kenya, a network of farmer 
field schools lobbied the national Poverty Eradication Commission for support 
for a mango processing facility (page 79). Farmers’ organizations may lobby for 
improvements in infrastructure such as roads, market places, telecommunica-
tions, electricity, airports and ports. They may press governments to provide basic 
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social services such as heath and education, since these have a direct impact on 
the long-term sustainability and dynamism of the rural private sector. They may 
also push governments to avoid conflict between custom laws and “modern” 
regulations: legitimacy is more important than legacy. This is particularly true 
when addressing land tenure or natural resource management issues.
Chain	engagement
Developing	a	vision
A chain facilitator supports farmers to develop a shared strategic vision on de-
veloping their value chain. The facilitator helps the farmers’ organizations do a 
participatory chain analysis. This looks at potential demand and supply, and the 
income potential for the farmers. It identifies the actors directly and indirectly 
involved in the chain, their role and importance, as well as their constraints and 
visions for developing the chain. The results of this analysis should be discussed 
during a multi-stakeholder chain platform meeting, where dialogue between the 
different actors is established. This leads to the formation of a group that takes 
the lead in developing the value chain. This group’s collective vision is a starting 
point for future interventions such as technical advice, innovations, the resolution 
of specific problems, or coaching of farmer leaders. Most of the cases in Chapters 
3–6 show that the facilitator puts in considerable amount of time to select the ap-
propriate actors for joint chain development. It is particularly important to identify 
actors that are willing to create longer-term sustainable value chains. Traders as 
well as producers may act opportunistically when market conditions change, so 
joint vision development helps them to foster longer-term engagements – as in 
the sugarcane example in Tanzania (page 62).
Trust
Buyers and sellers prefer to deal with those who have proved reliable in the past. 
Implicit contracts between buyers and sellers are a common form of agreement, 
and give rise to varying levels of uncertainty and transaction costs. In some cases, 
mistrust arose primarily because buyers or sellers opportunistically trade with 
others, rather than sticking to prior agreements. Mistrust also results because 
product quality is not standardized. In the early stages of developing value 
chains, intermediary organizations can play an important role to build confidence 
among the chain actors. Examples are the sunflower case in Tanzania (page 84) 
and SNV’s work to build partnerships between private-sector enterprises and 
honey producers in Kenya (page 75). Sometimes, though, the chain actors create 
their own mechanisms to build confidence, as in the Tanzania sugarcane case 
(page 62).
168
Chain empowerment 
Intermediary organizations can also play a role in facilitating linkages to service 
providers. For example, the FFS networks in Western Kenya linked farmer or-
ganizations to service providers (page 94).
Chain	development
Participatory	approach	and	ownership
The intervention should, where practical, be participatory. It should enable less 
informed chain actors (such as farmers’ groups) to learn how to implement new 
ideas and methods. The various chain actors should be able to influence decisions 
made in planning, experimentation, implementation and scaling up of interven-
tions. To strengthen their ownership, service providers should adopt a policy of 
“no handouts” to avoid dependency syndrome and to accelerate self-reliance. 
In some cases, subsidies and incentives may be required for low-income farmers 
to enter a value chain arrangement. But recipients should be clearly informed 
that this is a short-term support measure that will be phased out. It is important 
to keep in mind that value chain development takes time, so long-term invest-
ments (more than 5 years) are needed to build chain management capacities. An 
example of long-term support leading to empowerment comes from the shea 
butter case in Mali (page 122). 
Risks	and	savings
It is clear from all cases that farmers need to be well-organized if they are to be 
competitive in an ever-more-demanding marketplace. Working in value chains 
is often best achieved by farmers who are organized in self-selected groups of a 
similar age, background and wealth status (as in the milk cooperatives in Kenya, 
page 138). This type of organization facilitates learning and also enables group 
members to build trust and cohesion for collective action. The smallholders 
should integrate savings and internal loan schemes in their activities. This will 
help them work with money, keep records, and learn financial skills that are es-
sential to build their asset base. The pineapple case in Ghana (page 34) is one of 
the few examples of an intermediary organization supporting the establishment 
of a savings scheme. Intermediary organizations should consider setting up such 
schemes in their intervention. 
Engineering	an	organizational	development	
programme
The chain facilitator promotes the development of the farmers’ organization, based 
upon its existing capacities and on maintaining and improving the members’ 
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technical skills. For existing farmers’ organizations, this may involve upgrading 
products and processes through a skills development programme. The facilita-
tor may propose training, testing of innovations, improved farm practices, the 
introduction of new varieties, instituting quality controls, etc. Most of the cases 
show that intermediary organizations strengthen both the technical as well as 
managerial capacities of farmer organizations. Strengthening their entrepreneurial 
capacity is often less well developed.
When farmers are not yet organized, the facilitator may help them form groups. 
Groups may be informal or formal (as in a cooperative or association). In the past, 
governments forced farmers into cooperatives that failed to meet the farmers’ 
needs or to function as businesses. Despite this unfortunate history, well-function-
ing farmer groups, formed for the right reasons, can be an important, effective 
business type for farmers. A farmer cooperative or association is a business type 
with three unique characteristics: members own the business, members control it, 
and members benefit from it. At the start of an intervention, the facilitator should 
support the farmers’ organization by staying focused on the reason for forming 
the group. It should help the farmers by identifying effective local leadership that 
follows sound business practices. Developing trust among potential members is 
vital in order to improve group coherence. This is done through:
Steps in developing a cooperative
•	 Recognize a common need or an opportunity.
•	 Hold an organizing meeting to explain the idea and identify the initial leadership. Be 
sure to ask the question, “what is the right business type”?
•	 Conduct a feasibility study. The more complicated the idea, the more thorough the 
study will need to be. Do not skip this step, no matter how complicated or simple the 
idea appears. It is necessary to determine if the business concept has a chance of 
succeeding.
•	 Share the results from the feasibility study with potential members. Discuss whether 
the concept has a chance, and decide whether to proceed.
•	 If you do proceed, it may be necessary to incorporate the business by filing the nec-
essary paperwork. If a cooperative or association is formed, a constitution and by-laws 
will be needed.
•	 Prepare a business plan to provide the road map for your business. This is a vital 
step.
•	 Secure financing: it is not possible to start a business without some capital.
•	 Recruit members. If the business requires a certain level of production, make sure 
there are enough members.
•	 Hire management and staff. The board of directors should not run the day-to-day 
operations of the business.
•	 Hold the first membership and board meetings.
•	 Start operations.
170
Chain empowerment 
• Clear communication of member’s roles and expectations.
• Clear understanding of the organizations goals.
• Ensuring that the group’s business idea is likely to be feasible.
• Keeping members informed and involved. Member communication is essen-
tial. One way to do this is to designate one board member as a confidential 
person members can go to if they have problems.
• Conduct businesslike meetings, following an agenda.
The facilitator and group should follow a series of steps to develop a cooperative 
(see the box on the previous page). Some of these steps occur at the same time, 
while others happen later.
The facilitator should not fill in missing links in the chain itself, because this pre-
vents other private actors from fulfilling this role. In the case of vanilla in Uganda 
(page 128), for example, the intermediary organization took responsibility for 
quality grading, transport and marketing of the vanilla. The farmer organizations 
are entirely dependent on the intermediary’s presence, so the sustainability of 
this chain is undermined. The end of the project funding may mean the end of 
the vanilla chain. 
The box below outlines a toolkit for capacity building being developed by SNV 
in Mali.
Toolkit for capacity building
In Mali, SNV and two unions are together developing a training and tool kit covering the 
following questions:
•	 How to diagnose my value chain environment?
• How to determine the best formal or informal structure for my business?
• How to develop my business strategic vision, from my values and principles?
• How to elaborate my outline business project?
• How to determine the optimal and critical conditions for my business?
• How to pilot market analysis and opportunity, feasibility and marketing studies?
• How to identify and control service providers?
• How to negotiate technical and financial assistance for the implementation of my busi-
ness plan?
• How to manage the financing of my business plan: loans, grants, subsidies, incen-
tives?
• How to plan my technical and financial autonomy?
• How to measure my economic performances and the social, community and environ-
mental impacts of my business?
More information: Bernard Conilh de Beyssac, bconilh@snvworld.org 
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Promoting	entrepreneurial	attitudes
A viable business begins and ends with the market. The members of a farmers’ 
organization must be able to appreciate this: what is important is not what they 
want to grow, but what the market wants to buy. The facilitator should help the 
members learn such entrepreneurial attitudes. 
Business planning is a comprehensive, responsible, research-based investigation 
of a business idea. It involves an organized, thoughtful process of identifying and 
assessing opportunities and problems inherent in a business endeavor. Proper 
business planning will result in the development of well-conceived strategies for 
dealing with business challenges. The facilitator leads the farmers’ organization 
through this process, which results in a business plan. A number of cases show 
intermediary organizations that supported farmer organizations with business 
planning; they include the cases of jatropha in Tanzania (page 41), cashew in 
Mozambique (page 47), and shea nuts in Mali (page 122).
Basic questions for business planning
The facilitator initiates business planning by posing some basic questions:
Identifying the market
• Who/what is your target market?
• How big is the market?
• What does this market want? 
• Is this market growing, declining, or flat? 
• Who will be your competition in this market? 
The product
• How can you differentiate your product? What do you need to do?
• How easy or difficult is it to produce what you want to sell?
Price
• How much will your product sell for? 
• How much does it cost to produce? 
• What is your break-even point? 
• How many units do you have to sell every day, month and year to stay in business?
Business management
• How experienced is the person who will manage the business? 
• Is this person familiar with the business? 
Product distribution 
• How are you going to distribute your product to reach your target market?
• How complicated will it be to get your product to your customers? 
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Chain	monitoring	and	
evaluation
Monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment of value chain 
interventions are necessary to steer the intervention process, to 
design future interventions, and to be accountable to donors and farmers (and 
their organizations). It may be useful to use the indicators presented in Chapter 
2 (page 30). Additional indicators may be needed to cover broader development 
objectives:
• Local economic growth Successful interventions should have a knock-on 
effect on the local economy as organization members earn more, have more 
to spend, and generate jobs within and outside the community. Possible 
measures of such changes include tax receipts and indicators of wealth such 
as ownership of items such as vehicles, televisions and modern housing.
•  Gender In African cultures, cash crops often are seen as men’s affairs – so a 
focus on producing marketable products may benefit men at the expense of 
women (and children and the elderly). To measure impacts on women, it is 
necessary to distinguish between men and women when collect monitoring 
data. For example, how many of the organization members are women? How 
many of the leaders? What is the income of women compared to men? etc.
• Food security Focusing on cash may mean that farmers have less land or 
time to grow food to eat. That is not a problem when yields are high and prices 
are good, but can lead to disaster if the cash crop fails or the market collapses. 
Indicators of food security may measure food supply, access and outcomes 
(see Frankenberger 1992).
• Environment A focus on markets can impact the environment in many and 
unexpected ways. For example, farmers may switch to a new crop or cultiva-
tion method that may damage the environment (intensive ploughing, leading 
to erosion, or more spraying of harmful chemicals). Processing may require 
fuelwood, leading to more rapid deforestation. The changes may, of course, 
be environmentally benign (as in a switch to organic agriculture). Facilitators 
should bear the potential impacts in mind and select the appropriate indica-
tors to measure them.
The case studies show that most of the value chain development programmes 
lack a monitoring and evaluation system. The contribution of the interventions 
to poverty reduction is not measured, nor is the cost of production, value added 
due to improved processing, better prices or volumes traded. More attention 
should be paid to strengthening intermediary organizations to set up participa-
tory monitoring and evaluation systems to measure such items, and to adjust the 
interventions as needed. 
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Chain	learning	and		
innovation
Learning from others is vital. A learning approach should build 
on existing skills and resources of local communities, including 
producers, processors and traders. The goal is to build the management capac-
ity of chain actors and local service providers so that the community can benefit 
over the long term. A “chain platform” may be a forum where chain actors can 
exchange experience and expertise to develop mutual beneficial chains. A number 
of cases have shown examples of such chain platforms where multiple actors 
jointly carried out a chain development programme; however, there are few 
examples where these platforms continue without external support. 
Intermediaries can provide valuable support in building the capacity of farmers’ 
organizations and other actors in the chain. This support includes training, coach-
ing, group mobilization, organizational development, leadership development, 
etc. The intermediary can facilitate the farmers to evaluate their own capacity 
to manage the chain and activities in it. This analysis then forms the basis of a 
capacity building programme. Faida MaLi’s ten-step approach (page 178) is one 
example of such a programme.
A chain facilitator transfers the necessary know-how both to the farmers’ organi-
zation and to service providers. It may also transfer tools for quality control and 
certification. The facilitator has to be knowledgeable about value addition and 
stays connected to relevant knowledge sources. An important task is to create 
chain platforms or “farmer business schools”, where farmers continuously learn 
and innovate to better understand market development (pages 31 and 155).
Intermediary organizations that initiate a value-chain development process 
should have a market orientation; they should facilitate farmer empowerment; 
and they should ensure larger-scale impact as well as feasibility for resource 
poor farmers.
Chain facilitators should assess their own stake in the value chain. Not having 
a stake assures neutrality: the intermediary can organize stakeholder meetings 
and build trust among the chain actors, and is able to focus on broader develop-
ment objectives such as transparency and pro-poor advocacy. It is crucial that 
the chain facilitator remains focused on strengthening the capacities of farmer 
organizations instead of taking over their role in the value chain.
For those intermediary organizations that need more information regarding tools 
and approaches for value chain development, Chapter 9 describes a number of 
tools that facilitators can use to strengthen the capacity of smallholder farmers 
to manage chains.
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Resources
This chapTer includes brief descriptions of some general approaches that inter-mediary organizations can use in their value chain interventions. 
• SNV’s local economic development approach
• The FAIDA market linkage approach 
• CIAT’s rural agro-enterprise development approach 
• CIAT’s learning alliance for agro-enterprise development
• Participatory market chain approach 
• Participatory value chains analysis 
• Value chain development 
• Value chain research
• Participatory research methods
• INFO-Cadena: Instruments to foster value chains.
This chapter also also includes a list of references and further reading on value 
chains and related topics, a list of organizations and websites, and profiles of the 
contributors to this book. 
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SNV’s	local	economic	development	
approach
The local economic development (LED) approach was developed by SNV to 
promote local economic development in municipalities in Mozambique.
Goal
To build economic capacity of an area to improve its economic future and the 
quality of lives of its citizens.
Objective
To identify a municipality’s economic advantages, opportunities and constraints, 
start high-potential economic activities, and create an enabling environment for 
development.
The LED approach is designed for countries with limited financial and human 
capacities and where strong local organizations and institutional frameworks 
do not yet exist. 
Phase	1:	Identify	and	formulate	activities
1	 Pre-engagement	and	contracting
• Conduct a preliminary one-day appraisal to identify the potential of the mu-
nicipality for local economic development. 
• Pre-engage with the main partner (usually the municipal council or local 
authority). 
• If successful, sign a memorandum of understanding on continuing the proc-
ess.
2	 	Prepare
• Create awareness and identify potential key stakeholders in local economic 
development (beyond the municipal council itself). 
• Establish a core team of representatives of public and private-sector stakehold-
ers as well as the facilitator and (depending on the situation) NGOs. 
• Define the mandate of the core team and its members’ responsibilities (to 
elaborate an action plan and develop a monitoring and evaluation system). 
3	 Identify	economic	opportunities	and	constraints	
(leverage	points)	
• Select tools for an appraisal to identify opportunities and constraints (leverage 
points) for local economic development. Tools may include:
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o Participatory sub-sector and chain identification and analysis.
o Participatory appraisal tools such as triangulation, diagramming and 
mapping, ranking and scoring.
• Conduct the appraisal. 
• Analyse the appraisal’s findings on opportunities and constraints (and how 
to eliminate them):
o Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis .
o Political, economic, socio-cultural and technical factors (PEST) analysis.
• Prioritize the opportunities and constraints to be eliminated.
4	 Formulate	activities	and	targets
• Consult with stakeholders to prioritize a limited number of leverage points, 
economic opportunities and constraints.
• Develop proposals for activities. These may include economic activities or 
actions to create a favourable economic environment.
• Set SMART (specific, measurable, appropriate, realistic, time-bound) perform-
ance targets for activities.
• Identify and involve additional stakeholders (local private sector actors, lo-
cal or international investors, donors, government agencies, NGOs, research 
and development institutions) who are not yet part of the team. Agree with 
them their roles, responsibilities and commitments on human, material and 
financial resources. 
• Consolidate the activities into a local economic development plan. This details 
the activities, the stakeholders involved, their tasks and responsibilities, re-
sources available or to be acquired, and the timeframe for implementation.
Phase	2:	Implement	activities	
1	 Launch	the	local	economic	development	plan	
• Launch the plan and initiate the planned activities. 
• With the team, accompany and monitor the initial implementation phase.
• Ensure appropriate monitoring and evaluation for each activity, allowing 
for action-oriented and flexible implementation with a strong emphasis on 
learning by doing.
• Review the role of the team in subsequent steps. 
2	 Implement
• Implement activities, monitor and evaluate.
• Refine or revise strategies and action plans on a regular basis, if necessary.
More information: www.snvmz.org or contact Danny Wijnhoud, dwijnhoud@snvworld.
org
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The	FAIDA	market	linkage	approach
FAIDA MaLi’s ten-step procedure is a field-tested approach to mobilize, organize 
and train farmers and agricultural companies.
Main steps Main activities of facilitator Critical issues
•	 Conduct	market	research
•	 Review	profit	prospects	for	
farmers	and	company
•	 Review	environmental	issues
•	 Totally	new	enterprise	is	dif-
ficult	to	handle
•	 Market	dynamics
•	 Alternative	outlets	exist
•	 Review	company’s	expertise	
and	business	skills
•	 Gather	info	from	clients
•	 Review	end	markets
•	 Good	track	records
•	 Openness/provide	information
•	 Willingness	to	engage	in	cost	
sharing
•	 Review	if	climate	is	suitable
•	 Participatorily	review	farmers’	
expertise/resource	base
•	 Review	economic	activities
•	 Farmers	eager	to	participate
•	 Continued	food	production	
•	 Environmental	concerns
•	 Gender	issues
•	 Explain	the	contract
•	 Agree	on	responsibilities	of	all	
partners
•	 Ensure	all	sign	the	contract
•	 Everybody	understands	the	
contract	and	its	conditions
•	 Clear	activity/time	schedule
•	 Develop	trust	among	parties
•	 Assist	to	further	develop	key	
business	skills
•	 Assist	in	obtaining	finance
•	 Analyse	market	outlets
•	 Company	willing	to	provide	
inputs,	finance,	extension
•	 Buying/payment	procedures
•	 Long-term	perspective	
•	 Train	in	business	skills
•	 Support	group	formation
•	 Ensure	extension	services
•	 Promote	savings/credit
•	 Group	leadership
•	 Appropriate	extension
•	 Food	production
•	 Side-selling
•	 Link	with	relevant	government	
agencies	and	NGOs
•	 Share	the	work
•	 Train	other	organizations
•	 Positive	attitude	to	private	
business
•	 Active	involvement
•	 Replicate/adapt	approach	
•	 Find	solutions	for	problems	
that	arise
•	 Mediate	in	conflicts
•	 Link	to	specific	expertise
•	 Strong	commitment	of	all	par-
ties	involved
•	 Develop	trust
•	 Flexible	assistance
•	 Participatorily	review	experi-
ences
•	 Implement	improvements
•	 Jointly	plan	follow-up
•	 Systematic	data	collection	by	
farmers	and	company
•	 Learn	from	mistakes	
•	 Longer	term	perspective
•	 Stay	in	touch	with	further	
development	of	linkage	
•	 Approach	new	partners
•	 Start	new	linkages
•	 Pull-out	strategy	is	known	to	
all	parties	from	the	start
•	 Allow	partners	do	the	job
•	 Review	experiences
Steps in Faida MaLi’s market linkage approach
More information: www.faidamarketlink.or.tz
	
1	
Choose	enterprise
	
2	
Select	company
	
3	
Select	farmers
	
5	
Assist	company
	
6	
Assist	farmers
	
7	
Involve	others
	
8	
Support	the	linkage
	
9	
Monitor	and	evaluate
	
10	
Facilitator	withdraws
	
4	
Bring	parties	together
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CIAT’s	rural	agro-enterprise	
development	approach
CIAT’s Rural Agro-enterprise Development (RAeD) Project has developed a series 
of methods, tools and learning approaches to promote entrepreneurial develop-
ment in rural areas of the developing world. These approaches were developed 
through collaborative projects over the past 10 years in Latin America, Africa 
and Southeast Asia. 
Key elements in the strategy include ways to:
• Develop partnerships, evaluate project site resources and prepare joint 
plans.
• Evaluate markets and identify market opportunities.
• Develop business plans and establish or strengthen rural enterprises and local 
business support services.
• Assesses process performance and introduce mechanisms for scaling up.
• Share knowledge and effect institutional change towards income-based ap-
proaches.
• Advocate for improved marketing and trade policies. 
RAeD offers a methodical approach for service providers to use in identifying 
and responding to market demands. It enables service providers to assist com-
munities increase the competitiveness of their existing products and to diversify 
into other, higher-value products. The approach promotes a chain perspective 
that strengthens business linkages between producer groups, service providers 
and higher-order supply chain actors, rather than focusing on the farm alone. It 
emphasizes continual innovation to tackle the dynamic nature of markets, and 
collective action to shift from pilot projects to scale. 
New market-based activities must be competitive, sustainable and equitable. 
The RAeD methods incorporate basic marketing, business and community sup-
port principles into a stepwise process that facilitates market engagement. The 
approach is non-commodity specific and supports collective action, horizontal 
(among farmers) and vertical (between actors in the value chain) diversification 
and value addition as key options. The RAeD project views production-based 
food security approaches as unlikely to alleviate poverty in a market-driven 
environment. It believes that it is perilous to ignore the marketing element, even 
when seeking the basic aim of sustainable food security. 
For this approach to be effective, service providers and farmers need to acquire 
new skills and different ways of doing business. This change requires time, fi-
nances and careful planning. Decisions are needed on the best entry point – for 
example, to start with producer organizations, production chains, or business 
support services – and the expected duration of the support programme.
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Main	features
The main features of this approach are:
•	 Area-based  The process focuses on improving the livelihoods of beneficiar-
ies within a particular geographical area. 
•	 Participatory  The process is participatory. Partnerships begin by forming 
a stakeholder or working group, whose members share a common goal in 
improving enterprise activities for a selected target group. 
•	 Market-led and targeting growth markets  It aims to enable entrepreneurs 
in the area to identify and access remunerative market opportunities. 
•	 Thinking “outside the farm”  It encourages partners and stakeholders to 
think “outside the farm”.
•	 Seeking business linkages Many development processes focus on one seg-
ment of the supply chain – usually resource-poor smallholders. The RAeD 
approach takes a chain approach, and may select interventions at one of several 
points in the supply chain. 
•	 Organization and savings There is increasing evidence that farmers need to 
be better organized if they are to be competitive. Smallholders should integrate 
savings and internal loan schemes into their activities and adopt a policy of 
“no handouts” to avoid dependency syndrome and accelerate self reliance. 
•	 Seeking continuous innovation  Market engagement is a continuous process 
rather than a one-off exercise. Markets are dynamic, and agro-enterprises will 
be constantly confronted with new challenges. Service providers and com-
munities need to be empowered with the knowledge and assets to do this. 
1.1	 Identify	site(s)
1.2	 Form	a	working	group
1.3	 Assess	area-based	resources
Strategy	1
2.1	 Assess	market	for	existing	
products	(focus	on	market	
penetration)
Strategy	2
2.2	 Identify	market	opportuni-
ties	(focus	on	diversifica-
tion)
2.3	 Analyse	supply	chains
3	 Design	and	implement	intervention
4.1	 Assess	intervention	and	scale	up
4.2	 Evaluate	overal	process	performance	and	impact
5	 Manage	knowledge	and	institutionalize
6	 Develop	policy	options	and	advocacy	approaches
The rural agro-enterprise development process
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Manuals
The RAeD project has produced the following manuals on rural agro-enterprise 
development. They are available at the website below.
• A strategy for rural agro-enterprise development.
• Developing partnerships, territorial analysis and planning together.
• Identifying and assessing market opportunities for small-scale rural produc-
ers.
• Strategies to improve the competitiveness of supply chains for smallholder 
producers.
• Collective marketing for small-scale producers.
More information: www.ciat.cgiar.org/agroempresas/ingles/index.htm or contact Shaun 
Ferris, s.ferris@cgiar.org
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CIAT’s	learning	alliance	for	agro-
enterprise	development
A “learning alliance” is a model of mutual, participatory learning between re-
search, development institutions and rural communities. The alliance aims to 
accelerate institutional change, improve knowledge management and deepen 
the level of impact with rural communities. 
Whilst there are many successful research and development activities across 
Africa, it is often hard to learn of successful approaches. The learning alliance 
approach aims to overcome these barriers. It was developed by CIAT’s Rural 
Agro-enterprise Project (RAeD, page 179) and development partners from 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS). In East Africa, it involved CRS teams in Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and Madagascar 
in 2003–4. 
The process involves series of “learning spaces”, typically over a 12–18 month 
timeframe. It comprises the following:
•	 Identifying a common goal.
•	 Learning with direction from best-practice guides.
•	 Putting into practice what has been learned.
•	 Reflection and feedback on what has worked well and what has not.
•	 A further cycle of learning, practice, reflection and feedback, etc.
This approach differs substantially from the common practice of attempting to 
train development practitioners in new methods through short, one-off training 
courses. 
Principles	of	a	learning	alliance
•  Clear objectives Objectives need to be developed from the outset of the proc-
ess; these are based on the needs, capacities and interests of the participating 
organizations and client groups. 
•  A robust process CIAT uses the learning alliance to introduce “good prac-
tices” that will enable service provider to shift towards a market-led perspec-
tive in their agricultural interventions. The process has eight steps (see next 
page).
•  Shared responsibilities and costs  A learning alliance seeks to benefit all 
participants; therefore responsibilities and costs should be shared. This is an 
important precedent to make at the beginning, as funds for out-scaling or 
training are often tied to project budgets. 
•  Flexible  learning mechanisms  Learning alliances involve a variety of 
participants from different backgrounds. Their perspectives and interests to 
participate in different parts of the learning process need to be ascertained. 
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Best-practice guides need to be flexible but effective in guiding the group 
towards common goals. 
•  Long-term relationship  The learning alliance takes about 2 years. This time 
is required to effect meaningful institutional change and observe positive 
trends at the community level. Trust, generated through effective results, 
between researchers, development practitioners and donors is the glue to 
these relationships. 
•  Performance and accountability  Performance evaluation of the facilitators 
and implementers is essential. Poor performance must be addressed, and 
partners need to ensure that agreed tasks are being achieved. 
More information: contact Shaun Ferris, s.ferris@cgiar.org
Evaluate	and	
support	busi-
ness	develop-
ment	services
L
Apply,	
monitor	and	
follow	up
Select	territory
Form	interest	group
Diagnose	situation
Design	action	
plans	and	
develop	agro-
enterprise
L
Apply,	
monitor	and	
follow	up
Identify	and	
evaluate	mar-
ket	opportuni-
ties
L
Apply,	
monitor	and	
follow	up
6	months
6	months
6	months
5	days
5	days
5	days
5	days Monitor	and	evaluate
L = Learning 
process based 
on project 
site activities 
implemented since 
last workshop
The learning alliance approach
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Participatory	market	chain	approach
The participatory market chain approach (PMCA) is a way to foster broad par-
ticipation in existing or new value chains. It concentrates on solving two limiting 
factors: the lack of market-oriented participatory method expertise of research 
and development institutions, and the lack of methods that effectively integrate 
the different marketing chain actors. 
The approach has three phases: 
• Create interest
• Develop trust
• Implement collaboration. 
The PMCA instrument describes actions and activities within these steps and 
shows the role of development agencies.
Source: Bernet et al. 2005
Leader
Leadership
Backstopping
Facilitation
Participants
Collaboration
Interest
Mutual	trust
Objectives
Phase 3
Implement	joint	market	
opportunities
Phase 2
Analyse	joint	market	
opportunities
Phase 1
Know	market	chain	actors,	
their	problems,	ideas,	etc.
PMCA structure and processes
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Participatory	value	chains	analysis
Participatory value chains analysis (PVCA) is a modelling and analytical tool to 
analyse value chains as a part of participatory assessment process. It can also be 
used as an action-research tool for sustainable participatory processes for strategic 
learning and ongoing accountability within and between enterprise sectors.
PVCA involves:
• Mapping the chains involved in particular production sectors: the different 
types of activity, geographical location, and actors in different roles at differ-
ent levels.
• Quantitative and qualitative research to study the relative distribution of 
“values” and the reasons for inequalities, inefficiencies and blockages in the 
chain.
• Based on this analysis, identification of potential leverage points for upgrad-
ing the chain as a whole, or redistributing value in favour of those at the bot-
tom.
Key	dimensions
• Mapping the chains, networks and systems of interlinked production and 
exchange activities in particular sectors or subsectors.
• Mapping the geographical spread of linkages and networks operating over 
international, national and local areas.
• Identifying the key stakeholders at different levels of the chain, different 
geographical locations and in relation to differing external opportunities and 
constraints.
• Measuring the relative value accruing to different levels of the chain, different 
geographical locations and different stakeholders.
• Identifying the governance structures which affect the ways in which values 
are distributed between activities and geographical areas.
• Mapping the interventions directly targeting different levels of the chain, 
network or system.
• Clarifying the direct, indirect or unintended impacts at these different lev-
els.
• Exploring the different alternative levels of intervention or strategy.
Principles
Stakeholder	participation
• Visual and diagram mapping techniques accessible to all stakeholders.
• Dialogue between stakeholders and hence potentially mutual understanding 
and respect for their different opportunities and constraints.
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Equity	and	empowerment	
• Incorporation of poverty and gender analysis throughout the process.
• Ensuring participation of the most vulnerable and supporting their informa-
tion and action needs.
• Formation of sustainable systems for ongoing accountability of enterprise and 
chain governance.
Key	stages	
1 Scoping the analysis: clarification of questions and investigation strategy. 
2 Preliminary value chain mapping.
3 Participatory value chain analysis.
4 Setting up sustainable structures for sectoral and inter-sectoral accountabil-
ity.
Source: Mayoux 2003
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Value	chain	development
“Value chain development” consists of three stages: 
• Evaluating 
• Planning
• Managing.
Stage Activities Success factors
1
Evaluating
•	 Evaluate	 the	 idea	 and	
the	market
•	 Review	strategy
•	 Assess	resources,	risks	
and	rewards
•	 Careful	market	review
•	 Value	chain	catalyst
•	 Leadership	vision
•	 Value	chain	knowledge
•	 Strategic	analysis
•	 Clear	company	goals
•	 Measurable	objectives
2
Planning
•	 Select	partners
•	 Build	relationships
•	 Agree	 on	 goals	 and	
measures
•	 Careful	partner	selection
•	 Commitment	from	all
•	 Cohesion/interdependence
•	 A	dedicated	“champion”	and	chain	man-
ager
•	 Collaborative	planning	sessions
•	 Expert	assistance	in	facilitation
•	 Compelling	value	chain	goals
3
Managing
•	 Launch	pilot	project
•	 Integrate	systems
•	 Build	and	adapt
•	 Honest	pilot	evaluation
•	 Increasing	cohesion
•	 Opportunities	to	learn
•	 Process	for	ongoing	dialogue
•	 Commitment	from	the	top
Stages and success factors of value chain development
More information: Agriculture and Food Council of Alberta 2002 and 2004 
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Value	chain	research
This is a methodology for researchers and intermediary organizations to study 
value chains as a prelude to intervening in them. It covers the following:
• The point of entry for value chain analysis
• Mapping value chains
• Product segments and critical success factors in final markets
• How producers access final markets
• Benchmarking production efficiency
• Governance of value chains
• Upgrading in value chains
• Distributional issues.
Value chains are complex, and individual firms or farmers may feed into a vari-
ety of chains. Which chain to study depends on the primary area of interest and 
point of entry for research. For example, if the primary area of interest is farmers, 
then the point of entry will be farms; the analysis moves forward to processors, 
buyers and their customers, and backwards to input suppliers.
Primary 
area of 
interest
Point of entry What to map Examples
Agricultural	
producers
Farms Forwards	to	processors,	
buyers	and	their	custom-
ers,	backwards	to	input	
suppliers
Fresh	vegetables	to	salad	
packers	and	category	
buyers	in	final	markets
Informal	
economy	
producers	and	
traders
Home-based	
workers,	street	
traders
Forwards	to	processors,	
assemblers	of	third	party	
organizers/distributors,	
backwards	to	retailers
Outsourcing	in	clothing	
and	shoes,	recycling	
cardboard	cartons	to	
mills,	street-based	tourist	
handicrafts
Gender,	age	
and	ethnicity
Female	labour Use	of	female	labour	
throughout	value	chain
In	clothing,	women	in	
cotton	farms,	factories,	
export	agents,	design	
houses,	advertising	agen-
cies,	retail	stores
The	global	
distribution	of	
income
The	final	
consumer	(and	
recycling)	in	a	
sector
Backwards	down	whole	
chain	to	retailers,	buyers	
and	producers
In	furniture,	begin	with	
groups	of	customers	of	
department	and	specialist	
stores	in	rich	countries
Some examples of different points of entry into value chain research
Value chains are much messier than often assumed. The researcher will some-
times have to make arbitrary decisions on what to map in charting a path through 
complex value chains.
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Source: Kaplinsky and Morris 2000
The	way	we	describe	itA CB
The	way	it	really	is
B
A
E1
?
E2
??
X
C
H
g
A
E
	
D
?
Source:	Brown,	Bessant	and	Lamming,	
2000
Value chain mapping: Theory and reality
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Participatory	research	methods
Participatory research is very useful in analysing value chains. It involves local 
people in collecting and analysing data, with professional researchers acting as 
facilitators. This has several advantages: 
• Local people know most about their own livelihood systems, and have the most 
to gain or lose in any development effort, so they should be active participants 
in the selection, design, planning and implementation of interventions that 
affect them.
• Local people often find it easier to get sensitive information than outside 
researchers, and can judge the accuracy of information better.
• People who have been involved in the research are more likely to own its 
findings and recommendations. 
Some	guiding	ideas
• Be driven by the questions you want answered and not the method.
• The most effective way of answering your questions is often to use a combina-
tion of methods and sources.
• Chain analysis is mainly about relationships, so hear both sides of the story.
• Feed your analysis back to the stakeholders. This helps to bring about 
change.
• Mapping is an empowering exercise: it helps to show up bottlenecks, inequi-
ties and leverage points for action.
Attitudes	and	principles
Participatory research relies on certain underlying attitudes and principles:
• In a reversal of the usual roles, researchers become learners and research 
subjects become researchers. Researchers must listen to and learn from those 
being studied. 
• Constant self-criticism and evaluation of the process are important for suc-
cess.
• The research approach must adapted to the local situation and culture: it must 
be planned in advance, but flexible enough to change if particular techniques 
are not working well.
• Triangulation, or multiple strategies to study the same phenomenon from 
different perspectives and using different methods offer additional insights 
and can reconcile differing results. 
191
9 Resources
Setting	objectives
A participatory study begins with the setting of objectives. It is necessary to state 
why the research is needed, who will benefit from it, and what types of informa-
tion will be gathered. Both researchers and the local people must be involved in 
and understand these objectives.
Methods	for	data	collection
The study can draw on tools from both conventional and participatory meth-
ods. 
• Conventional research methods include the use of secondary sources, key 
informant interviews, focus group discussions, structured interviews, and 
case studies.
• Participatory methods include analytical methods such as indicators and rank-
ing or scoring techniques; visual methods such as mapping, making models 
Participatory research process
Sharing the results
•	 Report
•	 Policy	brief
•	 Workshop
•	 Drama	presentation
•	 Documentary	video
Conventional tools
•	 Secondary	sources
•	 Key	informant	interviews
•	 Direct	observation
•	 Focus	groups
•	 Structured	interviews
•	 Case	studies
Participatory tools
•	 Indicators,	ranking/scoring
•	 Maps,	models,	diagrams
•	 Stories,	dramas,	role	
plays
•	 Possible	future	scenarios
•	 Games
Objectives
•	 Why	this	research?
•	 Who	will	benefit?
•	 What	information	is	
needed?
Attitudes/principles
•	 Reversal	of	learning
•	 Self-criticism
•	 Evaluation
•	 Planning	and	flexibility
•	 Triangulation
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and drawing diagrams; stories, dramas and role-plays; scenario building and 
games.
Sharing	the	results	of	the	participatory	process
The results of the research can be shared in conventional form – as a research 
report or policy brief, as well as in more creative ways to bring the results to those 
who need the information:
• Workshops to explain the results and enable discussion and questions.
• Dramatic presentations to highlight key points.
• Video to combine verbal and visual messages.
Source: adapted from McCormick and Schmitz 2002, pp 69 and 191–96. 
More information: 
• www.ids.ac.uk/ids/particip/research/pra.html
• Mikkelsen 1995
• PAMFORK, pamfork@nbnet.co.ke
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INFO-Cadena:	Instruments	to	foster	
value	chains
INFO-Cadena is short for “Instruments to foster cadenas” (cadena is Spanish for 
“chain”). It is designed to enable technical assistance projects, NGOs and public 
programmes to support local economic development in rural areas by linking 
small rural producers to formal markets. 
Bases	for	action
Role	of 	government	and	sectoral	organizations
• Each economic actor must be efficient so it can collaborate in a value chain.
• The actors in a chain organize the cooperation and coordination themselves. 
The leader of the chain normally takes responsibility.
• To achieve sustainable development (e.g., to benefit disadvantaged groups), 
the state and development organizations must take the lead and offer addi-
tional services and financial support. 
Economic	opportunities	of 	small	rural	producers
The following criteria are important in selecting a product (a chain) for interven-
tion by development organizations:
• The business must be viable.
• There must be potential to organize producers and to ensure they do not 
become dependent on external support.
• The chain should promise social or ecological benefits.
• Do not continue to promote chains where private investment is already profit-
able and needs no external stimulus.
Which products are most likely to meet these criteria?
• Products that are linked to the use of natural resources.
• Products where small-scale producers have comparative advantages – e.g., 
products that require labour, are produced on a small scale, or require tradi-
tional processing.
• Products that have growth potential of the market, both domestic and export. 
This is often in high-value products such as fish, meat and fresh produce.
Principles	of	chain	promotion
• Market orientation
• Organization of small producers
• Development as a learning process.
194
Chain empowerment 
Chain	promotion	strategies
Building a support strategy for chain development follows a sequence of steps 
(see the diagram below).
Adapted from Springer-Heinze 2004. This guide provides an extensive list of instruments 
on issues and tasks in each step.
Monitor and evaluate
Observe	the	business	environment
Monitor	subsector	or	chain	
development	process
Observe	subsector	and	chain	
performance
Observe	implications	of	sustainable	
development
Support strategy for subsector or 
cluster development
Facilitate	process	
Analyse	subsector	and	assess	
development	benefits
Strengthen	services	and	service	
providers
Improve	regulatory	and	policy	
framework
Support strategy for supply chain 
development
Facilitate	process	
Analyse	business	opportunities	and	
chain
Integrate	rural	producers	and	chain-
specific	services	into	chain
Initial analysis
Select	markets	and	products	to	invest	in
•	Growth	potential	in	agriculture	and	natural	resource	
sector
•	Comparative	advantage	of	smallholders
•	Possibilities	and	need	for	public	support
Identify	level	of	intervention	(subsector,	cluster,	
individual	chain)
Determine	the	support	strategy
Steps in promoting a chain in INFO-Cadena
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Resource	organizations	and	websites
Faida Market Link Company (Faida 
MaLi) 
PO Box 13869, Arusha, Tanzania. Tel. 
+255-27-2503549, 2544459, fax +255-
27-2504080, email maria.ijumba@
faidamarketlink.or.tz, internet www.
faidamarketlink.or.tz
FAO, Linking farmers to markets 
www.fao.org/ag/ags/subjects/en/
agmarket/linkages/ 
FAO website on market linkages.
FAO, Agricultural Support Systems 
Division 
www.fao.org/ag/ags/
Food Security and Food Policy 
Information Portal for Africa, Pan-
African agribusiness 
www.aec.msu.edu/agecon/fs2/test/
links.cfm?Lang=en&Country=110&To
pic=10&Section=2
Imperial College London, Improving 
market information: Market 
information and organization in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
www.imperial.ac.uk/
agriculturalsciences/research/
centres/cdpr/imi/ 
IDS, Institute of Development Studies, 
Global value chain initiative 
www.globalvaluechains.org
IFC, International Finance Corporation: 
Small and medium enterprise 
development.  
www.ifc.org/sme 
IFAMA, International Food and 
Agribusiness Management Association 
www.ifama.org 
ACIAR. Linking farmer with markets: 
ACIAR’s supply chains matter 
newsletter 
www.linkingfarmerswithmarkets.net 
ACP-EU trade website 
www.acp-eu-trade.org 
A non-partisan source of information, 
documents and links on ACP-EU trade 
matters.
AgraNet 
www.agra-net.com  
Information on agriculture and food 
policy, markets and trade.
Agri Chain Competence Center 
www.kc-acc.org 
CBI, Centre for the Promotion of Imports 
from Developing Countries 
www.cbi.nl 
Dutch government agency promoting 
the competitiveness of companies from 
the developing world in the European 
market. 
Doingbusiness, Benchmarking business 
regulations. World Bank and 
International Finance Corporation 
www.doingbusiness.org 
Database provides objective measures 
of business regulations and their 
enforcement.
Epopa Tanzania 
Box 105575, Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania. Tel. +255-22-2771374, 744-
644540, fax +255-22-2771374, email 
rainardmjunguli@agroeco.net, internet 
www.epopa.info. 
Export promotion of organic products 
from Africa, links producers of organic 
products to markets.
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International Trade Center, UNCTAD/
WTO 
www.intracen.org
KIT, Royal Tropical Institute: Business to 
business: Connecting people, values 
and markets 
www.kit.nl/frameset.asp?/about_kit/
html/expertise.asp&frnr=1& 
KLICT, Chain networks, clusters & ICT 
www.klict.org/default.asp?Lang=EN
Match Maker Associates Ltd 
PO Box 5172, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 
Tel. +255-22-2780747, 744-403204, fax 
+255-22-2780747, email edmond@
mma-ltd.com, internet www.mma-ltd.
com
NCBA, National Cooperative Business 
Association 
www.ncba.coop/abcoop.cfm 
NetMBA Business Knowledge Center, 
The value chain 
www.netmba.com/strategy/value-
chain
NRI, Natural Resources Institute: 
Natural Resources and Ethical Trade 
programme 
www.nri.org/NRET/ 
PACA, Participatory appraisal of 
competitive advantage 
www.paca-online.de
PAMFORK,  Participatory Methodologies 
Forum of Kenya 
pamfork@nbnet.co.ke 
Network on participatory processes to 
strengthen citizens’ voices, influence 
policy making, enhance governance 
and transform institutions. 
SDC. Focal point for rural development: 
Value chains 
www.sdc-valuechains.ch
SEEP Network, Business development 
services.  
www.seepnetwork.org/section/
programs_workinggroups/bds/ 
SAIPlatform, Sustainable Agriculture 
Initiative Platform 
www.saiplatform.org 
Created by the food industry to 
support the development of and 
to communicate worldwide about 
sustainable agriculture involving the 
different stakeholders of the food 
chain.
SNV, Netherlands Development 
Organisation, Reference guides for 
market access for the poor: 
Food security, sustainable agriculture 
and trade: www.snvworld.org/cds/
rgFS 
Business development services: www.
snvworld.org/cds/rgBDS 
Economic analysis: www.snvworld.
org/cds/rgea 
Microfinance: www.snvworld.org/
cds/rgmfin 
Trade in agricultural products: www.
snvworld.org/cds/rgTAP
UWCC, University of Wisconsin Center 
for Cooperatives 
www.wisc.edu/uwcc/ 
WBCSD, World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development 
www.wbcsd.org  
Coalition of 180 international 
companies promoting sustainable 
development.
World Bank, Agro-food Systems, 
Agribusiness, and Agricultural 
Markets 
www.worldbank.org/afr/aftsd/
agribus.htm
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Participants’ profiles
Lily	Aduke	
Communication Specialist
PO Box 55569, Nairobi, Kenya. Tel. +254-
20-3776656, 2714092, 722 803859, email 
laduke@atpsnet.org 
Lily holds an MA in communications stud-
ies, a postgraduate diploma in mass com-
munications and a BSc in agriculture. She 
has over 12 years’ experience in agricultural 
extension work, information management, 
and scientific writing and editing in various 
governmental, inter-governmental, non-
governmental and international organiza-
tions. Lily is currently the Communications 
and Outreach Officer with the African Tech-
nology Policy Studies Network (ATPS), 
Nairobi, Kenya. 
Tito	Arunga
Private Sector Development Advisor, 
SNV Kenya
PO Box 1758- 30100, Eldoret, Kenya. Tel. 
+254-53-2033191, 2032763, fax +254-53-
2032764, email tarunga@snvworld.org, 
internet www.snvworld.org
Tito holds a bachelor’s in commerce and 
is currently pursuing an MBA from the 
Edinburgh Business School, UK. He has 
worked as a business development and 
market access specialist for the last 10 years, 
specializing on small- and medium-scale 
producers in developing countries.
James	Barham
Visiting Researcher, International 
Center for Tropical Agriculture/Se-
lian Agricultural Research Institute 
(CIAT/SADC) 
PO Box 2704, Arusha, Tanzania. Tel. +255-
748-230061, email barhamjg@yahoo.com
James holds an MA in cultural anthropol-
ogy and is currently pursuing a PhD at the 
University of Florida, USA. He is also a 
visiting research fellow at CIAT in Arusha, 
Tanzania, specializing on the impact of mar-
ket-oriented interventions on smallholder 
farms in northern Tanzania. 
Isaac	Bekalo
Regional Director for Africa, Interna-
tional Institute of Rural Reconstruc-
tion (IIRR)
PO Box 66873-00800, Nairobi, Kenya. Tel. 
+254-20-4442610, 4440991, fax +254-
20-4448814, email admin@iirr-africa.org, 
internet www.iirr.org 
Isaac holds a PhD in organizational devel-
opment and planning. His experience in-
cludes teaching, NGO training, curriculum 
design and organizational development. He 
provides consultancy services on strategic 
planning, participatory monitoring and 
evaluation, project design and proposal 
writing. He specializes in participatory de-
velopment approaches and organizational 
development.
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Arnoud	Braun
Experiential Learning and Empower-
ment Specialist, Endelea
Rietveldlaan 3, Wageningen, 6708 SN, the 
Netherlands. Tel. +31-317-418549, +31-6-
30884640, fax +31-847500302, email arnoud.
braun@farmerfieldschool.net, internet www.
farmerfieldschool.net 
Arnoud has set-up his own non-profit or-
ganization in the area of experiential learn-
ing and empowerment. Over the last 5 years 
he has done consultancies and missions for 
various organizations, particularly for FAO. 
Currently he is based in the Netherlands 
and operates as a match-making, infor-
mation resources and networking broker, 
with emphasis on facilitating partnerships 
among farmer field school stakeholders.
Bernard	Conilh	de	Beyssac
Senior Technical Advisor, SNV Mali
BP 2220, Bamako, Mali. Tel. +223-2233348, 
email bconilh@snvworld.org 
Bernard holds an MSc in environmental 
science. He worked with the Canadian 
Department of Environment for 7 years on 
environmental protection and conservation, 
and for 3 years in France on watershed 
management. His current duties in Bamako, 
Mali, entail developing and implementing 
a rural economic development programme 
in Koulikoro region. He has provided con-
sultancy services on diverse developmental 
issues in Mali, including land tenure man-
agement. 
Sander	Donker
Managing Director, Cheetah Limited
Private Bag 278, Lilongwe, Malawi. Tel. 
+265-1-761071, 762200, fax +265-1-761073, 
email paprika@cheetah.malawi.net, internet 
www.cheetahpaprika.com
Sander holds a BSc in international agri-
cultural trade from Deventer Agricultural 
College in the Netherlands, and an MSc in 
marketing and product management from 
Cranfield University (Silsoe College), UK. 
He set up his paprika business in Zambia 
(1994), Malawi (1995) and Mozambique 
(2001), where he is working with over 
25,000 smallholders. He is involved in the 
production of paprika, bird’s eye chillies, 
annatto, marigolds, baobab and sausage 
tree. He is interested in the later two crops 
because of the new focus on sustainable 
forest harvesting. Sander has been invited 
by several institutions to lecture on private 
sector involvement in development. He 
has significant experience in smallholder 
production and extension services. He is 
also interested in the introduction of new 
technologies to increase smallholder pro-
duction. 
Shaun	Ferris
Project Manager, Rural Agro-enter-
prise Development, International 
Center for Tropical Agriculture 
(CIAT)
PO Box 6247, Kampala, Uganda. Tel. 
+256-77221163, fax +256-41-567635, email 
s.ferris@cgiar.org, internet www.ciat.cgiar.
org/agroempresas/ingles/index.htm
Shaun is currently the manager of CIAT’s 
Rural Agro-enterprise Project, which works 
with partners in over 30 countries world-
wide. His interests include market analysis, 
rural enterprise development, marketing 
information services, and commodity 
trade analysis. He previously was regional 
coordinator of Foodnet, a marketing and 
agro-enterprise project in eastern Africa. 
As part of this work, he developed local, 
national and regional market information 
and market intelligence products. Shaun 
has worked in marketing and postharvest 
innovation since 1989 for research and de-
velopment agencies including the CGIAR, 
World Bank, EU, USAID and numerous 
partner agencies. 
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Chabir	Hassam*
Private Sector Advisor, SNV Mozam-
bique
Rua Brito Capelo 229, Beira, Mozambique. 
Tel. +258-23-311952, fax +258-23-311953, 
email chassam@snvworld.org
Aad	den	Heijer
Managing Director, Ghana Gold 
Farm Limited 
PO Box 196, 2230 AD Rynsburg, 
Netherlands. Tel. +31-6-53146265, email 
info@heyerconsult.nl, internet www.
verdelpcs.nl/tongu/
Aad is director of several firms, includ-
ing Invitrolabs (Ghana Limited), Tongu 
Fruits Limited and Ghana Young Plants 
Limited.
Maria	Ijumba
General Manager, Faida Market Link 
Company (Faida MaLi)
PO Box 13869, Arusha, Tanzania. Tel. +255-
27-2503549, 2544459, fax +255-27-2504080, 
email maria.ijumba@faidamarketlink.or.tz, 
internet www.faidamarketlink.or.tz 
Maria holds an MSc in plant breeding. She 
has been involved in facilitating sustain-
able market linkages between small-scale 
farmers and agricultural companies for 9 
years. She is experienced in bean breeding, 
community development, business training 
and entrepreneurship development. She 
has provided consultancies to development 
organizations in Tanzania on training of 
trainers, the Faida market link approach 
and business awareness training for farm-
ers. She focuses on training farmers on 
entrepreneurship skills, and setting up and 
managing farmers’ organizations.
Stephen	Kijazi
Agribusiness Officer, Faida Market 
Link Company
PO Box 13869, Arusha, Tanzania. Tel. +255-
27-2503549, 255-744 477875, fax +255-27-
2504080, email stevenkijazi@yahoo.com, 
stephen.kijazi@faidamarketlink.or.tz. internet 
www.faidamarketlink.or.tz
Stephen holds a BSc in agricultural econom-
ics and agribusiness from Sokoine Univer-
sity of Agriculture, Morogoro, Tanzania. He 
has worked with the Rural Markets Devel-
opment Project in Morogoro and Kongwa 
District, on business development services 
with Incomet 2001 in the Iringa region, and 
as an agribusiness officer with Faida MaLi. 
He has experience in coordinating project 
activities, building farmers’ capacity and 
conducting business training for farmers. 
He offers consultancy services in market 
research, supply chain analysis and sub-sec-
tor studies, and developing value chains for 
farmers. He is currently pursuing a master’s 
in business administration from Clements 
University, Australia. 
Masai	Masai
Farmer Field School Reproductive 
Health Project Coordinator/Consul-
tant, Coast Development Authority
PO Box 1322-80100, Mombasa, Kenya. 
Tel. +254-41-2224406, 2311277, fax +254-
41-2224411 email cda@africaonline.co.ke, 
shmasai@yahoo.com, internet www.cdakenya.
org
Masai holds a diploma in farm management 
and a BSc in agricultural economics. He has 
wide experience in farm management with 
several organizations. He has also provided 
consultancy services as a farmer field school 
master trainer for various organizations 
including the Aga Khan Foundation, CRS, 
Danida, FAO, JICA and UNFPA. Masai has 
participated in a study tour on farmer life 
schools in Cambodia and attended short 
courses on vegetable and citrus production 
in Israel. *Did not attend writeshop
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Reuben	Matango
Chairman, Mtibwa Outgrowers As-
sociation
PO Box 41, Mtibwa, Morogoro, Tanzania. 
Tel. +255-23-2620032, fax +255-23-2620032, 
email rmatango05@yahoo.com 
Reuben holds a BA and an MA in sociology 
from the University of Dar es Salaam. He 
has worked as district rural development 
officer and district commissioner in various 
districts in Tanzania. He has also conducted 
research and worked as a lecturer at the 
University of Dar es Salaam. Reuben has 25 
years of experience in working with farm-
ers at the grassroots. He has also served as 
a director of the TANICA coffee and sugar 
industry boards for 6 years. 
Engenda	Mekonnen
Development Coordinator, Jimma 
Bonga Catholic Secretariat
PO Box 376, Jimma, Ethiopia. Tel. +251-47-
1110434, 3310429, 3310342, fax +251-47-
1110434
Engida holds a diploma in plant science and 
technology. He has worked as production 
manager in a mechanized cotton state farm, 
where he was responsible for planning, 
budgeting, financial control and produc-
tion. He has also worked as programme 
coordinator and expert with the zonal ag-
ricultural department, Ethiopia. His current 
duties focus on planning, monitoring and 
evaluation, project design, proposal writ-
ing, fundraising and office management. 
Susan	Minae
Farming Systems Development Of-
ficer, FAO Sub-regional Office for 
Southern and Eastern Africa
PO Box 3730, Harare, Zimbabwe. Tel. +263-
4-791407, 253655, fax +263-4-700724, email 
susan.minae@fao.org
Susan is a socio-economist with over 20 
years of experience in agricultural develop-
ment work in southern and eastern Africa. 
She has worked with small-scale farmers 
to increase their food security and farm 
income. She has also been involved in 
various projects that enhance smallholder 
competitiveness. She is now focusing on 
agri-business development and capacity 
building in linking farmers to markets.
Rainard	Mjunguli
Project Leader, Export Promotion of 
Products from Africa (EPOPA) 
PO Box 105575, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 
Tel. +255-745-644540, +255-22-2771374, 
fax +255-22 2771374, email rayimjunguli@
agroeco.net, internet www.epopa.info
Rainard holds a certificate and postgraduate 
complementary studies in post-harvest and 
food preservation from Leuven University, 
Belgium, and a BSc in agriculture. He has 
worked as head of department for VECO 
projects in Tanzania and project leader in 
organic farming. 
Benson	Maina	Mwangi
Designer, Schoolnet Computer Ser-
vices
PO Box 10958-00100, Nairobi, Kenya. Tel. 
+254-20-2736388, 2736391, mobile +254-
733-785309, fax +254-20-2728507, email 
info@schoolnett.com, bmmwangi@yahoo.com, 
internet www.schoolnett.com
Benson is a freelance publication and web 
designer. He has been involved in several 
writeshops with IIRR and its various part-
ners since 2000. He has interests in database 
design, development and management.
Paul	Mundy
Independent consultant in develop-
ment communication
Weizenfeld 4, 51467 Bergisch Gladbach, 
Germany. Tel. +49-2202-932 921, fax +49-
2202-932 922, email paul@mamud.com, 
internet www.mamud.com 
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Paul is a British consultant in develop-
ment communication. He holds a PhD in 
journalism and mass communications from 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He 
specializes in easy-to-understand extension 
materials, developed through intensive 
writeshops like the one used to produce 
this book. He also provides consultancy 
services in various aspects of development 
communication. He has worked extensively 
in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Africa.
Lincoln	Mwarasomba
Socio-Economist, Land-use and 
Environmental Management Branch, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Kenya
PO Box 30028-00100, Nairobi, Kenya. Tel. 
+254-20-2714867, 722 262403, fax +254-20-
2714867, email L.Mwarasomba@nalep.co.ke
Lincoln holds an MSc in agricultural eco-
nomics from the University of Nairobi and 
has worked with the Kenyan Ministry of 
Agriculture in different capacities since 
1980. He specializes in rural development 
and environmental management and has 
experience in participatory development, 
participatory monitoring and evaluation, 
and a range of cross-cutting issues in agri-
culture, especially small-scale land use. 
Nsanya	Ndanshau
Private Sector Development Advisor, 
SNV Tanzania
PO Box 13304, Arusha, Tanzania. Tel. 
+255-27-2504709, 255-748 350703, email 
nndanshau@snvworld.org
Nsanya holds an MSc in agricultural eco-
nomics. He has worked as senior economist 
with the Ministry of Agriculture, Tanzania, 
and as agricultural advisor and team leader 
for a Danida-funded programme on envi-
ronmental conservation and sustainable 
agriculture. He has also worked as busi-
ness advisor for TechnoServe Tanzania, 
concerned with business development 
services and market linkage to farmer 
business groups. His current work focuses 
on capacity building in developing and 
upgrading several sub-sector value chains 
with meso-level organizations. 
Isaac	Komo	Ngugi
Research Fellow, Tegemeo Institute 
of Agricultural Policy and Develop-
ment
PO Box 20498-0200, Nairobi, Kenya. Tel. 
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27-2538029, +255-748 474940, email 
mviwata-monduli@satconect.net, internet 
www.mviwata.net
Martin studied community development at 
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Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO)–AGSF 
Via delle Terme di Caracalla 00100, Rome, 
Italy. Tel. +39-06-57055378, email Carlos.Da 
Silva@fao.org 
Carlos holds a PhD in agricultural econom-
ics from Michigan State University. Before 
joining FAO, he worked for 25 years as 
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project preparation and evaluation, and 
agribusiness development. His work in the 
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+255-22-2780747, 744-022400, fax +255-22-
2780747, email puliwa@raha.com, internet 
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tional strategic management.
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Danny holds an MSc in physical geography 
from the University of Utrecht, Nether-
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CHAIN EMPOWERMENT
SUPPORTING AFRICAN FARMERS TO DEVELOP MARKETS
ISBN-9966754-00-8
CHAIN EMPOWERMENT
SUPPORTING AFRICAN FARMERS 
TO DEVELOP MARKETS
CHAIN EMPOWERMENTSupporting African farmers to develop markets
This is a book of hope for Africa’s smallholder farmers. It shows how they can earn more 
from their crops and livestock by taking control over the value chains they are part of – 
chains that link them with consumers in Africa’s towns and cities, as well as in other 
countries.
The book describes two basic strategies that groups of farmers can use to improve their 
incomes: vertical and horizontal integration. Vertical integration means taking on 
additional activities in the value chain: processing or grading produce, for example. 
Horizontal integration means becoming more involved in managing the value chain itself 
– by farmers’ improving their access to and management of information, their knowledge 
of the market, their control over contracts, or their cooperation with other actors in the 
chain.
This book contains 19 case studies showing how groups of farmers through out Africa 
have adopted one or both of these strategies to improve their incomes. It shows how 
development organizations have helped them do this – how they have succeeded, and 
how they have sometimes failed. It shows the need to invest in improving the quality of 
existing products, developing new products, establishing market linkages, and building 
farmer organization and capacity.
The book provides numerous insights for those striving to empower smallholder farmers 
to develop markets. It will be of particular interest to government policymakers and staff 
involved in agricultural development, non-government organizations, university faculty 
and students, trainers, evaluators, and donors seeking ways to promote agriculture in 
Africa and elsewhere in the developing world.
The book is written in easy-to-understand language and is richly illustrated with line 
drawings.
